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Cover Picture

The Temple of All Religions
(Храм всех религий)

A unique architectural complex, situated in Kazan, Russia, established by a philanthropist Ildar Khanov in 1992, consists of 16 major religious architectures including a church, a mosque, and a synagogue, among others, stands as a symbol of religious unity where all religions can come together in harmony.

It is not an active temple of any religion, but rather, as Khanov describes its mission, a "temple of culture and truth". It has become a popular landmark in the city of Kazan, which takes pride in the peaceful combination of different cultures (Islamic Tatar culture, Orthodox Russian, and others).

Sources:

http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Temple_of_All_Religions
https://www.atlasobscura.com/places/temple-of-all-religions

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CHANGING DYNAMICS OF UZBEKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER SHAVKAT MIRZIYOYEV: PROSPECTS FOR CENTRAL ASIAN REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Adam Saud[✦]

Abstract

Uzbekistan holds a central position in the political, economic, security and demographic structure of the Central Asian region. Without the cooperation of Tashkent, efforts for regional integration have failed during the past. The first president Islam Karimov, who ruled the country for 25 years 1991-2016, was reluctant to integrate Uzbek economy to regional and global markets. Uzbekistan had one or the other issue with all its neighboring states, thus hindering prospects for the regional cooperation and integration. However, the new president Shavkat Mirziyoyev *is proactive towards regional integration. He is following a policy of 'Central Asia First' which has warmly been welcomed by all the regional states. The process of regional integration has also been facilitated by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of China as well as Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) in the form of development of physical infrastructural and transportation network.*

Objectives of this research are; to look into the dynamics of Central Asian region; to understand the central position of Uzbekistan in the region; to explore the areas of convergence for the regional states; and to analyze the prospects for regional economic integration after change in Uzbekistan's leadership. This research aims to address the questions such as: What is the future economic potential of Central Asia? How the foreign policy of Uzbekistan has influenced the regional dynamics under Islam Karimov?

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What are the impacts of Belt and Road Initiative and CAREC in Central Asian region? And with the recent change in Uzbekistan, what are the evolving prospects for regional economic integration in Central Asia? This research is primarily descriptive, exploratory, and analytical in nature. It relies on both primary (including interviews with Uzbek embassy officials and official data) and secondary sources.

Key Words

Uzbekistan, Foreign Policy, Regional Integration, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, CAREC, TAPI.

Introduction

When elected as the president of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev in his first address to the Parliament (*Oliy Majlis*) in May 2017 stated that Uzbekistan needs a 'modern' foreign policy. That was the first indicator that the incumbent president aspires a pragmatic and dynamic foreign policy vision. Having been prime minister under president Islam Karimov since 2003, Mirziyoyev had the firsthand knowledge about the Uzbek issues especially at the foreign policy front. Tashkent is moving towards active participation in regional and global agreements and is coming out of its 'semi-isolationist' foreign policy. The new president has rightly assessed the key geographical position of his country in the Central Asian region. Therefore, he gave special focus to this region as a foreign policy priority. He has visited all the regional states frequently and signed economic deals worth billions of dollars. Besides those economic deals, he has started negotiations on other geo-political issues, including water crises within the region. Tashkent is also busy in negotiations with the World Trade Organization and is eager to attract foreign direct investment. New tourism policy has attracted millions of tourists from the region and beyond. Furthermore, Uzbekistan is searching for the new markets to sell its products.

The above mentioned emerging foreign policy dynamics have revived the hopes for regional economic integration as Karimov's passive policies towards regional integration had been a major hurdle in this regard. The proactive policy of the new president has given hopes for stronger regional integration. President Mirziyoyev has stated that "Central Asian is a region with which the vital interests of our country are connected."[1]Tashkent has attended the meetings of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)

[1] "Central Asia is the Main Priority of Uzbekistan's Foreign Policy" *Uzbekistan Daily*, (August 12, 2017), Retrieved from https://www.uzdaily.com/articles-id-40429.htm

under the umbrella of Commonwealth of Independence States (CIS)[2] led by Russia. It has also started taking interest in Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc); also led by Russia. Previously, Tashkent had been reluctant to join such moves led by the outside powers in Central Asia.

Historical Background

The Uzbek foreign policy vectors have been fluctuating since its independence. Right after its independence, Tashkent got closer to Russia and Turkey for its geo-political, economic and ethnic security. However, when being disappointed by these states, Tashkent had to rethink about its foreign policy options. It then thought the Western world as a viable option and as a result Uzbekistan established cordial relations with the USA and Europe. The 9/11 incident in USA also provided Uzbekistan an opportunity to align itself with the western world. However, popular street protests called 'Coloured Revolutions" in CIS region and the Andijan incident of 2005[3] were more than enough for Uzbekistan to re-shift its focus back to Russia. It also got closer to China and South Korea. Tashkent never liked any state's influence into its political matters. When USA established the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) supply in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan again got closer to the US, this time to balance the increasing Russian and Chinese influence in the region. Nevertheless, it has to rely on Russia and China in the form of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for its vested regional interest.[4] Such shifts can be attributed as reactive which resulted in the demise of Uzbek self-confidence at global as well as regional level. Such frequent shifts badly affected the efforts for regional integration in Central Asia as well.

Modern day Central Asian nation-states are the artificial creation of USSR project under Joseph Stalin. The division of the then Turkestan[5] resulted in severe ethnic and political tensions. Such tensions were more intense and violent in the Fergana Valley which was divided among Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan during the 1920s. These internal tensions became international issues when the region got independence from

[2] It was loose security organization established by Moscow right after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The major objective of the Russian Federation to establish CIS was to have direct influence in its 'backyard.'

[3] Uzbek security forces attacked hundreds of peaceful protesters in Andijon city of Ferghana valley in May 2005. According to different estimates 250-700 people including women and children were killed by the state forces.

[4] Timur Dadabaev, "Uzbekistan as Central Asian Game Changer? Uzbekistan's Foreign Policy Construction in Post Karimov Era." *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, XX (X), (2018), 2.

[5] Old name of Central Asia.

the Soviet Union. Violent tensions in Osh, Kyrgyzstan[6] and Khojant, Tajikistan have remained as source of contention between the three countries sharing Fergana Valley. Water crises have also been a major hurdle in the way of regional integration. The two major rivers; Syr Darya and the Amu Darya flow from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (upstream states) to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (downstream). Since Uzbek and Turkmen agro sector heavily depends on the water of these two rivers, any development leading to an increased use of water by the upstream countries creates political tensions among the regional states.

Cotton is a major agro-export of Uzbekistan that is heavily dependent on the waters of Syr Darya. Tashkent had remained bitterly against any move to construct water reservoirs by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. It thought that such reservoirs will destroy its agriculture sector. Many times, Uzbekistan cut off gas supply to both these states in response to their efforts to construct water reservoirs. All this is the result of mutual distrust among the regional states.[7] Such tensions had been high when Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan announced to construct Rogan and Kambarata-1 dams respectively for hydroelectricity production and agriculture purposes. The tension between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan was so severe that Tashkent threatened Tajikistan with a war. There are also reports that Tashkent put an economic embargo on Tajikistan while blowing up a bridge connecting southern Uzbekistan with Tajikistan.[8] Furthermore, in order to compel them, Tashkent had used gas as a weapon many times.

Extremism and terrorism have also been a source of friction between Uzbekistan and its neighbors. Right after the independence, Central Asian region witnessed rise of extremism and violent religious parties and groups. Smaller groups like *Tauba* and *Islamic Lashkari* demanded Islamization in Namangan, Uzbekistan.[9] Karimov had to negotiate with them but could not succeed in convincing them. He dealt with them heavy handedly and ordered a crackdown against them. Many of them, especially the leadership fled to Tajikistan which was engulfed in a Civil war at that time. They joined the

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[6] Osh is the potential hotspot of ethnic clashes between ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz. It has witnessed worst ethnic clashes in 2010 resulting in hundreds of causalities.

[7] Alisher Ikhlamov, "High and Dry: Central Asian Failure to Avert the Impending Water Crisis." *Ferghana News*, (January 18, 2017). Retrieved from http://enews.fergananews.com/articles/2986.

[8] Alisher Ikhlamov, "High and Dry: Central Asian Failure to Avert the Impending Water Crisis." *Ferghana News*, (January 18, 2017). Retrieved from http://enews.fergananews.com/articles/2986.

[9] For details see Adam Saud, "Death of Islam Karimov and the Future of Islamism in Central Asia: Case of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan." *Central Asia*, 77. (Peshawar: Area Study Center, University of Peshawar, 2018)

United Tajik Opposition (UTO) led by the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) and fought against the Rahmanov regime. When the Tajik civil war concluded due to General Peace Agreement in 1997, IRP was included into the Tajik executive branch and its fighters were made part of Tajik security services. This move was disliked by Islam Karimov and he blamed Tajik regime for the rise of extremism and instability in the region.[10] Tashkent mined its borders with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the wake of suspected Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) incursions into Uzbek and Kyrgyz territories in 1999 and 2000 from Afghanistan. Such steps further strained the relationship between Central Asian neighbors.[11]

All the Central Asian states are quasi-democratic except Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz democracy has never been liked by the regional states as it has been perceived as a threat to their life long rules. Karimov had remained very critical to Bishkek in this regard. He thought that the region is neither ready for the western liberal democracy as it would bring instability nor it suits to the 'Asian values.' Two revolutions in 2005 and 2010 in Kyrgyzstan further intensified the relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan never had cordial relationship with Turkmenistan during the reigns of Supramurad Niazov of Turkmenistan (died in 2005) and Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan (died in 2016). Major reason for this animosity included what was deemed as the discriminatory policies by the Turkmen regime against Uzbek ethnic minority living in Turkmenistan. Most of those ethnic Uzbeks had concentration in the Uzbek-Turkmen border regions but Ashgabat displaced them to the inner and deserted regions of Turkmenistan.[12] Despite the fact that both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are very important states of the region, Tashkent and Astana had never been on good books till the death of Karimov. There are reports that both Islam Karimov and Nursultan Nazarbaev had animosity[13] which dated back to the Soviet times. This personal hatred towards each other never let both the states to be engaged into constructive manner. The southern neighbor of Uzbekistan is Afghanistan. As Afghanistan plunged into civil war and was considered as

[10] For details see Adam Saud, (2010). "Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan: Past, Present and Future." *Pakistan Horizon*, 63 (3), (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 2010) 77-91.

[11] For details see Zubair Iqbal and Adam Saud, "The Divergent Plane of Interests: Security and Counter-terrorism Dynamics of Central Asia." *Regional Studies*, XXXIV (4), (Islamabad: Institute of Regional studies, 2016) pp. 66-85.

[12] "Turkmenistan: Political opposition and minorities under threat of forced displacement by presidential decree," (July 23, 2003). Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/turkmenistan/turkmenistan-political-opposition-and-minorities-under-threat-forced

[13] Gulnoza Saidazimova, "Uzbekistan/Kazakhstan: Summit is a Sign of Changing Times," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Library*, (March 18, 2006). Retrieved from https://www.rferl.org/a/1066842.html

the epicenter of terrorism and extremism in the region, Karimov had a reserved and limited relationship with Kabul. Nevertheless, Uzbekistan upgraded the existing railway line from Termez (Uzbekistan) to Mazar-e-Shareef (Afghanistan) through Friendship Bridge on Amu Darya.

Such approach with its neighbors had been at the helm of Uzbek foreign policy during the first president Islam Karimov who ruled the country for 26 years. However, with the rise of Shovkat Mirziyoyev to presidential office, Uzbek foreign policy has witnessed a paradigm shift which is now "characterized by dynamism, openness, initiative and pragmatism."[14] Its major focus is on the 'region' now.

Economic Realities of Central Asia

Central Asia is considered as the next Middle East so far the hydrocarbons of the region are concerned. Kazakhstan has oil in abundance while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan possess large gas reservoirs. While Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are rich in hydroelectricity potential. Most of the regional hydrocarbons are exported to international markets through Russia. Nevertheless, China has constructed oil and gas pipelines from the region and these pipelines are operational. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline is also operational which in future will connect Central Asian hydrocarbon network through trans-Caspian pipelines. There are two gas pipelines from Turkmenistan to Iran as well. There is a proposed pipeline Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline that is constantly been delayed due to Afghan insecurity. The following tables give a picture of Central Asian (selective countries) energy statistics by the end of 2016.

[14] H. E. Furqat S. Siddiqov, Uzbek Ambassador to Pakistan, statement to the author on April 26, 2018.

Table-1: Crude Oil Statistics of Central Asia (end 2016)

Country	Proven oil reserves	Production / day	Consumption / day	Production in millions of tons/day	Consumption in millions of tons/day
Kazakhstan	30,000 million barrels	1612 thousand barrels	287 thousand barrels	79.3	13.2
Turkmenistan	600 million barrels	261 thousand barrels	148 thousand barrels	12.7	6.7
Uzbekistan	600 million barrels	55 thousand barrels	58 thousand barrels	2.6	2.8

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017.

Table-2: Natural Gas Statistics of Central Asia (end 2016)

Country	Proven Gas reserves	Production/ day	Consumption/ day	Production in million tons/day	Consumption in million tons/day
Kazakhstan	34 trillion cubic feet	19.9 billion cubic feet	13.4 billion cubic feet	17.9	12
Turkmenistan	617 trillion cubic feet	66.8 billion cubic feet	29.5 billion cubic feet	60.1	37.9
Uzbekistan	38.3 trillion cubic feet	62.8 billion cubic feet	51.4 billion cubic feet	56.5	46.2

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017.

Table-3: Coal and Hydro-electricity Statistics of Central Asia (end 2016)

Country	Proven Coal reserves	Production / year	Consumption / year	Electricity production /year	Electricity consumption / year
Kazakhstan	25605 million tons	44.1 million tons	35.6 million tons	94.5 terawatt hours	2.7 terawatt hours
Turkmenistan	NK	NK	NK	22.6 terawatt	NK
Uzbekistan	1375 million tons	1.1 million tons	1.0 million tons	58.9 terawatt hours	2.1 terawatt hours
Tajikistan	NK	NK	NK	16.4 billion kwh	15 billion kwh
Kyrgyzstan	NK	NK	NK		

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017 & "Tajikistan-Power Generation and Distribution," URL: https://www.export.gov/article?id=Tajikistan-Power-Generation-and-Distribution

Table-4: Central Asian states Country Profile

Country	Population in Million (2016)	GDP (PPP)	Unemployment	Inflation (CPI)	FDI Inflow
Uzbekistan	31.85	$205.7 billion 8.0% growth	8.9%	8.0%	$66.5 Millions
Tajikistan	8.7	$26.0 billion 3.0% growth	10.8%	5.9%	$432.2 Millions
Kazakhstan	17.9	$451.3 billion 1.2% growth	5.2%	14.6%	$9.1 billion
Kyrgyzstan	6.1	$21.5 billion 3.5% growth	7.7%	0.4%	$466.8 Millions
Turkmenistan	5.5	$95.5 billion v6.5% growth	8.6%	3.5%	$4.5 billions

Source: World Bank

Challenges to Regional Integration in Central Asia

Like other economically developing regions of the world, Central Asia is marked with number of issues so far intra-regional trade and economic integration is concerned. Such issues range from mistrust, personal animosities, ethnic division, border and water disputes, drugs and human trafficking, extremism and terrorism, lack of will, inadequate and old physical infrastructure especially the transportation network, harsh physical terrain, smuggling, time and cost effective and selective border crossings, weak role of regional organizations, reserved attitude of ex Uzbek and Turkmen presidents, lack of funds, and corruption to the role of external players.

Right after the independence of this region, many countries and economic organizations showed zeal and zest in the region especially into the hydrocarbons. Central Asian states were facing severe political, economic, ethnic, administrative and security crisis at that time. They were in dire need of allies and capital. However, they started their external relations very cautiously. Major reason was the old socialist political elite controlling the power. They started with reserved economic activities. Their trade remained heavily dependent on Russia as all the pipelines of Central Asia were directed towards mainland Russia. It was very much difficult for these states to come out of Russian economic dependence. Nevertheless, they joined many regional organizations with overlapping membership. These organizations were characterized by weak infrastructure. Lack of funds to materialize those regional organizations was also a major hurdle in the regional integration.

Another important hurdle for regional integration has been diverse economic strategies adopted by the regional states. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan remained controlled economies while Kazakhstan started with limited economic liberalization. The only country which adopted measures towards liberal market economy was Kyrgyzstan. Having no important export commodities to sell beside having comparatively small population and harsh physical terrain, Bishkek could not offer much for the real regional economic integration. Border and water disputes along with extremism and terrorist activities in the region have remained major source of contentions among Central Asian states.

Undue checking procedures and delays at the border crossings too have remained a major problem for the increased economic activity in this region. Poor transportation infrastructure, illicit border fees, corruption, frequent

police verifications, and poor logistics at the borders have never let Central Asian economies to integrate in a considerable manner. Private businesses are not healthy in the region. Regional organizations have also not played their role for the economic integration. The most effective regional organization Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has not proposed active mechanism to resolve disputes among the member states. EurAsEc is a vital economic organization but without Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan as its members, prospects for regional integration are not high. Although a custom union already exists among the EurAsEc members,[15]fruits for Central Asia region are yet to be achieved.

Since most Central Asian states produce similar kind of commodities-Kazakhstan oil and gas, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan gas, and Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan hydroelectricity-they look beyond this region for exports.

Shovkat Mirziyoyev and Prospects for Regional Economic Integration in Central Asia

Despite having the largest market of Central Asia which comprises of about 31.5 million people-almost half of the whole regional population-Uzbekistan could not offer much economic opportunities and regional integration to its immediate neighbors. Central Asia's key geographical location between East and West makes it extremely important for trade and economic activities. However, due to lack of regional integration, such activities have yet to take place at a larger level. The intra-regional trade in Central Asia is also very limited as compare to other developing regions in the world. Although, the pace of this trade increased fivefold during 2000 to 2008,[16] yet the scale remained limited.

President Mirziyoyev is very much keen towards the regional integration. While discussing the 'new' Uzbek foreign policy, Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov stated that "transforming the Central Asian region into an area of stability, sustainable development and good-neighborliness" is the main priority of Tashkent. [17]The Uzbek government

[15] Johannes F. Linn, "Central Asian Regional Integration and Cooperation: Reality or Mirage?" *EDB Eurasian Integration Book 2012*, *The Brookings Institute*, (2016) Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/10-regional-integration-and-cooperation-linn.pdf, 4.

[16] Johannes F. Linn, "Central Asian Regional Integration and Cooperation: Reality or Mirage?" *EDB Eurasian Integration Book 2012*, *The Brookings Institute*, (2016) Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/10-regional-integration-and-cooperation-linn.pdf, 4.

[17] Ozge Nur Ogutcu, "Uzbekistan New Policies Under New President: A New Era?' *AVIM Analysis* No 2017/26. (August 18, 2017). Retrieved from

has realized that it's important to resolve issues with the neighboring states, enhance physical infrastructure, and cooperate in energy sector along with an easy visa regime in the region to achieve economic development. President Mirziyoyev says that "Our main goal is to transform Central Asia into a stable, economically developed and prosperous region by common efforts."[18] He further stated, "On the very basis of the principles of good-neighborliness and mutually beneficial partnership our countries will be able to more effectively implement their potential in trade-economic, transport-communication, cultural and humanitarian spheres, as well as in the issues of security and stability."[19]

Uzbekistan's "Development Strategy for 2017-2021" also stresses on the resolution of border disputes with neighboring countries and secure and stable Central Asia.[20]Tashkent has also shown willingness to join international monitory regimes. Relations with International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have developed during the last couple of years. Negotiations with International Monitory Fund (IMF), Industrial Development Bank (IDB), Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank are underway. Tashkent has allowed the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to re-open its office in Uzbekistan. Mirziyoyev's regime quest for economic integration is evident from the fact that in 2017 only, around two hundred trade related agreements were signed by Uzbekistan. These agreements worth about $60 billion. [21]

In an unprecedented move, Mirziyoyev regime has shown interest to join Rogan and Karambata-1 projects. It has also shown desire to join Central Asia-South Asia-1000 (CASA-1000) and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) projects. Tashkent was critical to all these projects during Karimov regime. It also suggests TUTAP. Mirziyoyev

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http://avim.org.tr/en/Analiz/UZBEKISTAN-S-REGIONAL-POLICIES-UNDER-NEW-PRESIDENT-A-NEW-ERA

[18] Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Speech of the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev at International Conference in Samarkand," (November 11, 2017). Retrieved from https://mfa.uz/en/press/news/2017/08/13142/

[19] Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Speech of the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev at International Conference in Samarkand," (November 11, 2017). Retrieved from https://mfa.uz/en/press/news/2017/08/13142/

[20] Richard Weitz, "Uzbekistan's New Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity Under the New Leadership," (Stockholm: *Central Asia Caucasus Institute*, Silk Road Paper, January 2018), 10.

[21] "Shavkat Mirziyoyev: Effective Foreign Policy is the Most Important Condition for Successful Implementation of Reforms and Transformations," *UzReport,* (January 13, 2018). Retrieved from https://uzreport.news/politics/shavkat-mirziyoyev-effective-foreign-policy-is-the-most-important-condition-of-successful-

stresses that "peaceful and economically prosperous region is Tashkent's most critical goal and key task."[22]He stated that, "Uzbekistan has always remained committed to an open, benevolent and pragmatic policy towards its closest neighbors - Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan ..."[23]Current Uzbek regime thinks that Belt and Road Initiative by China is very crucial for the Central Asian economic integration. During a visit to Beijing in May 2017, Mirzoyiyev stressed the Chinese president Xi Jinping to include China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan railway network project into the One Belt One Road initiative.[24]

Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan Relations

During his visit to Ashgabat in March 2017, Mirziyoyev concluded several agreements with Gurbanguly Berdemukhamadov, Turkmen president. The most important of them was 'Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan Strategic Partnership' agreement. Tashkent intended to use Turkmen seaports in Caspian for its trade with Europe and Caucasus. Railway and road bridges at Turkmenabad-Farab on Amu Darya-connecting both the countries-were also inaugurated during the visit.[25] This connectivity is very much crucial for the proposed Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Oman transit route. The Uzbek O'zbekNeftGaz and the Turkmen Türkmennebit also agreed to jointly explore Turkmen gas.

During that visit several agreements were signed between the two states ranging from energy and transportation to boosting security ties. It also includes trade and economic cooperation, investment, tourism and cooperation in cultural sphere.[26]according to Uzbek ambassador to Pakistan, During April 2018 Turkmen president state visit to Uzbekistan, "agreements and contracts were signed for the amount of more than 250 million dollars, as well as documents aimed at further strengthening and progressive development of bilateral cooperation in political, transport-communication, educational and sports spheres. Also within the framework of the visit, 15

[22] "Tashkent to Host a High Level Conference on Afghanistan," Retrieved from https://www.uzbekconsulny.org/consulate/index.php/en/en-news-events

[23] "Central Asia is the Main Priority of Uzbekistan Foreign Policy." *Uzdaily*, (August 12, 2017). Retrieved from https://www.uzdaily.com/articles-id-40429.htm

[24] Catherine Putz, (2017), "What's Next for the Belt and Road in Central Asia?", *The Diplomat*, (May 17, 2017). Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/?p=111013.

[25] "Central Asia is the Main Priority of Uzbekistan Foreign Policy." *Uzdaily*, (August 12, 2017). Retrieved from https://www.uzdaily.com/articles-id-40429.htm

[26] James Durso, "Uzbekistan Foreign Policy is a Regional Policy," *The Hill*, (November 22, 2018). Retrieved from http://thehill.com/opinion/international/361449-uzbekistans-foreign-policy-is-a-regional-policy

documents were signed between universities and in the information and communication sphere."[27]

During the first quarter of 2018, trade volume between the two countries has risen by 55% and there is prospect that the trade volume between two countries will rise up to $ 500 million in 2020. Due to these visits, cooperation in energy sector has boosted. Ashgabat now exports its electricity to Tajikistan through Uzbekistan. Memorandum of Understandings have been signed to export the Turkmen electricity to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan while pooling it into the 'unified energy grid' system. [28]

"The Uzbek and Turkmen nations have always been neighbors in peace and harmony."[29] During his 'three' visits to Turkmenistan during 2017, Mirziyoyev also signed an agreement on Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TUTAP) to transport electricity to South Asia.[30] Construction and upgradation of Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline will also boost economic activity thus integration in the region. The pipeline has the capacity to transport up to 25 bcm of Central Asian gas to China annually.

Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan Relations

In an unprecedented move, President Mirziyoyev visited Astana and met President Nursultan Nazarbaev. Both inaugurated joint business forum where more than 400 companies from both the states participated. Both the presidents signed economic contracts worth $1 billion. In order to strengthen relationship between Tashkent and Astana, need for a joint strategy was desired.[31] Mirziyoyev has declared 2018 as the 'year of Uzbekistan' in Kazakhstan and year 2019 as 'year of Kazakhstan' in Uzbekistan.[32] High

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27 H. E. Furqat S. Siddiqov, Uzbek Ambassador to Pakistan, statement to the author on April 26, 2018.

28 Bruce Pannier, "How High Should Hopes be for Change in Uzbekistan?" *Radio Free Europe*, (December 25, 2017). Retrieved from https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-mirziyoev-hopes-for-change-karimov-cotton-foreign-policy/28938193.html

29 Siddiqov, op. cit.

30 Casey Michel, "Will Uzbekistan Join TAPI?," *The Diplomat*(May 23, 2017). Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/will-uzbekistan-join-tapi.

31 "Central Asia is the Main Priority of Uzbekistan Foreign Policy." *Uzdaily*, (August 12, 2017). Retrieved from https://www.uzdaily.com/articles-id-40429.htm

32 "Kazakh, Uzbek Leaders Hail Improving Ties at Tashkent Meeting," *RFE/RL*, (September 16, 2017). Retrieved from https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-kazakhstan-nazarbaev-mirziyoev-visit/28739276.html

speed rail link and opening up of the M-39 highway are other initiatives taken by both the states in post-Karimov era.

Since then the relationship between the two neighboring countries is on the right track. Cooperation between Astana and Tashkent will surely pave the way for regional integration in Central Asia as Kazakhstan is the largest economy while Uzbekistan is the largest market of this region. Increasing trade volume between the two states is a very positive sign in this regard. According to Uzbek ambassador to Pakistan, "In 2017, the volume of mutual trade turn over between two countries amounted $2 billion, which increased for 32% comparing with 2016. It is planned to increase trade turnover up to $5 billion for 2020."[33]As a matter of fact, Uzbek-Kazakh partnership will boost the political and economic integration within Central Asia on the pattern of German-French cooperation in Europe in the post WW-II era. [34]

In addition to economic and political aspects of the relations between two countries, military cooperation is also on the table. On 18th of August Defense Minister of Kazakhstan Saken Zhasuzakov visited President Mirziyoyev during his visit to Tashkent. Minister Zhasuzakoy is expected to visit his counterpart in order to sign bilateral agreements to boost ties in the field of military.[35]

The tense relations between the two had been marked with border disputes besides desire for regional leadership, Uzbeks illegal migration to Kazakhstan, and Kazakh close relations with Moscow.[36]However, after leadership change in Tashkent, greater cooperation has been seen in the form of increased flights between the two states, Uzbekistan reduced taxes on Kazakh agricultural products.[37]Around "230 enterprises work in Uzbekistan with the Kazakh capital while there are 130 enterprises working in Kazakhstan with Uzbek capital."[38]

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33 Siddiqov, op. cit.

34 John Engvall, "The Reemerging Self Confidence of Central Asia," *Central Asia Caucasus Analyst*, (March 22, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13504-the-reemerging-self-confidence-of-central-asia.html

35 Ozge Nur Ogutcu, "Uzbekistan New Policies."

36 Richards Weitz, (2018). "Uzbekistan's New Foreign Policy." Pp. 31-32.

37 "Узбекистан и Казахстан упростят прохождение границы своим гражданам", Podrobno.uz, (December 26, 2016). Retrieved from http://podrobno.uz/cat/obchestvo/uzbekistan-i-kazakhstan-uprostyatprokhozhdenie-granitsy-svoim-grazhdanam-read-more-http-ru-sputnikn/? sphrase_id=9249

38 Siddiqov, op. cit.

Tashkent is very much optimistic about the future integration and development in the region in the form of growing Kazakh-Uzbek cooperation. The Uzbek ambassador to Pakistan says "between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan good-neighborhood partner relations are being consistently strengthened. Cooperation between two countries is developing on the basis of high trust and mutual respect. The launch of the Tashkent-Almaty high-speed train and bus routes between two countries will undoubtedly strengthen the transport links, serve to develop interregional contacts, trade and tourism."[39]The most important indicator for integration in the region is enhanced connectivity.

Uzbekistan-Tajikistan Relations

Relationship between Tashkent and Dushanbe had hardly ever been on good terms. Right after independence, till the recent change in Uzbekistan, both states were indulged into water crises, border disputes, gas payments problems, and allegations of not taking actions against extremism and terrorism. Tashkent was critical to Rahmanov regime in Dushanbe for including IRP into the government after Peace Accord in 1996 ending the five years' Tajik civil war. Karimov threatened Dushanbe with a war when tension escalated on water in 2012.[40] It was the time when bilateral trade between two states fell drastically from$ 300 million in 2008 to only few million US Dollars in 2014. Uzbekistan also disrupted Tajik rail and road links with Turkmenistan.[41] Flights between two states remained suspended for almost 25 years.

Relationship between the two neighboring states have improved to an extent that during his visit to Tajikistan in March 2018, president Mirziyoyev and president Rahmanov signed 27 bilateral agreements including opening up of 16 border crossings and a 30 days visa free entry for each other citizens.[42] Such initiatives has not only boosted bilateral trade up

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39 Siddiqov, op. cit.

[40]Catherine Putz, "Uzbekistan's Changing Rogun Tone," *The Diplomat,* (July 10, 2017). Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/tag/tajikistan-uzbekistan-relations/

[41] Edward Lemon, "Signs of improving relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan but tensions remain", *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, (October 19, 2016). Retrieved from https://cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13405-sings-of-improving-relationsbetween-uzbekistan-and-tajikistan-but-tensions-remain.html.

[42] John Engvall, "The Reemerging Self Confidence of Central Asia," *Central Asia Caucasus Analyst*, (March 22, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13504-the-reemerging-self-confidence-of-central-asia.html

to $ 240 million[43] that is 22% increase till the end of 2017[44]but has increased the number of Tajik citizens visiting Uzbekistan. This increase in bilateral trade has been seen after 20 years. This visit has also paved the way for resumption of air, road and rail traffic between the two countries.

Although Tashkent remained critical to the construction of Rogan water reservoir fearing that it would lead to further water crisis in Uzbekistan, president Mirziyoyev has offered Tajikistan cooperation for the construction and production of electricity from this project. During his visit to Tajikistan, president Mirziyayev signed several agreements including borders demarcation and liberalization of visa regimes besides 'joint' construction of Rogan dam. During that visit President Mirziyoyev stated "We have resumed flights with Tajikistan. Trade volume are increasing, the links between border areas are strengthening cultural and humanitarian exchange has intensified."[45]Both the states intends to increase bilateral trade up to $ 1 billion by the end of 2018.[46]

Another important areas of cooperation stressed during the first ever Uzbek president visit to Tajikistan after their independence was energy sector. "Currently, an active negotiation process is being conducted between *Uzbekenergo* State Company and "*Barki Tojik*" company on resuming the interaction of the energy systems in the framework of parallel work with the United Energy System of Central Asia."[47] Both the states have also agreed to provide energy to each other's remote regions. Tashkent agreed to provide gas and electricity to the remote Tajik regions bordering with urban and settled regions of Uzbekistan while Dushanbe agreed to electricity to Uzbek remote areas bordering with Tajikistan.[48] Cooperation with Tajikistan will not only take Tajikistan out of its isolationism due to its difficult physical terrain and old economy but will also provide Uzbekistan an opportunity to reach China and South Asia, especially Pakistan through alternative routes. Cooperation between these two states will help integration in the region.

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[43] Kamila Aliyeva, "Uzbekistan, Tajikistan May Enter New Markets under Single Brand." *Azernews*, (October 13, 2017). Retrieved from https://www.azernews.az/region/120379.html.

[44] "Central Asia is the Main Priority of Uzbekistan Foreign Policy." *Uzdaily*, (August 12, 2017). Retrieved from https://www.uzdaily.com/articles-id-40429.htm

[45] "Speech of the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev at International Conference in Samarkand," (November 11, 2017). Retrieved from https://mfa.uz/en/press/news/2017/08/13142/

[46] Siddiqov, op. cit.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Aziz Egamov and Rafael Sattarov, "A New Era for Uzbekistan," (April 10, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist?page=20&a_aid=3598aabf&start=590

Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Relations

Uzbekistan had been skeptical towards Kyrgyzstan due to its 'liberal' policies. Tashkent considered Bishkek as the possible destabilizing factor in the region due to its democratic government and liberal economy. Bishkek has given 'suitable' religious, political, economic and social freedoms to its citizens which are unmatchable throughout the region. IMU's incursions into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan remained a issue of contention between the two states. Ethnic crises in Kyrgyzstan especially in Osh in 2005 and 2010, have also been a destabilizing factor in the relationship between two states. Water issues and fencing of border between the two were also major reasons for not good relations.

Like the cases of other regional states, Uzbek relations with Kyrgyzstan have improved substantially in the post-Karimov era. The trade volume between the two has increased by 56% by 2017. The bilateral trade reached up to $235 million which both states intend to increase by $500 million by the end of 2018.[49]As the outcome of president Mirziyoyev's visit to Bishkek after 17 years, mutual understanding on many issues and a common desire for cooperation have been strengthened. Tashkent has agreed to participate in the construction of Kambarata-1 water reservoir. It is pertinent to note that this project had been a major source of friction between the two states.

Tashkent is very much keen in the construction of Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-China railway line. It is also open towards the BRI project of China. Resolution of almost 80% of border dispute between Tashkent and Bishkek will surely pave the way for regional cooperation and integration. Tashkent also desires to construct roads from Tashkent to Xinjiang through southern Kyrgyzstan, especially Osh. Osh already connects Kashgar in China through a rough and tough road. The regional governments plan to develop and upgrade this road to an all season friendly highway. Uzbekistan has started bus service between Tashkent and Balykchy town at the Issyk-Kul lake a tourist attraction in Kyrgyzstan. It is also interested to start a cargo train in near future.

Increased bilateral relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan can be assessed by the statement of president Mirziyoyev that "Uzbekistan highly appreciates the centuries-old friendship and cooperation between our peoples. The development of cooperation between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, based on mutual respect and trust,

49 Siddiqov, op. cit.

is one of the important areas of our foreign policy."[50]with the increased high level bilateral visits, Uzbekistan intends to open nine new enterprises in Kyrgyzstan. Both the states have also agreed upon to produce "Uzbek agricultural machinery, cars, buses, and special trailers in Kyrgyzstan."[51]Enhanced cooperation between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan will not only increase the prospects for intra-regional trade and integration but inter-regional trade and integration as well. Chinese connectivity with Iran, Turkmenistan and Europe through Central Asian region will surely integrate the region not only economically but also politically, culturally and socially.

Uzbekistan-Afghanistan Relations

Although Uzbekistan is the largest trade partner of Afghanistan in Central Asia, the volume of trade between the two states is far less than the potential. Since Afghanistan is instable right now, it's a major obstacle for Uzbek international trade with its southern neighbors. Tashkent is very much concerned about the stability and security situation in Afghanistan. It supports staying NATO forces in Afghanistan yet stresses on regional initiatives to resolve the Afghan issue. Uzbekistan thinks that it is important to assist Afghanistan financially at global level for its socio-economic reconstruction. Tashkent thinks that "the solution of a number of key issues of economic development, regional security and stability in Afghanistan depends to a large extent on us, neighboring countries, on our goodwill and readiness to actively promote national reconciliation process."[52]

President Mirziyoyev says about Afghanistan "I underline that Uzbekistan will continue to actively participate in the economic reconstruction of the neighboring country, development of its transport and energy infrastructure, training its human resources."[53]Trade relationship between Tashkent and Kabul have increased during the recent past. Bilateral trade remained around $600 million during 2017. The trade volume will further increase with the initiation of a new railway line project by Uzbekistan in Afghanistan. The "Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat" railway project, with the length of 657 km and a total cost of $1.8 billion will provide jobs for

[50] Batir E. Tursunov, "New Dynamics in the Regional Policy of Uzbekistan as a Factor of Stability and Development in Central Asia." *Institute of Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of Republic of Uzbekistan*, retrieved from https://cgss.com.pk/internationalpartners/pdf/New-Dynamics-in-the-Regional-Policy-of-Uzbekistan.pdf

[51] Siddiqov, op. cit.

[52] Siddiqov, op. cit.

[53] "Speech of the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev." URL: https://mfa.uz/en/press/news/2017/08/13142/

30,000 Afghan people.[54] It is pertinent to note that Afghanistan is connected with Uzbekistan through 'only' railway line between Termez (Uzbekistan) and Mazar-i-Sharif. This railway line connects both the states by "Friendship Bridge" at Amu Darya.

Uzbekistan also supplies electricity to Afghanistan. Afghanistan imports 300 megawatts of electricity from Uzbekistan.[55] Construction of power transmission line "Surkhan-Puli-Khumri" with capacity of 500 kWh will supply an additional 1000 MW of electricity to Afghanistan.[56] According to the chairman of the Board of Uzbekenergo, Ulugbek Mustafoyev, "In the long term, this line will increase electricity supplies by almost 70 percent with the subsequent access to Pakistan. That is, a new market opens for us."[57] The project will increase the supply of electricity from Uzbekistan to Afghanistan by 70% - up to 6 billion kWh per year.

Tashkent supports regional and global efforts for the peace and stability in Afghanistan. According to H. E. Furqat Siddiqov, "the security of Afghanistan is the security of Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan also has experience in promoting the peace process in Afghanistan. In 1999, in Tashkent, the "6+2" meeting was organized at the level of foreign ministers of the neighboring countries of Afghanistan, Russia and the United States. It was also attended by representatives of the Northern Alliance and the Taliban movement. Following the talks, the Tashkent Declaration was adopted."[58]Uzbek economic development substantially depends upon Afghan security. Tashkent can have direct and easy access to the ports of Gwadar, Karachi, Chahbahar, and Bandar Abbas through 'stable' Afghanistan thus connecting Central Asia with South Asia and the Persian Gulf.

Uzbekistan thinks that there is a need to "consider Afghanistan not as a source of regional threats and challenges, but as a land of unique strategic opportunities for wide trans-regional connectivity in whole Eurasia."[59]Uzbekistan has supported the peace talks between Afghan government and Taliban. It has even offered its good offices for the said purpose. March 2018 Tashkent international conference on Afghanistan is

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54 Siddiqov, op. cit.

55 Zabihullah Jehanmal, "Uzbekistan Cuts Electricity Tariffs for Afghanistan." *Tolo News*, (April 9, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.tolonews.com/business/uzbekistan-cuts-electricity-tariffs-afghanistan

56 Kamila Aliyeva, "Uzbekistan to Increase Power Supply to Afghanistan." *Azrenews*, (March 26, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.azernews.az/region/129211.html

57 Ibid.

58 Siddiqov, op. cit.

59 Ibid.

an attempt by Uzbekistan to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan. The conference was attended by representatives of CSTO, SCO, NATO, EU, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, India, Iran, Japan, Italy, Germany, China, France, Russia, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, US, UK, and the UN.[60]Besides focusing on peace in Afghanistan, the conference's major objective was to promote regional trade and integration.

Since Central Asia has a common cultural, religious and ethnic history, there are great opportunities for regional integration. What is most needed is the will of the political leadership. President Mirziyoyev has rightly assessed Central Asia as a 'single organism' with centuries old common culture. Regime change in Tashkent has given high hopes for regional integration in Central Asia. Besides strengthening bilateral relationship with the neighboring countries, president Mirziyoyev also focuses on the relationship with regional organizations like SCO, CSTO, OSCE, CIS and so on. His efforts have given birth to high hopes of regional integration in the near future.

Role of Regional Organizations in Central Asian Regional Integration

The most important organizations engaged in Central Asian integration are Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA), Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc), and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Some of the most important initiatives for potential regional integration include, TAPI, CASA-1000, BRI, Trans-Caspian Pipeline, TUTAP, TUKC pipeline, and Uzbek-Afghan rail and road connectivity. CAREC and RECCA have taken special initiatives for the Central Asian integration. BRI has also given high hopes for the regional integration. The challenges, however, are more than the prospects to these organizations. CAREC is an action oriented organization which works by its technical committees comprising mainly of the trade, finance and transport ministers.

Despite such positive developments, CAREC still faces many challenges in the form of neglected trade and energy policies, non-participation of Russia, weak relationship between the national sector and regional sector strategies for specific investment projects, and overall the will of regional leadership. CAREC has five corridors connecting Asia with Europe. According to Ishaq Dar, ex Pakistani finance minister "Once the six

[60] "Declaration on the Tashkent Conference on Afghanistan: Peace Process, Security Cooperation, and Regional Connectivity." URL: http://uza.uz/en/politics/declaration-of-the-tashkent-conference-on-afghanistan-peace--28-03-2018

CAREC Corridors (CAREC Energy Strategy identified five potential energy corridors in Central Asia which included Central Asia – East Asia, Central Asia – South Asia, Intra-Central Asia, Central Asia – Russian Federation, and Central Asia – European Union) and major seaports start providing access to the global markets, they will deliver services that will be important for national and regional competitiveness, productivity, employment, mobility, and environmental sustainability."[61] The Central Asia-South Asia Corridor is considered as one of the most effective and much needed corridor.

Figure-1: CAREC Road and Railway Infrastructure



Source: South Asian Voices

[61] Associated Press of Pakistan, "CPEC to complement regional connectivity initiatives of CAREC countries: Dar," (October 26, 2016). Retrieved from http://www.app.com.pk/cpec-to-complement-regional-connectivity-initiatives-of-carec-countriesdar/

The 5th RECCA conference held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan in 2012 emphasized on connectivity. The major focus of this conference remained on five key areas "infrastructure (transport and energy), human resource development (including vocational training and labour market facilitation), investment and trade (including transit and border management), regional disaster risk management, and regional fiber optic connectivity."[62]RECCA in 2016 states "explore concrete linkages between the USD $43 billion CPEC and steps to transform Afghanistan into a regional trade and transit hub."[63] Addressing to the 15th CAREC Ministerial Meeting in Islamabad, Ishaq Dar stated, "the CPEC offers a massive opportunity for connectivity between Central Asia, Middle East and Africa and is bound to play a defining role in the economic development of our region."[64] 7th RECCA Conference held on 14th and 15th November 2017 at Ashgabat reaffirmed "that regional economic cooperation and integration offers broad opportunities for growth, and can assist with exploiting and developing the long term economic potential that exists in Afghanistan and the wider region; and stressing the need for further advancing regional economic cooperation as an effective means to achieve economic prosperity in Afghanistan and the wider RECCA region."[65]

The west especially US is interested in connectivity of Afghanistan with its northern and southern neighbors. Besides backing RECCA, Washington has introduced the "New Silk Road Strategy" and Northern Distribution Network (NDN). The New Silk Road (NSR) initiative of the US is focused on Afghanistan as a main hub for economic integration and transportation. In 2012, US Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Geoffrey Pyatt stated that the New Silk Road Strategy helps the regional connectivity. It facilitated "electricity from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan powering small businesses and government buildings in Afghanistan; rail connections being built between Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan and a new rail line from the Uzbek border to Mazar-e-Sharif.; Moreover Turkmen, Pakistani, and Indian officials discussed finalizing of pricing agreement for the TAPI gas pipeline."[66]

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[62] Johannes, F. Linn, "Central Asian Regional Integration and Cooperation: Reality or Mirage?" (The economics of the Post-Soviet and Eurasian Integration, European Development Bank, 2012), 11.

[63] "One Belt One Road Initiative and Afghanistan," *RECCA*, Retrieved from http://recca.af/?page_id=2077

[64] Associated Press of Pakistan, "CPEC to complement regional connectivity initiatives of CAREC countries: Dar," (October 26, 2016). Retrieved from http://www.app.com.pk/cpec-to-complement-regional-connectivity-initiatives-of-carec-countriesdar/

[65] "RECCA VII-Ashgabat", retrieved from http://recca.af/?page_id=2607

[66] Joshua Kuchera, "A New Silk Road?" *The Diplomat*, (Tokyo), (November 2011). Retrieved from http://thediplomat.com/2011/11/11/the-new-silk-road/

During a visit to India in 2011, then Secretary of States Hillary Clinton stated, "[Let's build] an international web and network of economic and transit connections. That means building more rail lines, highways, [and] energy infrastructure, like the proposed pipeline to run from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan, Pakistan into India (TAPI). It means upgrading the facilities at border crossings. And it certainly means removing the bureaucratic barriers and other impediments to the free flow of goods and people."[67]

Figure-2: Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) Pipeline Project

Source: Google Images.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project of China is a catalyst for the transportation, energy and electricity infrastructure development of the

[67] Tridivesh Singh Maini, "China's New Silk Road Vision: Lessons for India," *The Diplomat* (Tokyo), (May 17, 2014).

region. This project has boosted the hopes for regional integration as China not only has already been engaged in developing rails and road infrastructure but is also busy constructing oil refineries, tunnels and power lines and oil and gas pipelines. BRI has placed Central Asia at the helm of East-West trade; a position which this region held for centuries. The two important road projects by China which connect Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan with Xinjinag, China are Osh-Sarytash-Irkeshtam and Bishkek-Naryn-Torugart. These two roads also cross cut Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.[68] China has also helped Tajikistan constructing the Dushanbe-Chanak highway and Uzbekistan by digging a railway tunnel between Ahengran and Pop and electrifying the line there as well.[69]

Figure-3: Belt and Road Initiative: Three Corridors



Source: China Daily (Beijing) June 28, 2014.

[68] Nasrullah Brohi, "CPEC: The Real Game Changer for Central Asia," *Modern* Diplomacy, 27th June 2016. URL: http://moderndiplomacy.eu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=1533:cpec-the-real-game-changer-for-central-asia&Itemid=134.

[69] Fuad Shahbazov, "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: An Opportunity for Central Asia?", *Central Asia Caucasus Analyst*, (June 19, 2017). Retrieved from https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13450-china-%e2%80%93-pakistan-economic-corridor-an-opportunity-for-central-asia?.html

The investments of China have significantly been increased from $1 billion to about $50 billion since the independence of CARs.[70] Since Central Asia is central to the OBOR project, its stability guarantees the success of the project. CPEC will also help Central Asia integrate into the global economy. CPEC is a milestone for CARs as "it will accelerate their development and progress. As developing industries demand new markets; technological innovations facilitate international cooperation; better transportation and logistics increase trade efficiency; and growing energy demands require international cooperation, (CPEC) projects will act as a catalyst towards generating regional cooperation, building political flexibility, enhancing economic growth, offering trade diversifications, investing in transportation, mining and energy sectors."[71]Real hopes for regional integration are with BRI project now as it has initiated the practical projects to develop infrastructure of the Central Asian region but integration in this region is unachievable without the will of regional leadership.

Figure-4: Pop-Ahengran Railway Tunnel

[70] Umbreen Javed and Azhar Rashid, "China Central Asia Relations and Opportunities for Pakistan", *South Asian Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 2, (July, 2016), 157-175.

[71]S. M. Hali, "Regional and Global Scenarios of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor," in Minhas Majeed Khan, Ahmad Rashid Malik, Saira Ijaz , Ume Farwa, eds. *China-Pakistan Economic Corridor A Game Changer*. (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies), 35.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is another platform which has provided the regional states impetus for economic integration. Although the prime objective of SCO is security cooperation, nevertheless, it has provided the member states a forum where they can negotiate on the matters of common interests. Inclusion of India and Pakistan into SCO as full fledge members have put one third of world population into a single organization. All the Central Asian states have endorsed and supported the entry of India and Pakistan into SCO. Reacting to the entry of New Delhi and Islamabad into it, Tashkent stated that SCO now have all those states "who are directly interested in stabilizing the military-political situation and improving the socio-economic situation in [Afghanistan, which] will create favorable conditions for reaching a regional consensus on the political settlement" of that conflict.[72]As discussed earlier, all the regional states have real concerned about the peace and stability in Afghanistan. This peace and stability is the key of economic integration between Central Asia and South Asia.

Central Asia-South Asia 1000 MWs (CASA-1000) project is another hope for the regional integration. It will not only integrate Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with Afghanistan and Pakistan but Uzbekistan to the network as Mirziyoyev regime has shown keen interest to join the project. The TUTAP project will also help regional integration bring Turkmenistan closer to Tajikistan through Uzbekistan. When materialized, the CASA-1000 project will transport Kyrgyz and Tajik electricity to Afghanistan and Pakistan. There are prospects that once completed electricity can be exported to India as well. With the materialization of this planned project, Central Asia South Asia Regional Electricity Market (CASAREM). The World Bank has promised US $526.5 million while US has announced to pool $ 15 million. The Islamic Development Bank will finance US $155 million.[73]

[72] Shakhriyor Turgunboyev, "Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister [Anvar Nasirov] about the results of Uzbekistan's participation in the SCO Astana summit," *Jahon*, (June 15, 2017). Retrieved from http://www.jahonnews.uz/en/politika/314/35554/.

[73]"*Tajikistan-Power Generation and Distribution*," URL: https://www.export.gov/article?id=Tajikistan-Power-Generation-and-Distribution. For more detail see "Tajikistan: Country Profile." *International Hydropower Association*, URL: https://www.hydropower.org/country-profiles/tajikistan

Figure-5: CASA-1000 Project



Recommendations

'Central Asia' as the foreign policy priority by Mirziyoyev regime has brought high hopes for improved regional integration but Tashkent alone will not be able to bring the desired integration in Central Asia until and unless other leaders have the same will. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan can play an important role in this regard. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan will surely back all the efforts of regional integration due to their political and economic situation. Mirziyoyev have righty pointed out that "any major regional projects in the spheres of transport, communication and energy cannot be realized without active interaction with the countries of the region, without ensuring a high level of their integration."[74]

Resolution of border and water disputes which are also linked with gas supply crises in the region is an important step towards the regional integration. Regional states must support Mirziyoyev's efforts to resolve these issues especially with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Cooperation on construction on Rogan and Kambarata-1 by Uzbekistan is historical and must not be lost at any cost. Adoption of the UN Convention on Water Sharing will be a plus advantage.

Since connectivity heavily depends upon the transportation network, regional states should also try to cooperate and help each other building such infrastructure. Although 'outside the region' states are busy in this regard, efforts of the regional states are must. Uzbekistan which connects to all the Central Asian states needs to play a central role in this regard. Policies and initiatives of Mirziyoyev regime must continue and should expand to all the spheres of life.

This connectivity must bring common people nearer to each other. There must be easy visa regimes, less border protocols, least tariffs, and 'tolerance' policy to ethnic minorities. Such initiatives will bring people closer to each other. People to people connectivity will reap the benefits of regional integration as it will enhance intra-regional trade and economic activities.

Policy of open regionalism where extra regional economies are welcomed and are not discriminated will also help in regional integration. South East Asian model can be helpful in this regard. Role of regional economic organizations is instrumental in this regard. There should not be

[74] Ozge Nur Ogutcu, "*Uzbekistan New Policies Under New President*," Retrieved from http://www.academia.edu/34642674/UZBEKISTAN_S_REGIONAL_POLICIES_UNDER_NEW_PRESIDENT-_A_NEW_ERA-_1_.pdf

any 'lead' organization or country in the process of integration. Respect and equal weightage to all the members in such organizations is must for the successful regional integration.

As most of the Central Asian population adhere to single ideology of Islam, prospects for integration are high in this regard. President Mirziyoyev announcement to open the borders between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan brought 3 million Tajik tourists within a month to Uzbekistan notably to the Holy places and shrines in Uzbekistan.[75] Common Turkic culture is another bond of affiliation in the region. The common civilizational heritage will surely play an important role in regional integration.

Regional economic forum will also help strengthening ties among the regional states. As stated by president Mirziyoyev, "the creation of Regional Economic Forum may become a practical step in this direction. I am talking about an open platform for a direct dialogue among business communities and substantive discussion of specific projects of trade-economic, investment and innovative interaction. Our numerous meetings with the representatives of business circles and leading enterprises of the region's countries allowed to significantly intensify economic ties, increase the volumes of mutual trade."[76]

Conclusion

Lack of connectivity among the Central Asian leadership has been a major hindrance in the regional integration. Unwillingness of late Uzbek president Islam Karimov for regional integration, issues of regional leadership between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, water and border crises within Ferghana Valley, and the rise of extremism and terrorism have been the major problems for regional integration in Central Asia. However, with the change of regime in Tashkent, efforts for regional integration are on the right track. According to Alexey Malashenko, an analyst of the region, "Mirziyoyev is a pragmatic person…He relies upon a need for the expansion of regional cooperation. He thinks that Uzbekistan can play a more significant role in the region. But he doesn't think he's the leader… if he

[75] Siddiqov, op. cit.
[76] "*Speech of the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev*." URL: https://mfa.uz/en/press/news/2017/08/13142/

were to emphasize [his own role], he would damage relations with everybody."[77]

Positive vibes for regional integration are also the outcome of March 15, 2018 Astana meeting of the Central Asian leadership. This meeting was unprecedented in the region as no 'extra' power was involved in convening this meeting. One of the most important outcomes of the meeting was that all the state agreed upon that there is no need of extra-regional powers to resolve 'our' issues. President Mirziyoyev policy of continuous engagement through different channels with the Central Asian counterparts has given birth to process of dialogue at different levels within the regional states. The outcomes of such dialogues are positive as it has given a new impetus for regional integration in the form of cooperation in trade, transport, energy, economic and communication spheres. Tashkent knows it very well that for the economic development of Central Asia in general and Uzbekistan in particular, regional economic integration is must. It thinks that growing interactions depends upon the resolution of regional issues especially border and water crises besides controlling the violent non-state actors. Dialogue is the key to resolution of regional issues and Tashkent had adopted this feature under the new regime. If current policies and initiatives by president Mirziyoyev continue for a substantial time in future, regional integration in Central Asia will become a reality and will pave the way for economic development of this region as well as neighboring regions.

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[77] Timur Toktonaliev, "Could Uzbekistan Lead Central Asia?" *IWPR*, (November 11, 2017). retrieved from https://iwpr.net/global-voices/could-uzbekistan-lead-central-asia

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EMERGING COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA-RUSSIA AND PAKISTAN: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

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Abstract

Over the past decade, the relationship between neighboring giants China and Russia has evolved from being a union formed out of convenience into one that holds immense strategic importance for both countries. One of the interesting dimensions of this strategic partnership is their growing interest in cultivating a strong relationship with Pakistan. China and Pakistan have marked a new era of emboldening their economic ties via CPEC, diplomatic ties through common framework of partnership and security ties as both countries cooperate on all military matters including joint military exercises. Russia on the other hand was always considered a traditional ally of India but has shifted its focus towards Pakistan and is boosting its military and diplomatic ties with Pakistan. The new emerging axis of China-Pakistan-Russia is inevitable as it stems from the congruence of interests between the countries: However, it is not without its share of challenges and any amount of distrust from either side can create fault lines.

Key Words: Geopolitics, China-Pakistan-Russia, Strategic Triangle, CPEC, Balance of Power

Introduction

China and Russia have strengthened their partnership considerably over the last decade. The first overseas visit undertaken by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Russia in 2013 highlighted the importance of this alliance in

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China's foreign strategy[1] symbolizing an effort undertaken to fortify relations with Russia. In addition, a statement was issued by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on their plans to strengthen the relationship between the two countries with the aim to safeguard world peace and stability[2]. The two countries have also shown interest in cultivating stronger relationship with Pakistan.

In recent years, Russia has taken increased political interest in Pakistan. Pakistan had remained almost invisible in Russia's foreign policy due to the prime reason that the former was a supporter of United States during cold war and thereafter during the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. However, in 2008, Russia's foreign policy document made references to developing relations with Pakistan and leading regional states[3]. Bilateral trade between the two countries has increased substantially with over 33% percent increase as compared to previous years; the trade between the two counties has now reached to a total volume of $541 million as compared to $400 million in year 2017.[4] In terms of security, Russia lifted the self-imposed embargo on Pakistan in November 2014[5], which earlier limited their cooperation in the areas of security and bilateral trade. Thereafter, military cooperation strengthened with Pakistan and a major military cooperation agreement was signed between Russia and Pakistan[6]. The cooperation entailed exchanging information on political and military issues, increasing collaboration in new sectors such as counter-terrorism and defense, having similar view points on Afghanistan and strengthening business cooperation.

China, on the other hand has always been considered as an 'all-weather' friend of Pakistan. The strain in Pak-US bilateral ties, sequel to President Trump's decision to suspend the Pakistani security assistance worth $1.3 billion[7] has further brought China and Pakistan closer to each other. This has further increased China's interest to invest in this 'all weather' partnership. Economically, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is yielding substantial dividends in terms of strengthening transport, port and industrial

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[1] Sheng Wang and Xiao Luo, "Building a New Type of Sino-Russian Relationship," *Contemporary International Relations*, (2013): 89.

[2] Yi Wang. "China-Russia Strategic Coordination Has Become the Ballast Stone of Safeguarding World Peace and Stability," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*. December 3, 2016. Accessed June 2, 2018 at; http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1421647.shtml

[3] Vladimir Moskalenko and Petr Topychkanov, "Russia and Pakistan: Shared Challenges and Common Opportunities," Carnegie Moscow Center, (2014)

[4] "Pak-Russia bilateral trade shows 33pc increase," APP, February 19, 2018.

[5] Zachary Keck, "Russia Ends Arms Embargo against Pakistan,' Diplomat, June 04, 2014.

[6] Baqir Sajjad, "Pakistan, Russia sign landmark defense cooperation agreement," November 21, 2014

[7] Michael Peel and Kiran Stacey, "Pakistan turns to Russia and China after US military aid freeze," Financial Times, January 28, 2018.

infrastructure. Besides, the people to people exchanges and generating power for both China and Pakistan. In terms of security, the prominent form of assistance and support given by China to Pakistan would be to support Pakistan's civil nuclear program[8] and enable the sale of submarines[9] built in China to Pakistan.

Theoretical Framework

Realists and neo-realists recurrently use the concept of Balance of power (BOP). The concept simply implies that a state forms alliance with another state to balance the power of a more powerful state, in order to maintain equilibrium. In history, BOP was evident in Cold War (1945-1991) and a balance of power was maintained between the western powers and the eastern powers. At present the five nuclear powers; China, U.S, Russia, India, and Pakistan, maintain balance of power through their strategies in Asian continent, especially in South Asia. In the case of balancing, according to TV Paul there are three key types of balancing; hard, soft and asymmetric[10]. In the case of South Asia, states are pursuing soft balancing[11]; Russia China and Pakistan are developing an alliance to balance the US and Indian strategic alliance in the region.

Development of a Cooperative Mechanism between China–Russia and Pakistan

China and Russia have strengthened their positions, polices and cooperation on political and security issues. Political leadership of China, Russia and Pakistan has also analyzed the threats and development of the international system in a similar manner. Most prominent is how they regard U.S intentions and behavior in terms of using sanctions on other countries and limiting their economic potentials.

In larger political spheres, Beijing, Moscow and Islamabad have a similar discourse on how they perceive U.S. In the case of China, it is U.S Pivot Asia, also known as Re-balancing Asia; an indirect threat for the Chinese regional interests. For the Russian Federation, it is the expansion of NATO into the post-Soviet independent states, where NATO is posing direct and indirect threats for Russia. For the Pakistan, it is the growing military

[8] "China 'to build third Hualong One nuclear reactor' in Pakistan," South China Morning Post, November 25, 2017.

[9] "China-Pakistan military ties set to get even closer as 'iron brothers' eye new alliance," South China Morning Post, January 7, 2018.

[10] Snyder Glenn, *Alliance Politics*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 4

[11] T.V Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S Primacy." *International Security*, (2005):47

cooperation between US and India, posing a serious threat, along eastern as well as western frontiers besides, the asymmetric warfare within Pakistan. While China does not pursue an outward policy of confrontation with U.S, Russia and Pakistan have expressed dissatisfaction when it comes to the approach of U.S in the war in Afghanistan.

A destabilized Afghanistan poses great threat for the regional countries, especially; Pakistan, China and Russia. However, instability in Afghanistan provides a pretext for the U.S to prolong its strategic presence there and keep destabilizing the region for the realization of its strategic interests. India is also being benefitted from volatility in Afghanistan, since it uses Afghan geopolitics for its geo-strategic and geo-economic interest. India uses Afghan soil against its rivals and promotes its interests in Central Asian region. Through its financial investment, Indian has attained the acceptability of Afghan authorities and a strong backing of United States, since both pursue common economic and strategic interests.

On the other hand, being the regional countries, China, Russia and Pakistan have convergence of interests both; strategic as well as economic interests. In 2016, Chinese President expressed his interest in collaborating with Russia in the high profile 'One Belt One Road initiative (OBOR), renamed as Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).[12] The initiative connects the landlocked part of China with vital European markets through infrastructure development of roads and highways eventually connecting with Russia's Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) initiative. The Russian led Eurasian Economic Union is an institution formalized in January 2015.[13]

Major objective of EEU is 'regional economic integration', currently consisting of five states; Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. There is a likely inclusion of Mongolia and Tajikistan in EEU in next few years. "With a GDP of $1.59 trillion in 2015, an industrial production of $1.3 trillion in 2014, and population of almost 200 million as of 2016, the union could represent a geopolitical success that supports both Putin's ambitious political agenda and the Union's economic prospects."[14] Similarly, the BRI has various projects, starting from China to Central Asia and onwards to African continent and Europe. It is indeed, the Chinese response to US Re-balancing of Asia.

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[12] Greg Shtraks, "China's One Belt, One Road Initiative and the Sino-Russian Entente," National Bureau of Asian Research, August 9, 2016,

[13] Bruno S.Sergi, Putin's and Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union: A hybrid half-economics and half-political, Journal of Eurasian Studies- Volume 9, Issue 1, January 2018, Pages 52-60. Accessed at; https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1879366517300258

[14] Ibid.

Whereas, US uses the concept of hard power and China respond it by soft power, through an economic engagement. The infrastructure projects under China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will reap economic, social and demographic dividends not only for the two countries but for the region. In this regard, the Gwadar Economic zone which was inaugurated on January 29, 2018[15] brings with it prospects of regional trade and greater economic collaboration between the three countries.

Security wise, these three countries have commonality of interests with respect to United States. President Trump's New National Security Strategy-2017[16] and US South Asian (Afghan) Policy-2017 have created prejudices for Pakistan, China and Russia. The US National Security Strategy (NSS) explicitly singles out China and Russia as competitors that have emerged to "challenge American power, influence, and interests."[17] It also recognizes the strategic significance of space and cyber as new domains, and discusses efforts by adversaries to lower confidence in democratic institutions. Moreover, it spells out that U.S. adversaries and competitors often resort to "gray zone"[18] activities that are coercive yet do not meet the threshold of military action or unlawful behavior.

Upon decision of Trump administration to suspend military aid to Pakistan, the latter plans to strengthen its ties with Russia and China. China, on the other hand, is upgrading its naval capabilities and many analysts see it as a means to challenge U.S naval supremacy in the region. According to a report released by China's Department of Defense[19], Chinese Navy; Peoples Liberation Army (N), possesses more than 300 vessels including but not limited to submarines, ships, patrol craft and combat ships. A statement by Xi Jinping in 2017 confirms China's ambition stating their desire to build a navy that ranks at the highest order globally[20]. Similarly, for Russia, there is increasing space for confrontation, especially in lieu of their opposing

[15] "Free zone of Gwadar port inaugurated to boost regional development," Xinhua Net, Saturday January 29, 2018.

[16]Yuki Tatsumi, The US National Security Strategy: Implications for the Indo-Pacific

The Trump administration makes clear the Indo-Pacific is at the top of its strategic agenda, The Diplomat, December 21, 2017. Accessed at; https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/the-us-national-security-strategy-implications-for-the-indo-pacific/

[17]Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19]"Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," Office of the Secretary of Defense, (2017)

[20] "China's Xi says navy should become world class," Reuters, May 24, 2017.

position in Syria. The recent threat by President Trump over Russia's position in Syria indicates a volatile moment in the relationship between the two countries in April 2018.[21]

The Future Prospects of Partnership through SCO

On July 10th, 2015 President Vladimir Putin announced acceptance of Pakistan as a member of SCO in its annual summit[22]. The inclusion of Pakistan in SCO has broader implications for the harmony and stability for South Asia, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Politically, the U.S opposition not being always part of the official rhetoric of three countries, it certainly is an important dimension. SCO has been used in the past by China and Russia to encourage United States to set a time frame for the removal of its troops from Central Asia [23] and the common position towards the conflict in Syria and this was expressed in Bishkek Declaration[24]. The three countries have the potential to come together due to their common stance towards regional players and opposition towards U.S intervention in Afghanistan and region.

For regional stability, peace in Afghanistan is a crucial factor and could be a strong contributing factor of the convergence of a similar stance adopted by Russia, China and Pakistan from the platform of SCO. A continued political instability in Afghanistan will have devastating repercussions for Pakistan, China and Russia and in the current scenario where Afghan security situation is deteriorating with each passing day, much remains to be achieved. It was because of this rationale; SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group was created in 2005 to proactively contribute in Afghanistan's inner matters by adopting supportive measures to create sustainable harmony in Afghanistan[25]. President Putin has asserted that the greatest security threats facing the region emanated from Afghanistan and the central concern of SCO are terrorism that hampers regional peace and stability[26]. To ensure regional security and to enhance regional stability, a stronger coordination between China-Russia-Pakistan is needed.

Economically, SCO has been seeking to enable economic co-operation through mutual trade among member states to become a more viable

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[21] "US-Russia tensions build as Moscow hits back at Trump's Twitter threat," *Guardian*, April 11, 2018.

[22] "Pakistan, India join Shanghai Cooperation Organization," *Dawn*, July 11, 2015

[23] Bobo Lo, "The Long Sunset of Strategic Partnership," *International Affairs* (2004): 296-298

[24] "Shanghai Cooperation Organization Discusses Syria in Bishkek," *The Moscow Times*, September 13, 2013.

[25] Raj Sharma, "SCO's Role In Afghanistan: Prospects and Challenges," no 24, *Mainstream Weekly*, 2015

[26] "Afghanistan threat on agenda for Xi, Putin at summit, says China," *Japan Times*, July 6, 2015

organization. For this purpose, it established Interbank Association in 2005 and a business Council in 2006[27]. It was in the spirit of broader economic cooperation that SCO Development Fund was created. SCO expansion will sow the seeds for regional stability and will positively contribute towards the national interest of its members. As emphasized during the SCO Summit, took place in June 2018, the Minister of Commerce Gao Feng asserted that SCO members enjoy strong trade ties[28]. In terms of estimates, China trade volume with other members rose to $217.6 billion in 2017 which is an increase of 19% from the previous year. The structure of SCO is in essence conducive to encourage fruitful investments as evidenced by Chinese investment which has increased to approximately $84 billion with SCO member states.

The spirit of SCO restrains from coercion in international affairs and due to its consent-based decision-making process, it instills assurance in its members. This is a new phase of regionalism where the member countries of SCO; China, Russia, and Pakistan can favor regional collaboration while operating under the umbrella of the organization to resolve the major issues of security due to the problems caused by terrorism, extremism and separatism. The fact that the consensus approach that drives the decision-making process in SCO prevents coercive cooperation. Undoubtedly, no regional organization can replace bilateral relations that countries neither utilize nor are able to resolve long-standing tensions between confrontational neighbors.

SCO has the potential to reduce the tensions between the conflicting parties by utilizing its diplomatic methods to influence achieve consensus. The fact that both Pakistan and India have been admitted together in SCO, manifests that member countries like China and Russia realize the sensitivities of Indo-Pak relations. The leading members share a unique relation with India and Pakistan. While Russia has closer ties with India, China has closer relations with Pakistan and they would not desire to offend either while being part of SCO.

Pakistan has been the victim of extremism, terrorism and separatism, the three core concerns identified by SCO. The fact that most terrorist organizations work through strong transnational networks therefore,

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[27] Julie Boland, "Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Lost Decade? A Partner for the U.S?," 21st Century Defense Initiative Policy Paper, *Brookings*, (2011): 14-15

[28] "SCO makes remarkable achievements in economic and trade cooperation," People's Daily, June 7, 2018

combating them single-handedly by one country may not a viable strategy. To ameliorate this problem, an effective counterterrorism strategy that allows the states to come together must be formulated. Since its formulation, SCO has been engaged in countering the menace of terrorism and created Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in 2003[29] with the main purpose of coordinating non-military actions to tackle this problem. Post Bishkek summit in 2007, 1600 Chinese soldiers 2000 Russian military personnel and defense forces from Tajikistan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan took part in joint counter-terrorism military exercise known as Peace mission 2007[30]. The inclusion of Pakistan to RATS will facilitate in a joint counter terrorism strategy to dismantle the safe havens of terrorism in both South Asia and Eurasia.

SCO could also be a significant platform to strengthen the cultural exchanges between China, Pakistan and Russia. During the Shanghai Summit Declaration on June 15, 2006 where SCO claimed that diversity in cultural traditions, values and model of development and course of history should not be taken as a pretext to interfere in other counties affairs[31]. It can be garnered from this development that SCO respects differences in civilizations and stresses upon conducting exchanges amongst civilization on an equal basis which leads to enhanced collaboration.

A Critical Analysis of the Challenges Facing the Partnership

a. Pakistan-China Partnership

While China and Pakistan have been classically termed as 'all-weather friends', the relationship has its share of constraints. In the past, the suspicion by Chinese authorities that Uyghur militants were operating in Pakistan and fueling terrorist incidents in Xinjiang province of China was pre-dominant[32]. The fact that Xinjiang has been prone to a terrorist incidents as well as increasing fundamentalism increased concerns of Chinese government regarding Pakistan's actions to fight terrorism[33]. However, Pakistani military operations against terrorists organizations; both local and foreigners have proved that, Pakistan does not allow its soil to be used by any terrorist organization or any country. Both China and Russia have been

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[29] Marcel Haas, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the OSCE: Two of a kind?," Clingendael (2014):248

[30] "Shanghai Cooperation Organization Holds Biggest War Games Ahead of Leaders' Summit," *VOA*, October 27, 2009

[31] "Moscow, Beijing to sign declaration on world order," *RIA Novosti*, June 29, 2005.

[32] "Pakistan Tells China that All Uyghur Terrorists were Annihilated," Voice of America, September 23, 2015.

[33] "US News Media: The Problem of The New Silk Road: Needs to Solve the Threat of Terrorism," Accessed June 2, 2018, http://finance.takungpao.com.hk/hgjj/q/2014/0505/2457376.html

globally appreciating the role played by Pakistan towards combating the extremism, terrorism and separatism.

Economically while CPEC projects are considered to be a game changer, the security threats, posed by terrorism and internal insecurity and instability in Pakistan would have implications for the smooth running of the project[34]. Chinese analysts had fear that the projects' construction sites and personals may be targeted by extremists due to previous incidence of attack on Chinese engineers by militants'[35].

Indeed, Pakistan Army took over the responsibility for the security of CPEC right from the beginning. For this purpose, a special force of a division plus size was raised under a Major General, called Special Security Division (SSD). This security division is fully functional now with a force of 15000 men and officers. The troops having been trained on the lines of Special Services Group (SSG) and counter terrorism force. These men assumed their duties in those areas, where developmental work is going on the CPEC. Furthermore, with respect to security, there has been no incident of breach of security (except mentioned above and an attempt of terrorism against Chinese Consulate at Karachi in November 2018), ever since this project started. Over the period, the aspects related to security of CPEC, raised by various quarters have been addressed.

Pakistan and China desire that regional countries to take part in this project of economic prosperity. In this regard, Afghanistan and Iran are two significant countries, which may join the project at later stages. Pakistan, China and Russia needs to have consensus on all issues by formulating supplementing policies for each other's benefit. CPEC is a project of immense economic potential for Pakistan and all regional states. With its completion, there will be major economic activity all over Pakistan, western China and neighboring countries. CPEC entered into a new phase in 2017-2018, touching more critical and sensitive areas of trade, industrialisation and financial settlement systems.

However, the project faces its share of complications. While the quantum of investments in the power sector, and loans for road projects, currently under implementation are worth $27 billion by the Planning Commission, estimates suggest that these would add to foreign repayment

[34] Shi Zhiqin, Lu Yang, "The Benefits and Risks of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor," Carnegie Tsinghua Center, December 21, 2016

[35] Mayank Pratap Singh, "Baloch Rebels Attack Dudher Project Site, 2 Chinese Engineers Killed, Many Hurt," India Today, September 28, 2016.

obligations by $3bn to 3.5bn per annum over the next few years[36]. Pakistan faces economic constraints towards re-payment of this foreign investment.

The long-term success of this project hinges upon the extent to which China and Pakistan promote the free flow of capital in an orderly manner and enhance the facilitation in cross-border transfer of legitimate funds and open up their financial sector to each other. In November 2018, Pakistani Foreign Minister and his Chinese counterpart reiterated timeframe of CPEC completion and also reiterated to continue work on all on-going projects between Pakistan and China, CPEC being the most favourite. In this regard, China needs to address the multiple Pakistani concerns. Visit of Prime Minister, Imran Khan has made some progress; however, there is no documentary evidence available to really assess the outcome of the visit and the reservations made by Financial Advisor, Abdul Razzaq Dawood. Despite all these, CPEC will be implemented for the common good of Pakistan and China.

Chinese Consul General in Pakistan, Long Dingbin has said that, "Instead of hard cash, China plans to eventually provide multiple forms of bailout packages [to Pakistan] in the shape of phenomenal investments in fresh projects."[37] This would provide a chance for Pakistan to overcome its financial crisis. During the visit of Prime Minister Imran Khan to Beijing, fifteen new agreements have been signed between Pakistan and China. All these agreements are aimed to an enhanced "cooperation in politics and the financial sector and will also improve cultural ties."[38]

b. Pakistan-Russia Partnership

Russia and Pakistan started coming closer to each other towards the beginning of 21st Century. Though there has been an enthusiasm on both sides, yet they had their own limitations and constraints. First and foremost, of these are the fears that reside in Russian circles to not offend India. The possible cooperation between Russia and Pakistan especially in areas of missile technology, strike aircraft, missile defense and submarine technology has been viewed with pessimism by India[39]. In 2007, Pakistan was the recipient of JF-17 thunder Jet fighters which were jointly developed by

[36] Khaleeq Kiani, "CPEC enters most crucial phase." DAWN, Dec 25, 2017.
[37] China to provide 'multiple forms of bailout packages' to Pakistan, Dawn, December 2, 2018. Accessed at; https://www.dawn.com/news/1448985/china-to-provide-multiple-forms-of-bailout-packages-to-pakistan-official
[38] Ibid.
[39] H. V. Pant, "The Pakistan Thorn in China-India-U.S. Relations," Washington Quarterly (2012): 85

Pakistan and China and fitted with Russian RD-93 engines[40]. The fear to upset India remains a pertinent factor in Russia-Pakistan relations. This was also evident when the Dushanbe Four Summit in Pakistan in 2012 was derailed by President Putin who decided not to visit Islamabad until he visited New Delhi and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was sent to Pakistan instead[41]. Russia has deep and enduring strategic, economic and political relationship with India, which runs counter to Pakistani interests.

Another factor that still hasn't evolved in the context of Russia-Pakistan economic relations is the lack of confidence of Russian investors in Pakistan. The way investors perceive doing business in Pakistan is heightened by concerns of Moscow about the security of its personnel and investments. Case in point is the North-South gas pipeline whereby the project agreement signed in October 2015 was expected to be concluded in December 2017 faced a stalemate[42]. The project aimed to connect Karachi's Liquefied Natural Gas terminal with those of Lahore through an 1100-kilometer-long pipeline with a capacity of 12.4 cubic meters per annum, but, did not progress. This was mainly due to Pakistan insisting on reducing the LNG fees despite it being revised twice.[43] The Russian companies were reluctant to approve these changes and expressed concern that this would delay the project[44]. While Moscow remains eager to cooperate with Pakistan to develop infrastructure projects, this can only be ensured if there are more confidence building measures between Pakistan, Russia and China with assurances for the long-term security of investments.

Over the past decade, the developments at bi-lateral level have paved the way for a deeper cooperation between Pakistan and Russia, whereas, Pakistan already has deeper military relationship with China. One such development is signing of an agreement between Pakistan and Russia for training of Pakistani troops and officers in Russia. The agreement is result of lot of homework between Russia and Pakistan, spreading over last two decades. It is indeed, a beginning of a new cooperative mechanism in the defense cooperation between Pakistan and Russia.

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[40] "The RD-93 Engine Was Found Highly Reliable," Voenno-Promyshlennyy Kur'er, March 22, 2013.

[41] Vladimir Moskalenko and Petr Topychkanov, "Russia and Pakistan: Shared Challenges and Common Opportunities," Carnegie Moscow Center, (2014): 9-12.

[42] "Pakistan Russia Sign Agreement for Construction of North-South Gas Pipeline," Dawn, October 16, 2015.

[43] Zafar Bhutta, "$2b North-South pipeline: Pakistan asks Russia to further cut LNG supply fee", Express Tribune, February 11, 2017.

[44] Ibid

c. China-Russia Partnership

There has been a gradual rapprochement between China and Russia, starting from the decade of 1990. The events following the US invasion of Afghanistan, gave a new impetus to this trend of closeness against a common adversary. Despite this growing closeness, there is a historical weakness in China-Russia partnership. China's potential to be a strategic threat to Russia increased post-Cold-War as many analysts pointed out the growing asymmetry of economic power of both states.

In 1980, Soviet Union's GDP was five times higher than that of China but by the end of 1990s, China's GDP was five times higher than Russia and the economic gap continued to widen since then. Chinese military expenditures increased since 1990s and from early 2000s it exceeded Russia. In 2000, China's military expenditure was roughly equal to Russia ($30 billion) and by 2010 China's military budget ($110 billion) surpassed Russia ($50 billion).[45]

In Russian political and academic circles apprehensions persisted regarding China as source of danger. Another leading academician, Alexei Bogaturov asserted that China was a formidable geopolitical rival of Russia. Various opinion polls at that time showed China ranking second in Russia's potential enemies list in public perception[46].

China and Russia also have different approaches with respect to their economies. While China focused on strengthening its commercial and manufacturing power and embraced international economic integration, Russia, on the other hand showed less interest in enhancing its economic integration. As the competition in the area of research and development increases in the 21st century, Russia faces the problem of garnering sufficient financial resources to cater to the demands of the education sector and research.

China on the other hand has strengthened its research-based programs and has diversified its economy by adopting the latest trends. It has cultivated a strong economic partnership with Pakistan and other regional countries. While Russia faces the problem of slow growth in its knowledge-based economy due to scarcity of researchers and finances, China succeeds in these areas by encouraging innovation in small and medium private companies.[47] Harley proposed that Russia should adopt China's example of

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[45] Ibid

[46] BlackJoseph, *Vladimir Putin and the New World Order: Looking East, Looking West?* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004): 36.

[47] Harley Balzer, Yukon Huang, James F.Collins, "Russia and China in the Global Economy," *Carnegie Endowment For International Peace*, (2008): 1

embracing globalization[48]. On the other hand, Lowell Dittmer argues that despite Russia's enhanced positive perception of China's economic model, it still retains come condescending views about Beijing[49].

Way Forward and Conclusion

Following key deductions emerge from the debate, carried out in this research:-

- A willing Russia and an all times friendly China provide Pakistan an excellent alternative mechanism for enhancing and strengthen its military and security ties, particularly in the wake of its fallout with the United States.
- The confidence building measures initiated by China towards Russia, Pakistan and other regional countries need to be enhanced and continued on regular basis. This process is extremely essential for the promotion of regionalism, establishment of peace and promotion of economic cooperation among all regional states.
- The changing and an over ambitious Indian role together with United States, runs counter to regional stability and national interest of Pakistan, China and Russia. As a resurgent power, Russia has a very decisive role to play with a clear focus. It needs to constructively unambiguously engage with China, Pakistan and other regional countries on converging issues. Russia needs to strengthen dialogue between members of military, civil and economic institutions in Pakistan in order to broaden and deepen the cooperation on diverse issues.
- China, Russia and Pakistan need to adopt a common discourse with respect to U.S policies of interventionism and unilateralism with a common aim to bring peace in this region; the South and Central Asia.

China and Russia, the two global powers have shown an active interest in strengthening their relations with Pakistan over the past decade. The drivers of China's growing interest in Pakistan range from political and security in consideration of the political fallout between U.S and Pakistan, and economic, in consideration of China-Pakistan Economic Corridors', a project for the mutual benefit for the two countries.

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[48] Ibid

[49] Dittmer, Lowell, *Political and Cultural Roots of Sino-Russian Partnership*. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012):57.

On the other hand, Pakistan-Russia relations initially remained lukewarm politically, but gradually strengthened in last one decade. Politically, like China, Russia also takes interest in Pakistan to counter U.S influence in the region, while economically the ties between two countries need to be strengthened. The emergence of a strategic triangle between China-Russia and Pakistan, when viewed in terms of balance of power dynamics, stands out being the most significant aspect.

The recent developments in global affairs strengthen the position of this trio; China-Pakistan and Russia on having a similar discourse on how they perceive U.S. reinforces this dynamic. The three countries not only have political convergence, but also economic and military convergences as well. However, this partnership is not devoid of its own problems and weakening bilateral relations between any two countries, part of this troika which can limit their cooperation in any future scenario.

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CHINA-RUSSIA STRATEGIC CONDOMINIUM: AN EMERGING POWER BLOC IN EURASIA IN 21ST CENTURY

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Abstract

China and Russia, two major regional political actors, regard the Eurasia core as their strategic backyard. The regional ambitions of these two powers are a threat in a new era of competition or possible cooperation in the Eurasian region. China is using the economic potential of 'One Belt, One Road' (OBOR) in order to integrate Eurasia as its heartland, while Russia has formed the 'European Economic Union' (EEU) with hopes of establishing a power bloc. This article is an attempt to underscore the potential of these formations and their consequences for the geopolitics of Eurasia. The subject of this research is to elucidate the context of OBOR and EEU, the major regional projects in the region, and their consequences for the Eurasian region.

Key Words: Eurasia, Condominium, Regional Hegemon, Geopolitics, Eurasian Economic Union, One Belt One Road, Strategy, Integration

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Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union shifted the locus of power from Eurasia to the Western World however Eurasia still preserves its importance because of its geopolitics, hydrocarbon resources, and transportation routes. The pragmatic outlook of the region makes it important for China and Russia each of whom seeks Eurasia as a means of trust building not only with Eurasian countries but with rest of the World as well. Beijing is promoting its grand project of the "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR) to become integrated with Eurasia and to access its energy and raw material needs through this economic corridor. On the other hand, Russia is struggling to establish a Russian dominated geopolitical bloc to integrate Eurasia to strengthen economic ties for the foundation of collective leadership. The initiatives of both China and Russia may be different but their strategic ambitions are the same. The paper is an attempt to analyze the divergent interests of China and Russia in the Central Asia and Eurasian region. It discusses the paramount significance of the two major regional projects One Belt One Road and EEU to China and Russia respectively. It also evaluates the strategic condominium between China and Russia through OBOR and EEU and its implications in the creation of a new regional power bloc.

Theoretical Framework

International politics is moving towards multi-polarity[1] which may involve very different rules of the game from the older international order. The great powers are looking to capitalize on their share of the world power to ensure their survival, maintain their authority and to attain a hegemonic position in world politics[2], but their desire to maximize their power is not without its limitations in the contemporary era[3] because it's not easy for a country to dominate or claim to be a sole hegemon[4] in the present global

[1]Ian Taylor, *Africa, Rising ? Brics-Diversifying Dependency,* (Woodbridge Suffolk, James Curry, 2014), 29 and Goedele De Keersmaeker, *Polarity, Balance of Power and International Theory,* (Cham Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan,2017), 161

[2]Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Theirry Balzacq,*The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies,* (London, Routledge, 2009), 13, Kathleen J Hancock, and Lobell E Steven, "Ralism and Changing International System; WillChina and Russia Challenge the Status Quo ?" *China and Eurasia Forum Quaterly vol. 8 No. 4* (2010), 143-165 and John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power politics.* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994),33

[3]Janson Dittmer and Jo Sharp, *Geopolitics: An Introductory Reader.* (London, Routledge, 2014), 143

[4] A state more powerful than the other great powers in the multi polar system is not hegemon, because it faces, by definition, other great powers. A global hegemon must dominate the entire globe while a regional hegemon dominates only distinct geographical area that is easy to manage for great power. For example, United States is the regional

system.[5] Offensive realists think that "the emerging major powers are hardly ever satisfied with the contemporary distribution of power "and at the same time they have kind of mistrust, fear and suspicion that from where the next threat to their security can emerge which eventually result in a security competition among states.[6] For Example, China and Russia both want to enhance their security and influence in the region so they are seeking alliances with regional powers and beyond.

Geopolitical Setting and Policy of Russia

The Soviet disintegration created a power vacuum in the heart of the Eurasian region. Russia was not only in the midst of a crisis on an internal and international scale but it was also facing a systemic crisis owing to changes in its old socioeconomic model. It was not easy for her to acknowledge the new geopolitical realities of the region[7] and its social crisis also magnified the geopolitical void. Russian borders had dramatically shrunk. Beyond the frontier, the WARSA Pact had also collapsed and former satellite states of central Europe rapidly jumped towards joining NATO and the European Union. Furthermore, the loss of Ukraine deprived Russia of "the dominance of the Black Sea where Odessa had served as the trade gateway with the Mediterranean and beyond the world"[8]. In the South-East, the geopolitical disturbances changed the geopolitics of the Caspian Sea basin and also those of Central Asia. The Caspian Sea was an effective lake between the Soviet Union and Iran meant for inter-state transport[9] but Russia had been pushed back thousands of miles after the emergence of Central Asian States making it only one of the five claimants to the riches of the Caspian Sea Basin like Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.

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hegemon of the Western hemisphere and not a true global power because China and Russia have potential to be a regional great power in their geography.

[5]John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power politics,* (New York, W. W. Norton, 1994), 33-40. David Shambaugh, *The China Reader: Rising Power,* (London, Oxford, 2016), 24 and Colin Elman, Michael Jensen, *Realism Reader,* (New York, Routledge, 2014), 184.

[6]T. V. Paul, James J Wirtz, Michel Fortmann, *Balance of Power Theory and Practice in the 21st Centur,* (California: Stanford University Press, 2004)

[7]Minton F. Goldman, *Russia, the Eurasian Republics and Central eastern Europe,* (Mc Graw-Hill Dushkin,2000), 56

[8]Zbigniew Brzezniski, 1998. *The grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives,*(New York, Basic Books), 92 and Kerrace, "*Russia's Spirtual Rebirth, Coup D'etate Ukrain Black Sea", deepturthmedia,* March 26, 2014, https://deeptruthmedia.wordpress.com.

[9]Ewan W. Anderson, *Global Geopolitical Flashpoint: An Itlas of Conflict.* (London, Routledge , 2014), 74

At that time, with its empire dissolved, Russia was facing an ominous situation in the Far East. China, who had been weaker than Russia for several centuries, was now on the way to success and the rapid growth of the Chinese economy was reversing the historical equation between the two countries[10]. According to the arguments of Anssi Kullberg (2001), as a reaction to the collapse of the Soviet Union, three broad geostrategic options emerged for the new Russian state. Firstly, "priority was given to the mature strategic partnership with America for a global condominium". Secondly, emphasis was placed on the policy of near abroad as Russia's central concerns, with some advocating a form of Moscow-dominated economic integration but with others also expecting an eventual restoration of some measures of imperial control, thereby creating a power more capable of balancing America and Europe. The third option was to form an alliance involving some sort of anti-US coalition designed to reduce the American preponderance in Eurasia.[11] Each option was related to Russian preoccupation with its status vis-a-vis the United States and each contained internal variants[12]. The idea of a mature strategic partnership between Moscow-Washington was elusive.[13] Washington never intended to share global power with Russia. On the other side, the Russian leadership always tried to assert that the world should recognize Russia as equal to the United States and no problem could be resolved without Russian participation. The new Russia was weaker and devastated compared to the old one, and there was the common perception of NATO's expansion following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Russia perceived it as an attempt by United States to expand her influence in Moscow's sphere of operations.[14] The gulf between Russia and the United States was further widened by Russian unwillingness to disaffirm all of Stalin's conquest. Therefore, Moscow could not realize its desire of being a part of a larger Euro-Atlantic system. The United States was also looking for interstate relations in Eurasian Region and Ukraine was critical in this respect.[15]Ukraine's distinct status brought Russia and the U.S. in more direct confrontation and Russian hopes that the U.S. would not hamper its role in Central Asia, failed.

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[10]Brzezniski Zbigniew, Opcit, 95

[11]AnssiKullberg, "From Neo-Eurasianism to National Paranoia, Renaissance of Geopolitics in Russia" *The Eurasian Politician Issue no. 4, August 2001*

[12]David Gress, "*From Plato to Nato" The Idea of the Wes and its Opponants,* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 2010), 9

[13] Aldo Ferrari, Siminel Rodica, *Method of Titolo: U.S. Political Influencein the Ex. Soviet unionand their impact on the Russian-American Relations,* (Anno Acacademico, 2013), 27-28

[14] Anita Orban, *Power, Energy and the New Russian Imperialis,* (London, Praeger Press, 2008), 38

[15]FBIS Report,*Central Eurasia*, Isuues 106-113, (Washington, The Service 1993).

Moscow started looking for massive economic reforms faced as a result of economic crisis after the disintegration. To reach for closer political and economic integration and more accommodation in the region, Russia signed two agreements, the RTA (Regional Trade Agreement) and the FTA (Free Trade Area) with members of CIS[16]. These initiatives indicated the displeasure of the West especially Washington over the integration of Russia and CIS. But Russia continued its efforts to establish an anti-hegemonic alliance and Yeltsin visited China and signed a declaration that both countries would align themselves against Washington.[17] Russia also made efforts to strengthen the Sino-Iran connection[18] to increase its sphere of influence[19]. Renewal of the Sino-Russian connection was also to counter the emergence of the only global power and appropriate response to Washington's backing of the enlargement of NATO. In the meantime the US interests have further increased in Central Asia as she started Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). United States is also in competition with Russia, China and Iran in the energy sector in the region and these countries contest for the oil and gas pipeline route, markets, and regulatory environment. China, Iran, Russia and United States are also major players for controlling the oil and gas reserves of the Caspian Sea Basin. Furthermore, Washington is willing to encompass democratic and market economic transform in the region to support human right, freedom, prosperity and tolerance in regional states. United States interests in Central Asian region are not temporary efforts rather she takes it as a long term commitment[20] but the continued US presence in the region is considered a threat to the interest of China, Iran and Russia.

Russia and Eurasian Economic Union

Russia understands, to this day, that Eurasia is a power base where it can exercise some influence. Russia also has the vision that the world order will

[16]Frank Columbus, *Russia in Transition* Vol. 2. (New York, Nova Science Publishers 2003), 8

[17]Zbigniew Brzezniski, Opcit, 116

[18] Russia supported Iran on its nuclear energy program.

[19] Dmitry Shlapentokh, *Russian Elite Image of Iran: From the Late Soviet Era to the Present*, (Washington, Strategic Study Institute, 2009), 5-6

[20] According to Assistant Secretary A. Elizibeth Jones "United States interests in Central Asia are counterterrorism nonproliferation and energy integration in the world, these are not temporary efforts. It is a long term commitment and Central Asia is very important to us". Hsiang-tao Hsu, Challenges to US's Strategic Interests in Central Asia, Journal of International Affairs, 2005, p.162 https://wwwusembassy-kazakhastan.freenet.kz-press-releases/join-eng-html

consist of macro blocs in future and countries will like to be associated with one of these blocks to dominate the others".[21] Moscow believes that the regional institutions such as APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), EU (European Union) and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) and TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership)[22] might become integration bricks that can be used for a more sustainable global economy.[23] The rise of China pushed Russia to look for to constitute a trade and economic zone not only to support her economy but to incorporate the regional neighbors in that economic plan in case they tend to join the Chinese bloc. On January 1, 2015, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus instituted Eurasian Economic Union to boost the economy and to protect mutual interests of the members' states. Now Armenia and Kyrgyzstan has joined the union and Tajikistan is formally invited to join while Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia are offered by EEU and China also has signed the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with EEU[24]. Moscow not only wants to boost her economy but to maintain its political influence in Central Asia and expects that Eurasian Economic Union as a Russian-dominated bloc will serve the desired purpose (although it may not be able to compete with western-led Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership). Many scholars hope that over the time the project may become a truly integrationist one benefiting not only its members but the neighbors and that multilateral decision-making will be helpful to curb the hegemonic tendency of Russia herself.[25]However, EEU multilateralism has not started yet working properly because of intolerant political climate, interstate geopolitical differences and fear perception of regional states towards Russia-led isolationist project.[26]Indeed, EEU member states are not a ripe fruit like EU integration. The trade among

[21]Mathieu Duchatel, *Eurassian Integration: Caught Between China and Russia*, (European Council of Foreign Relations. June 7, 2016). www.ecfr.eu/article-essay-eurasian.

[22] Trans-Pacific Partnership is a trade agreement among Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chili, Japan Malaysia, Mexico, New Zeeland, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam and United states signed on February 4, 2016. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is also a trade agreement between EU and US proposed on February 11, 2013).Well-known growing economies like China India and Russia were excluded from these agreements.

[23]Alex Newman, *Putin: Key Player in the New World Order,(New American September 22, 2014), http://www.thenewamerican.com*

[24] Dezan Shira , *China's FTA with EAEU will improve Market access*, (EU Transhipments, Briefing China, May 17, 2018). Retrieved from: www.china-briefing .com/news/chinas-fta-eaeu-will-improve-market-access-eu/

[25]Ian Bremmer,*These Five Facts Explain Russia's Economic Decline,* (Time, August 14, 2015), time.com/3998248/these-five-facts-explain-russia-economic-decline/

[26]Rilka Dragneva, Kataryna Wolczuk, "*The Eurasian Economic Union: Deals, Rules and Exercise of Power*", (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, May, 2017), P.24

the member states of EEU is less than[27]the trade with the outside partners.[28] Though there are hopes that EEU collaboration with Chinese project 'One Belt One Road' will be significant for the member states of Eurasian Economic Union because goods can move China to Europe via EEU. The rise of China will also create a system of regional balance of power where smaller states of the region will never find themselves under the influence of one dominant power. Though Russia has already inherited influence in the region but certain regional security problems may make it difficult for her to manage itself for the role of security provider. Beijing may be hesitant to accept the responsibility of security of the Central Asian region however it is not clear whether Russia will prefer to act individually or through CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) or SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) but to achieve real gain from OBOR and EEU integration, there is a need to modernize and diversify the EEU economies otherwise that corridor would not automatically bring about.

Chinese Interests and Strategy in Eurasia

China, a distinctive and densely populated country, feels a great pride in its own peculiar civilization with reputation of great advancement in the field of art, culture, social and technical skills, philosophy and politics[29] and has led the world in the fields of agriculture, industry and living standards although having undergone tremendous changes since antiquity. The statistics of foreign investment and the pace of its current economic growth predict China to be a global power, equivalent to Europe and United States within coming decades as its economy has already exceeded Japan.[30] Such economic pace allows China to attain greater military power for its defense and may pose a threat to its neighbors even its geographically distant opponents[31] as greater China will be a dominant state as a global power

[27]For instance, the fall of oil prices in 2016 even slowdown the Russian economy and has caused of the decline of internal trade.

[28]Himani Pant, Russian Economy in 2016, *The Diplomat*, (May 11, 2016).

[29]Scott Morton, W. *China Its history and Culture, (*New York, McGraw Hills Inc, 2005), 10-11

[30]M. Morrison, Wayne, *China's Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges and imlication for the United States.* (Washigton : Conressional research Service,2015),42 and Alex Gray, "The world's 10 Biggest economies in the 2017." *World Economic forum,* (March 9, 2017),https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/03/worlds-biggest-economies-in-2017/.

[31]Rajesh Rajagopalan, India's Strategic Choice: China and the Balance of Power in Asia, Carnegie New Delhi, (September 14, 2017), https://carnegieindia.org/2017/09/14/india-strategic-choic-china-and-balance of power-in-asia

however, dependency on imports will make China more vulnerable to external pressure.

Although the Chinese military has qualified as a global power, its expansion has affected negatively its GDP growth.[32] The Chinese population is still increasing and needs of energy and foods are becoming more important to internal matters and political stability. The ever-increasing demand for energy has forced China to restrain itself from playing a major role in any exploitation of the seabed deposit that may occur in Southern coast of China.[33] In these circumstances, Beijing has begun to show her interests in the energy-rich, Central Asia. China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed a joint security agreement in 1996 which was a clear signal of China's increasing involvement in the geopolitics of Central Asian States. Attraction and seepage of Chinese immigrant and traders towards Russian areas is helping China to promote economic cooperation in North East.

One Belt, One Road

In 2013, during the visit of Astana (Kazakhstan) Chinese president Xi Jinping announced the plan of 'One Belt, One Road'. The OBOR project has broad geographical coverage that could spring as far as Egypt to the peripheral border of China. Beijing has established a SRF (Silk Road Fund) of $40 billion to promote private investment in One Belt One Road project.[34] The Chinese Investment Corporation, The China Development Bank, the Import-Export Bank of China and official Foreign Exchange are sponsoring the fund. The China Development Bank has claimed of investing over $890 billion in 900 projects in 60 countries to encourage the efforts[35] and Beijing also intends to spend $1 trillion on the One Belt, One Road.[36] But the problem lies in its ability to supervise the loaning and to limit risks[37]. Since the project involves many different institutions of the various stakeholder

[32] Michael Pettis, Is China's Economy growing as fast as China's GDP?, Carnegie, Washington, (September 5, 2017), carnegieendowment.org/china/financial/markets.
[33]Mathieu Duchatel, Opcit.
[34]*The Economist, "What is China's Beltand Road Intiative", May 15, 2017. https://www.econmist.com/blog/economist-explains/2017/05/economist-expain-11*
[35]*He Yini, "China to Invest$900 billion in Belt and Road initiative", The Telegraph.* June 10, 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world/china-billion-dolars-belt-road-intiative/.
[36]Jane Pearlez, Yufan Huang, "Behind China's $ 1Trillion Plan to Shake up the Economic Oder by Jane Perlez and Yufan Huang", The New York Times, May 13. 2017. https://nyorktimes.com/2017/05/13/business/china-railway-one-belt-one-road-1-trillion-plan.html
[37]*The Economist, Opcit.*

countries, it certainly requires the approval of those emerging economies. Initially, "One Belt, One Road" was a web connection but the variety of geopolitical issues, however, may create problems in successful implementation of OBOR project.

The motives of this project are viewed in the context of Chinese economic as well as strategic objectives in Eurasia and beyond that can challenge even the United States in East Asia. This initiative is being seen as a tool by Beijing in order to invest its global foreign exchange reserves to maintain the pace of increasing excess capacity constructing industries that may cover the slower growth at home and domestic investment[38]. According to an estimate by Chinese officials, the middle class consumers that may benefit from One Belt, One Road will increase as much as three billion by 2050, resultantly creating a trade of over $2.5 trillion among these countries, benefiting more than four billion people[39]. Chinese companies have already invested $8.6 billion along Silk Road during 2015. Beijing has managed 13.8 percent of import and 8.9 percent of export along the OBOR. According to a report by the IMF, China, Caucasus and Central Asia have increased their trade tenfold from $ 5 billion in 2005 to almost $ 50 billion in 2014 and has encouraged China to establish a capacity to invest as many as $35 billion more in the region[40].

One Belt, One Road has linked the geopolitical components in the region that's why, there is a possibility that Beijing also may strive to expand the project in the area of East Asia where the US influence is rather weak. Beijing also has the capability to attract even some traditional partners of Washington to her sphere of influence in the Moscow dominated regions. Although Beijing denies these objectives, the fact is that One Belt One road does let Beijing to by-pass Moscow economically, geographically and politically, as there are several substitute routes available to China[41]. Though

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[38]*Hong Yu, Motivation Behind China 'One Belt, One Road' Intiatives and Establishment of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 26, Issue 105,(2017): 353 (353-368)*

[39]Wang Yiwei, "Building a Better Word with Belt and Road Intiative", CCTV.Com, August 9, 2016: englishcctv.com/2016/08/09/ARTIzyLEMGjHsfqsty4MEUDa160908.shtml

[40]Deloitte Insights, "Embracing the BRI Ecosystem in 2018, February 12, 2018, https://www2.deliotte.com/insight/us/en/economy/asia-pacific/china-belt-and-road-initiative.html

[41]Francois Godement, "*One Belt One Road: China's Leap Outward"* China Analysis, (European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2,

China expects OBOR as an opportunity in the future but there is a long way to link 65 countries as so far China has signed memorandums of understanding on One Belt One Road with only nine countries[42].

Consequences for China-Russia Integration in Eurasia

China and Russia are differently placed. Though Post-Soviet Russia has had a declining position in Eurasia, it is still seen as the state that has the capability to exercise military power beyond its borders. On the other hand, Beijing has not only developed herself as an economic partner of some Eurasian Countries but has also invested in its maritime capabilities since the last thirty years. It also extends its cooperation on anti-terrorist issues with the SCO and agreed on joint military anti-terrorist exercises within the SCO framework. Russia surely wants to maintain and even strengthen its political as well as economic influence in the region and perceives Chinese presence in Eurasia, along with the OBOR project as a geopolitical threat at the end[43].

Chinese project of 'One Belt One road' and the Russia led Eurasian Economic Union are leading towards globalization rather than regionalization of international politics, despite their current manifestations. Russia is willing to view the OBOR and the 'Eurasian Economic Union' as a balancing factor rather than a competing one.[44]Moscow believes that China's recognition of the Eurasian Economic Union will be a step towards international legitimacy for the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia also hopes that China may accept Russia as a political power and security provider in Central Asia as China does not have any rival designs in the region. Apparently both the projects "One Belt, One Road" and 'Eurasian Economic Union 'are the project of distinct style, distinct interests and distinct capabilities but a clash is still on the cards now. The Eurasian Economic Union is designed for internal trade, not the external one. Moscow is still highly confused whether Chinese cheap goods could invade its market through Central Asia and consequently, threaten the EEU's internal production capacity. On the other hand, China sees EEU as a corridor of One

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2015),www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary_one_belt_one_road_chinas_great_leap-outward3055

[42]Tom Hancock, "China Encircles the World with 'One Belt, One Road' Strategy", Financial Times, May 4, 2017. https://www.ft.com/content/0714074/a-0334-11e7-aa5b-6bb-07f5c8e12

[43] Pete Baumgartner, "China' Massive 'One Road' Project largely Bypass Russia but Moscow Still on Board", Radio Free Europe Radio Library, June 26, 2017, https://www.frrerl.org/a-russia-china-one-bet-one-road-project-putin-xi/28579849.html.

[44] Enrico Cau, "The Geopolitics of the Beijing-Moscow Consensus", The Diplomat, January 4, 2018, https://www.thediplomat.com/2018/01/the -geopolitics-of-beijing-moscow-consensus/

Belt, One Road which offers the shortest route and wants to prevent the EEU from being a barrier in the way of its boosting economy.

Conclusion

It is evident from the above discussion that two projects of OBOR and EEU are pushing both China and Russia closer together in order to form a counter weight to the European Union. Interestingly enough, Europe also has a relationship with the Central Asian countries that look to Europe for their protection from Russia and China. Though One Belt, One Road surely reduces the Russian control and influence in the region, it seems quite clear that no single county can control the entire energy route. Now, there are three mechanisms of cooperation for regional states, European Union, European Economic Union and One Belt, One Road embracing the competition, and resultantly drawing Eurasia further in to its orbit. Both projects (EEU and OBOR) can be pivotal for the progress of Eurasian region if these two projects are structured and promoted properly. However, Europe is confused in deciding whether it should encourage Russia's role of being security provider in Eurasia to counter the rising Islamic fundamentalism or Chinese influence in the region.[45] In short, China and Russia have to counter the political obstacles in the region which are discouraging the promotion of their projects. They would have to frame special strategies in order to promote and safeguard the completion of their projects.

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[45] Mathieu Duchatel, Francois Godement, "Absorb and Conquer: An EU Approach to Russian and Chinese Integration in Eurasia", European Council for Foreign Relations June 9, 2016.
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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN: A WAY FORWARD

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Abstract

Afghanistan is facing multipronged challenges mainly by the surge in Afghan Taliban insurgency, the emergence of Islamic State-Khurassan Province, fragile Afghan security forces, upsurge in Afghan Drug Trade and discord among Pakistan, Afghanistan and India. All these factors are responsible for the mayhem and turmoil in Afghanistan and would have far reaching implications for Pakistan and Central Asia. It is imperative for the regional and global powers to support reconciliation and negotiation process with Afghan Taliban and other reconcilable groups to settle this issue amicably and open the gates for cooperation and development in the region. India and Pakistan must end their proxy war, resolve their outstanding issues, and collectively work for the stability of Afghanistan. Moreover, Pakistan and Afghanistan must overcome their differences, settle the border dispute, secure the border and collectively work for the regional connectivity and collaboration. The United States of America, China, Russia and European Union must support Afghanistan in rebuilding and reconstruction. Politically and economically stable Afghanistan would connect the land locked Central Asian states with rest of the world and pave the way for better connectivity and economic development.

Key Words: Terrorism & Extremism, Insurgency, Afghan Taliban, Resolute Support Mission

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Introduction

Afghanistan is passing through the toughest phase of its history. Terrorism and extremism has plagued its society and seriously hampered the peace and security in Afghanistan. It is facing multi-faceted challenges which includes, insurgency led by the Afghan Taliban and their affiliates Haqqani Network, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. The rise of Islamic State Khurasan Province- (IS-KP), regrouping of other terrorist groups like Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan-(IMU), East Turkestan Islamic Movement- (ETIM), Tehrik- I- Taliban Pakistan-(TTP) and their splinter groups would seriously challenge the peace and security of Afghanistan and its neighboring states including China, Central Asia, Iran and Pakistan which may hinder the connectivity of Afghanistan with rest of the world. The drug trade in Afghanistan is also one of the major issues which need an urgent attention. The drug trafficking in Afghanistan funds the militants and it is considered as the backbone of Afghan insurgency.[1]

Another major challenge to Afghanistan is the proxy war between Pakistan and India. Afghanistan's overwhelming tilt towards India has complicated its relationship with Pakistan. The policy makers in Pakistan view India's role in Afghanistan as negative and they believe that it is averse to their economic and strategic interests in Afghanistan and beyond.[2] Unless, Afghanistan is unstable, it is impossible for Pakistan to fully connect its economy, people and trade with that of the Central Asian States. Afghanistan's inability to defeat Taliban insurgency greatly depends on the ability and capacity of their security forces.

The Afghan National Security Forces- (ANSFs) are weak and fragile. They are newly established force. They would require continuous training and mentorship by the foreign advisors and trainers to become an effective and agile force against highly trained, well organized and robust insurgents. The withdrawal of the US led alliance in 2015, presence of a meagre force under Resolute Support Mission- (RSM) and failure of the ANSFs to contain the Afghan Taliban has further complicated the security situation in Afghanistan.[3] The Afghan impasse needs a holistic solution to its issues. The first thing which could be considered is the all-inclusive reconciliation

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[1] Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Afghanistan's opium production is through the roof—why Washington shouldn't overreact" *Brookings Institution*, November 21, 2017, (https://brook.gs/2jL1Kkm, December 30, 2018).

[2] Mary Gloria C. Njoku, Christian C. Anieke, *Stories of Peace Volume II: Creating and Sustaining Peace through Social Responsibility and Education, Volume 2* (UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), 81.

[3] Ashley J. Tellis, Jeff Eggers, "U.S. Policy in Afghanistan: Changing Strategies, Preserving Gains", *Carnegie Endowment*, July 22, 2017. https://bit.ly/2SnqL1u, (December 30, 2018).

process between Afghan Taliban and government. It is imperative that all stake holders with the support of key regional and global actors must initiate meaningful dialogue process with the Afghan Taliban and other reconcilable warring groups and incorporate them in government machinery to end this violent conflict.

Pakistan, Afghanistan and India must resolve their bilateral disputes and work together to stabilize Afghanistan and connect themselves with energy rich Central Asia States to overcome their energy woes. Pakistan and Afghanistan must manage their porous border effectively and check the movement of militants and collectively curb any terrorist group roaming in these areas. The opium trafficking is the major source of funding for all sorts of militant groups in Afghanistan.

It is vital for Afghanistan to curb this funding through an effective cooperation with the neighboring transit states including Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asia. The role of religious scholars/Ullemas cannot be ignored. There is an urgent need of counter narrative to shun the propaganda of the militants. This is the duty of religious elite to spread the true teachings of Quran and Sunnah and convey this message that Islam is the religion of peace and tranquility, it rejects all forms of violence in society. It encourages forgiveness, brotherhood and peacefulness and discourages transgression, offense and viciousness against other human beings.

Moreover, the major powers must come forward and start reconstruction and development in Afghanistan and Tribal areas of Pakistan. It is prerequisite for a better society, that government on both sides of the border must build more schools, colleges, universities, hospitals, establish industries and provide basic necessities to the aggrieved population living in border areas. For long term peace and stability we need to stabilize Afghanistan, only then we can connect it with energy rich Central Asia. This paper aims to analyze the threat matrix in Afghanistan and how it is considered as a nuisance towards regional connectivity. It seeks to explore ways to resolve Afghan impasse in an amicable way to bring long lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Threat Matrix in Afghanistan: An Appraisal

Afghanistan is marred by the worst kind of violence in its history. Before 9/11 there was only one major terrorist organisation- (Al-Qaeda) in Afghanistan but after seventeen years many other ferocious militant outfits have emerged in Afghanistan. This part of the study would discuss the threat matrix in Afghanistan and highlight the major terrorist organisations on Afghan soil and other issues challenging the regional and global security.

The Afghan Taliban/Haqqani Network

The Afghan Taliban are undeniable force in Afghanistan. The United States along with other allies dismantled Taliban regime and established a government led by Hamid Karzai after 9/11 incident. At that time Taliban were about 45,000 in number.[4] But in 2003 the US opened another front in Iraq and diverted its military machine and resources from Afghan front to Iraq. Which gave the Afghan Taliban an opportunity to get regrouped and today they have become a potent force of about 60,000 men.[5] Many areas in Afghanistan are under Taliban control and they are running shadow government in those areas.[6] The US led alliance withdrew most of their troops from Afghanistan in 2015 and carried out Bilateral Security Agreement- (BSA) with the Afghan government.[7] Under BSA, the US have stationed about 16,919 troops as Resolute Support Mission- (RSM) force to help ANSFs in countering terrorism, advice and training.[8] The reduction in foreign forces helped the Afghan Taliban and their affiliates Haqqani Network and Al-Qaeda to get reorganized and increase their terrorist activities in Afghanistan to put more pressure on the Afghan government to succumb to their demands.

Since 2015, the Afghan Taliban carried out many terrorist attacks in which thousands of Afghan soldiers and civilians lost their lives. The Afghan Taliban have increased the intensity of attacks in recent times. They have shown their capacity and outreach to carry out some of the deadliest attacks deep inside Afghan capital, military bases, and other strategic installations controlled by the US and their allies. According to the United Nation Assistance Mission in Afghanistan- (UNAMA), in first six months of the year 2018, Afghanistan have witnessed more than 5,122 civilian casualties (1,692 deaths and 3,430 injured).[9]

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[4] Luke Harding, "Taliban forcing thousands into army" *The Guardian*, 04 October 2001. http://bit.ly/2rLwsLU. Accessed on November 12, 2017.

[5] "U.S. General to Congress: War in Afghanistan is at stalemate and local troop deaths unsustainable" *Japan Times*, December 05, 2018. https://bit.ly/2CFawr7, accessed on December 30, 2018.

[6] Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, *An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban-Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 272.

[7] Gale Mattox and Stephen M. Grenier, (Ed.)., *Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan: The Politics of Alliance.* (California: Stanford University Press, 2015), 10-11.

[8] "Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures" *North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*, July 18, 2018. https://bit.ly/2GhE6H5, accessed on December 30, 2018.

[9] "Mid- Year update on the protection of civilians in armed conflict:1 January to 30 June 2018" *UNAMA*, July 15, 2018. https://bit.ly/2LEyKo3 (access on December 30, 2018).

Afghan Taliban and their affiliates
India, Pakistan and Afghanistan's proxy wars
Threat Matrix in Afghanistan
Fragile Afghan Security Forces
Drug Trafficking
IS- Khurassan Province (IS-KP)

Source: Author's own description

In the recent times the Afghan Taliban have intensified their attacks against the Afghan and NATO forces in which they have imposed heavy damages on both. The trend may continue in coming months until the government in Afghanistan and the US come to a negotiated ceasefire followed by a long term political settlement. The Afghan Taliban are now well equipped, they possess more than $2 billion of funds, enough to prolong this insurgency for many years.[10] The Afghan Taliban are stronger than ever before with robust command & control structure, innovative tactics and strategies.[11]

[10] Joseph V. Micallef, "How the Taliban Gets Its Cash" *Huffington Post*, http://bit.ly/1X03MUO. accessed on March 24, 2017.

[11] Peter Eichstaedt, *Above the Din of War: Afghans Speak about Their Lives, Their Country, and their future, and why America should listen* (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2013), 240.



Source: UNAMA Mid-Year Report-2018. https://bit.ly/2LEyKo3

Their morale is high and they believe that the withdrawal of the allied forces from Afghanistan is their victory. It seems that the US led alliance and Afghan troops are unable to fight, lack the will or capacity to eliminate Afghan Taliban from Afghanistan. The US President Donald Trump have recently indicated that the US may pull out half of the deployed troops in Afghanistan.[12] However, the report has been rejected by the White House.[13] But in the wider context the US have accepted this reality that they cannot win this war and the ultimate solution is to negotiate with the Afghan Taliban. But the Afghan Taliban have preconditioned the talks with the US withdrawal. It seems that the US have agreed to the Taliban demand of phased withdrawal, which may start in coming months.

However in recent times, the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network and IS-KP have carried out high profile attacks against civil and military installations in Afghanistan with greater impunity, which shows their suppleness and outreach. The intensity and ferociousness of these attacks increased in recent times. Especially in 2018, some of the deadliest attacks were carried out by the Afghan Taliban and they threaten about 70% of the

[12] Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Mujib Mashal, "U.S. to Withdraw About 7,000 Troops from Afghanistan, Officials Say" *New York Times*, December 20, 2018. https://nyti.ms/2EHhgGX, accessed on December 30, 2018.

[13] Morgan Gstalter, "Trump hasn't ordered Pentagon to withdraw troops from Afghanistan" *The Hill*, December 29, 2018. https://bit.ly/2s1lQYs, accessed on December 30, 2018.

Afghan territory[14] which shows the gravity of the fragile security situation in Afghanistan, which may impede any connectivity with resource rich Central Asia with rest of the region and beyond. The instability and turmoil in Afghanistan would have far reaching implications for Pakistan.

Recurrence of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan

The United States of America soon after 9/11 incident, attacked Afghanistan to eliminate Al-Qaeda's safe heavens and erode their ability to strike the US homeland or their allies again. In initial years, the US with the support of Pakistan eliminated Al-Qaeda sanctuaries from Af-Pak region. Most of the Al-Qaeda militants after the US attack on Afghanistan moved to Pakistani tribal areas and got refuge under the patronage of local tribes.[15] Which led Pakistan Army to launch military operations in its tribal belt.[16]

After years of sustained military operations in FATA and urban areas, the Al-Qaeda network was dismantled, many high profile leaders were either killed or nabbed by the Pakistani security forces.[17] As of today after the operation Zarb-I-Azb in North Waziristan Agency, Pakistan army controls tribal belt and has deployed more than 200,000 troops to deny sanctuary to any militant outfit there.[18] The Operation Zarb-I-Azb and operation Khyber-I-II-III compelled Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups to take refuge in Afghanistan.[19] All sorts of militants left Pakistan's tribal region and took shelter in Afghanistan, including Al-Qaeda and their affiliates. According to different estimates there are about 300-500 Al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan.[20] They are expert in the manufacturing of improvised explosive devices- (IEDs) and Guerrilla warfare tactics. The Al-Qaeda operatives in

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[14] Shoaib Sharifi and Louise Adamou, "Taliban threaten 70% of Afghanistan, BBC finds" *BBC*, January 31st 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42863116, accessed on December 30, 2018.

[15] Usama Butt and N. Elahi, (Ed)., *Pakistan's Quagmire: Security, Strategy, and the Future of the Islamic Nuclear Nation.* (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), 158.

[16] Christophe Jaffrelot, (Ed)., *Pakistan at the Crossroads: Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 228.

[17] Eamon Murphy, *The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism.* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 143.

[18] "Kashmir diplomacy: "LoC tension can impact Pak anti-terror efforts" *The Express Tribune*, 09 October 9 2016, http://bit.ly/2rtd5qo.

[19] Ismail Khan, "Military operation in Khyber ends successfully" *The Dawn*, Islamabad, 03 July, 2015, http://bit.ly/2qQmGFi.

[20] Kenneth Katzman and Clayton Thomas "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy" *Congressional Research Service*, 19 May 19, 2017. http://bit.ly/2kK7mcV, 17.

Afghanistan are primarily playing an advisory role and helping the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network in their fight against RSM and ANSFs.[21]

Though, Al-Qaeda linked operatives in Afghanistan are in meagre size but their counselling role in militancy cannot be ignored. It is necessary to eliminate this group from Afghanistan for long lasting peace and stability. To achieve this goal, there must be a political settlement between the Taliban and Afghan government. Because, Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, is deriving its power from Taliban, they are providing them safety and sanctuary in Afghanistan. There are many ungoverned areas where the Afghan government has no writ.

The Afghan Taliban are capitalizing on the weaknesses of ANSFs and controlling those areas where the Afghan Army has minimal presence and established their IED factories, training centers and safe heavens to reorganize, coordinate and execute their operations in Afghanistan. If the settlement takes place between Afghan government and Taliban, then it is a possibility that Al-Qaeda would face pressure and may relocate to other countries.

The Emergence of Islamic State- Khurassan Province- (IS-KP)

The emergence of Islamic State- (IS) in Middle East had far reaching implications for the global peace and security. The IS has global agenda and it is not confined to one country or a region. They want to establish global caliphate especially in those areas where Muslims once ruled.[22] To achieve their objectives in this region, the IS militants established their foothold in Afghanistan to institute Khurasan province under the patronage of IS in Iraq and Syria.[23] The IS militants call this region as Khurasan, which covers parts of South Asia and Central Asia. The IS-KP is in small number and centered in Nangarhar province of Afghanistan.[24]

They are composed of Pakistani Taliban, Uzbeks, Tajiks and disgruntled ex-Afghan Taliban militants. According to recent estimates their numbers have shrunk from 3,000 men at peak in 2015 to around 1,000 fighters in 2017 because of the consistent military operations, drone strikes and air strikes by the ANSFs and RSM.[25] The IS-KP have faced significant losses in these operations and lost most of its men and resources. In the recent past, the US drone strikes have taken out four most important figures of IS-KP,

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[21] Matthew Bugeja, *Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan: Nation-building and Combating Al-Qaeda's Ideology* (Hamburg: Anchor Academic Publishing, 2014), 33.

[22] Dr. Adil Rasheed, *ISIS: Race to Armageddon*. (New Delhi: Vij Books India, 2015), 66.

[23] Brian Glyn Williams, *Counter Jihad: America's Military Experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.* (Philadelphia*:* University of Pennsylvania, 2016), 291.

[24] Seth G. Jones et al, *Rolling Back the Islamic State.* (Santa Monica California: Rand, 2017), 159.

[25] Hollie McKay, "ISIS threat in Afghanistan shows no end in sight" *Fox News*, 31 May, 2017. http://fxn.ws/2rknsvm. Accessed on March 11, 2018.

including Mullah Rauf, governor of the IS-KP Saeed Khan, Shahid Ullah Shahid- (former spokesperson of TTP) and Gul Zaman a key leader of IS in Afghanistan.[26]

The US is seriously hunting the IS militants in Afghanistan, and it looks they are not taking any chances as far as IS emergence in this region is concerned. This is the reason that consistent drone and missile strikes have taken out many IS commanders and foot soldiers in Afghanistan. In recent times, the US has dropped the most lethal non-nuclear weapon, the Mother of All Bombs- (MOAB) on the IS-KP hideouts in Nangarhar province of Afghanistan (which is close to the border with Pakistan), in which the IS-KP lost more than 92 of its fighters and their hideouts were also destroyed which imposed significant damage to their morale and degraded their potential to launch attacks against ANSFs or civilians in Afghanistan.[27]

The IS-KP is facing three pronged challenges in Afghanistan, first from the US led RSM, second from the ANSF and lastly from the Afghan Taliban. The ANSF may not defeat the Afghan Taliban but they can seriously impose heavy damages on the IS-KP in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the Afghan Taliban are undeniable force in Afghanistan. It is their playground, they would never allow the IS-KP to establish their foothold in Afghanistan.

This is the reason that the IS-KP faced stiff resistance from the US, ANSF and Taliban in Afghanistan. It seems that the IS-KP may not survive much longer in Afghanistan, but despite all these challenges they have the ability to carry out high profile terrorist attacks against the US and Afghan government in Afghanistan. Which shows that they possess the ability to disrupt peace and stability in Afghanistan.

The Afghan Drug Trade- Backbone of Terrorism/ Insurgency

Afghanistan is the largest producer of opium in the world and the money generated from this Drug trade goes to different militant groups in Afghanistan. According to one such estimate, the Afghan Taliban generate about 50% of their funds from drug trafficking and protection money. Despite spending more than $8 billion on counter narcotics since 2002, the US has been miserably failed to curtail the production of opium in Afghanistan. The major causes of record increase in the opium production are endemic corruption at lower and higher level in Afghan political circles,

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[26] Carlo Munoz, "Head of Islamic State in Afghanistan killed in U.S. drone strike" *The Washington Times*, 12 August 2016. http://bit.ly/2boMN3k. Accessed on August 24, 2018

[27] "US drops largest non-nuclear bomb in Afghanistan" *CNN*, 14 April 2017. http://cnn.it/2obPUfw. Accessed on April 24, 2018

lack of political will, fragile security forces and quick monetary benefits for the Afghan farmers.[28]

A Triangle of Drug Trafficking in Afghanistan

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime-(UNODC), the opium production in Afghanistan decreased by 29% in 2018 as compared to the production of opium in 2017 because of the severe drought in the country. In 2017, the area under poppy cultivation was close to 328,000 hectares. However, in 2018 it has shrunk to 263,000 hectares. Helmand province has been on top of the list in the production of opium in Afghanistan.[29] The Illicit Afghan drug economy is around $604 million which is 3% of the Afghanistan's total GDP[30] and the estimated total value of the Afghan opium in international market is more than $61 billion.[31] This is the reason that makes the drug trade in Afghanistan lucrative and highly

[28] "Afghanistan's Booming Poppy Harvest Feared to Boost Taliban Militancy" 17 May 2017. *Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project- OCCRP*, http://bit.ly/2qYm8wg. Accessed on August 26, 2018

[29] Prof. Salamat Azimi et al, "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018: Cultivation and Production" *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime*, November 2018. https://bit.ly/2OPNH73, accessed on December 30, 2018), 5.

[30] Ibid, 7.

[31] Justice Tettey et al, "World Drug Report 2011" *UNODC*, (https://bit.ly/1kPK7bH, accessed on December 30, 2018).

profitable business not only for the farmers, drug mafia but also for the regional and global drug cartels.

The Afghan drug is transported mainly from three supply routes to reach the regional and global markets. First route originate from Pakistan. Most of the Afghan opium pass through Pakistani route. According to the UNODC, 43% of the Afghan opium is trafficked through Pakistan.[32] The Drug traffickers utilize the porous border between both states and transport Afghan opium to Pakistan from where it is transported via sea to the Middle Eastern and European markets. Second route for the Afghan opium is from Iran, another country that share border with Afghanistan. The last route is from Central Asian Republics.[33]

The Afghan drug trade is one the major issue between Central Asian states and Afghanistan. The Central Asian route is one of the major transit for Afghan opium, this is one of the major concern for these states. Because insurgency in Afghanistan has fueled drug trafficking, especially Tajikistan from CAS would face the brunt. Currently large scale opium is smuggled through Tajikistan border, which pose serious threats to the peace and stability of this country.[34] Drug trafficking would help smugglers, criminal elements and insurgents which is going to create serious security challenges for Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Central Asian states. Other than drug addiction the ratio of crime and lethal infectious disease likes HIV/AIDS would also increase in these countries. It is necessary that regional actors must fight this menace collectively and save this region from possible spillover of drug trafficking from Afghanistan.

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[32] Hasan Mansoor, "Afghan drugs go to rest of world via Pakistan: UN report" *Dawn*, Islamabad, 24 August 2016. http://bit.ly/2swkjZm.

[33] "The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment, 2011" *UNODC*, July 2011. http://bit.ly/2sw3VrG, 17.

[34] Oktay F. Tanrisever, (Ed), *Afghanistan and Central Asia: NATO's Role in Regional Security Since 9/11* (Washington DC: IOS Press, 2013), 39.



There is lot of money involved in this business, which attracts many state and non-state actors. Many terrorist groups' benefits from Afghan opium trafficking, according to one such estimate, the Afghan Taliban alone generate about $300 to $500 million in drug sales.[35] The Afghan drug trade is one of the issue which needs an urgent attention. The opium trade in Afghanistan directly and indirectly funds the insurgency and seriously endanger the peace and stability of Afghanistan and hamper the efforts for regional connectivity.

India-Pakistan Discord: Proxy War

India and Pakistan are engaged in a proxy war in Afghanistan, which has created serious rift between these states. India is there in Afghanistan for two reasons, first is economic and second is strategic. India is a $ 2.8 trillion economy[36] with a population of about 1.31 billion.[37] To sustain its economic growth and to manage the requirements of its growing population, India would require resources from other states. Afghanistan is rich in natural resources. According to some estimates, Afghanistan possess more than $3

[35] Jim Michaels, "Airstrikes cripple Taliban drug labs, costing group $42 million" *USA Today*, April 13, 2018. (https://bit.ly/2Ao1mO0, accessed on December 30, 2018).

[36] "World Economic Outlook Database- 2018" *International Monetary Fund*, December 2018. (https://bit.ly/2RgURXd, accessed on December 30, 2018).

[37] "Population of India- 2018" *Live Population*, December 30, 2018. https://bit.ly/2xfkNV5, accessed on December 30, 2018.

trillion of natural resources.[38] Which makes it lucrative market for the Indian policy makers. Due to instability and turmoil in Afghanistan, these resources are still untapped.

In 2011, India got a contract to extract Iron reserves from Hagigak.[39] The worth of Iron deposits in Hagigak is more than $420 billion.[40] This is the reason that India has funded many projects in Afghanistan to earn a soft image in this country and achieve foothold to extract huge wealth of Afghanistan. Other than economic reasons, India is there in Afghanistan for strategic reasons. Indian thinkers believe that after the withdrawal of the US, Afghan Taliban may come in power again and provide a base for the Kashmir based fighters, which may create problems for India not only in held Kashmir but also at home.

To achieve this goal India wants a favorable government in place to prevent Taliban from coming in power and help India in countering Kashmir based insurgents.[41] Secondly, India wants to use Afghan soil to create problems for Pakistan in Baluchistan and FATA, to internally engage Pakistan in terrorism and insurgencies so it may not take up Kashmir issue at any forum regionally or globally. In 2013, former US secretary of defense Chuck Hagel said in a statement that India is financing problems for Pakistan from the Afghan soil.[42] The confession of TTP financier Latif Mehsud[43] and former spokesman Ehsan Ullah Ehsan- (Liaquat Ali) unveiled the Indian involvement in Pakistan.[44]

The confession of Indian spy Kulbushan Yadav further consolidated Pakistan's position about the subversive activities of India inside Pakistan. Such policies are dangerous for regional peace and stability. Pakistan officially agitated the Indian government's involvement in terrorist activities in tribal areas and Baluchistan. It has also requested the Afghan government

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[38] Suleman Yousaf, "Afghanistan's Mineral Resource Potential: A Boon or Bane?" *Journal of Current Affairs*, Vol. 1, Nos.1&2: Islamabad: IPRI, 2016, 88.

[39] Erica Downs, "China buys into Afghanistan" *SAIS Review*, Vol. XXXII no. 2, Washington DC: John Hopkins University Press, 2012), 76. http://brook.gs/2rt1Q1g. Accessed on August 27, 2018

[40] Cindy A. Hurst and Robert Mathers, "Strategic Implications of the Afghan Mother Lode and China's Emerging Role", *Joint Force Quarterly 72*, 01 January 2014. http://bit.ly/2s9H9sn, 78.

[41] Larry Hanauer and Peter Chalk, *India's and Pakistan's Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region.* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2012), 11-12.

[42] "India finances trouble in Pakistan: Hagel" *Dawn*, Islamabad, February 27, 2013. http://bit.ly/2qQmMMY. Accessed on June 24, 2018

[43] "India is behind terrorism in Pakistan: TTP Commander Latif Ullah Mehsud Speaks out". 29 January 2016. YouTube video, http://bit.ly/2rLmri3. December 31, 2018.

[44] "Former TTP, JuA spox claims terrorist organizations being 'used' by India, Afghanistan" *Dawn*: Islamabad, April 27, 2017. http://bit.ly/2rtdU2L. Accessed on May 24, 2018.

to take action against such elements. But instead of solid action, the Afghan intelligence agencies in collaboration with Research and Analysis Wing-(R&AW) of India carried out nefarious activities in Baluchistan and tribal areas. Which compelled Pakistan to support the Afghan Taliban to counter the Indian influence in Afghanistan. Former Army Chief and President of Pakistan Parvez Musharraf acknowledged that Pakistan considered Afghan Taliban as allies because other factions in Afghanistan got the backing of Iran, India and Russia.[45]

In order to maintain strategic influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan rely on Afghan Taliban because they are powerful dominant group and a crucial player in the future political settlement of Afghanistan. This is the reason that many important countries including the US, Russia and China are directly negotiating with them.[46] The discord among Pakistan, India and Afghanistan must be resolved with meaningful negotiations. Pakistan and India must realize this fact that they cannot live without each other, instability in Afghanistan would hurt the interests of both parties.

Pakistan and India may not get access to Central Asia for their energy needs if Afghanistan is unstable. Afghanistan must also realize that the only viable route to connect with the rest of the region and to the outer world is through Pakistan. It must shun the aggressive policies influenced by India and seek help from Pakistan to overcome its problems in Afghanistan. The best way to resolve Afghan impasse is reconciliation and dialogue. It must be supported by Pakistan and India, only then stability in Afghanistan is possible.

Fragile Afghan Security Forces

The Afghan security forces are newly established force by the US, they are weak, lack motivation and adequate resources to fight highly organized, well trained Taliban guerrillas. Due to these reasons they are unable to protect Afghanistan and facing huge losses. The United States has spent around $68 billion on ANSFs since 2001 but it could not bring a drastic change in the operational capacity of the ANSFs.[47] The US has planned a force of about 352,000 but so far it could not meet the target.[48] Currently the strength of Afghan National Army is close to 183,000 men and police has

[45] Jon Boone, "Musharraf: Pakistan and India's backing for 'proxies' in Afghanistan must stop" *The Guardian*, February 13, 2015. http://bit.ly/2svW5yB. Accessed on August 11, 2018.

[46] Dawood Azami, "Afghanistan war: Taliban attend landmark peace talks in Russia" *BBC*, November 09 2018. (https://bbc.in/2zLoq8x, accessed on December 30, 2018).

[47] John F. Sopko, "Assessing the Capabilities and Effectiveness of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces". *SIGAR*, 12 February 2016. http://bit.ly/20Ql1Pq, 9.

[48] Ibid, 6.

about 151,000 personnel.[49] Whereas, Afghanistan is a huge country of about 652,864 sq. km[50] and the enemy is much stronger than ever before.

It is difficult for the ANSFs to cover whole Afghanistan with such a meagre force and it is beyond their capacity to eliminate Afghan Taliban, their safe heavens, training centers, command and control network from Afghanistan. Weak Afghan security forces are major challenge for the peace and stability of Afghanistan. It is necessary for the US to deploy more advisors and trainers to improve the quality of the ANSFs especially the local police and Special Forces. In addition, Pakistan can also help Afghanistan in this regard. Pakistan's army is a professional and highly trained force, it can help Afghan troops in counter insurgency and also equip them with light weapon and equipment. To achieve this goal there must be trust, faith and cordial relationship between both states.

Way Forward for Lasting Peace in Afghanistan

Afghanistan needs a holistic solution which is acceptable to all warring parties and stake holders. The following recommendations would bring long term peace and stability to war torn country which is prerequisite for the inter-regional connectivity and development of Afghanistan.

Collective Efforts at Regional and Global Level: Meaningful Reconciliation Process

Instability and turmoil in Afghanistan has seriously threatened the global peace and security. If Afghanistan is left on its own, then there would be a bloody civil war which may seriously hamper peace and stability of Afghanistan. All sorts of militant groups would take refuge and establish their training grounds, IED factories, network, command and control centers in Afghanistan. It is necessary that regional countries including Pakistan, Iran, Central Asian Republics, Russia, China and India must take concrete steps and help Afghanistan to come out of this quagmire of terrorism and extremism.

There is a dire need of meaningful dialogue process between Afghan Taliban and government to end this bloody insurgency and bring long lasting peace. In the same pattern, the major powers must also help Afghanistan to overcome operational deficiencies in its overall military capabilities. More funds, advisors and troops are needed to train ANSFs and carry out counter terrorism operations against Islamic state, Al-Qaeda and other irreconcilable militant groups in Afghanistan. Because if there is no peace in Afghanistan,

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[49] "Afghan National Security Forces-(ANSF)" *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, June 2013. http://bit.ly/18JhdGQ. Accessed on May 12, 2018.

[50] Karen Jacobs Sparks (Ed)., *Britannica Book of the Year 2012*. (London: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, 2012), 361.

we cannot expect peace at regional or global level. The IS, Al-Qaeda, IMU, ETIM and other militant groups would find shelter in unstable Afghanistan. It would again become a hotbed and a safe haven for all sorts of militant groups. However, it is necessary that NATO and regional countries of Afghanistan must work together and bring eternal peace to Afghanistan.

Pak-Afghan Border Management

The Pak-Afghan border management is one the issue that hampered the relationship between both states. Afghanistan is a land locked country, and Pakistan provides Afghan goods the shortest route to the world. Apart from legal trade between both states, smuggling also takes place between both countries, because of the poor border management. Different militant groups, criminal elements, drug mafia and smugglers use this porous border to carry out their nefarious activities.

It is imperative that Pakistan and Afghanistan must work closely and devise a mechanism to properly manage this border to disrupt movement of the militants, drug trade and other criminal activities. Both countries must increase the number of check posts along the Pak-Afghan border to keep constant check on the movement of the people. In addition, both states must make it compulsory for their citizens to carry valid identification documents, visa and passport etc.

It is quite difficult to keep vigilance over 2,400km Pak-Afghan border.[51] This is the reason that Pakistan has started fencing on the Afghan border to effectively curb the movement of smugglers and militants. Pakistan has planned to fence almost 2,611 km border with Afghanistan by December 2019. So far it has built 233 forts out of 843 and also completed the fencing of 802km out of 1,200 km priority one areas close to the border with Afghanistan to curb movement of the militants.[52] Pakistan can utilize its UAVs to monitor unchecked areas to disrupt any illegal movement of terrorists or smugglers. Pakistan and Afghanistan must take concrete steps towards the management of this mountainous and rugged border to dissuade any terrorist activity in this area.

Curb Terrorist Financing

Afghanistan has become the hub of narcotics trade and chief supplier of the world's opium. Drug trade is deep rooted in Afghan society, even many members of the Afghan parliament had been part of this trade.[53] The drug trafficking takes place from Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia. Through these

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[51] Joseph J. Collins, *Understanding the War in Afghanistan: A Guide to the Land, the People, and the Conflict.* (New York: Skyhorse Publishing Inc., 2013), 7.

[52] "Pak-Afghan border fencing to complete by Dec 2019: DG ISPR", *The Dawn*, December 31, 2018.

[53] Christopher M. Blanchard, "Afghanistan: Narcotics and U. S. Policy". *Congressional Research Service*, 12 August 2009. http://bit.ly/2sehRtJ, 8.

supply routes the Afghan opium reaches the global markets where it becomes highly profitable for the drug cartels. According to UNODC the estimated total value of Afghan drugs in the international market is in billions. Apart from this, the Afghan drug trade also work as a fuel for insurgency and terrorism in Afghanistan. Different terrorist groups generate millions of dollars from opium trade in Afghanistan.

Especially the Afghan Taliban generate in millions as protection money from drug mafia and farmers. This source of funding for militant groups would plunge the region into further mayhem and turmoil. It is necessary that Pakistan, Iran and Central Asian Republics must improve their vigilance at borders and disrupt any move to smuggle opium from Afghanistan to rest of the regions. In addition, the US may also carry out aerial spray to destroy opium crops and provide alternative livelihood to the Afghan farmers.

Counter Narrative- Role of the Ullemas

Most of the extremist organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan use religion Islam to recruit people and carry out terrorist activities. Here, the role of Ullemas or religious scholars becomes essential. The religious elite in both states must denounce all forms of terrorism and counter the narrative of militants with the help of Quran and Sunnah. Islam is the religion of peace and harmony. The Ullemas must represent the true picture of Islam to the masses and also interpret injunctions of Jihad in Quran and Sunnah with its true meaning, sense and context. The militants use their own interpretations to recruit and execute their terrorist activities. There is a need of counter narrative which must be humane and reflection of Quran and Sunnah. The madrassas in both states also needs an overhaul, transformation and proper monitoring. Most of the militants captured or killed had Madrassa education, which means there are loopholes in the education and management of Madrassas in both states. There is an urgency to revamp Madrassa education in both states. It must be at par with modern education system, a graduate of Madrassa must be fit in the society instead end up a radical or an extremist. With these steps we can counter the propaganda of the militants who use religion Islam for their own notorious political aims and objectives.

Massive Reconstruction and Development in Af-Pak Region

Afghanistan and Tribal Areas of Pakistan have suffered a lot in last few decades. Both areas were denied of education, socio economic and human resource development. Which made it easy for the terrorist organizations to manipulate and brainwash locals. People without education, employment and regular source of income were lured to join terrorist activities. This is the time that economically stable countries including China, Japan, Canada, Russia, Europe and America must come forward and help Afghanistan and Tribal areas of Pakistan in reconstruction and development process.

Regional states like Pakistan, Iran and India must also shun their proxy war and help Afghanistan to improve its economy, human resource, health care, infrastructure and education sectors. More schools, colleges and universities are needed to bring these societies at par with other developed areas or urban centers. In addition, there is a need to improve the human resource development in these areas. Pakistan and Afghanistan with the help of developed countries must establish small scale industries and technical schools in these war ravaged areas where people can learn different skills, earn diplomas and professional certificates to find a respectable livelihood.

Counter Terror Training of the Local Forces

The local forces in any country are first line of defense against any mala fide elements. The ANSF and local forces like FC, Khassadars and levies deployed in FATA needs serious help. The US along with its allies have raised a reasonable force against Taliban and other terrorist outfits in Afghanistan. But more efforts are required. Pakistan can play an important role in this regard. Pakistan's armed forces are well trained, war hardened and better equipped. In last 17 years they have learnt a lot from their counter terror/insurgency campaigns and their success rate in the war against terror has been monumental.

They can extend help to Afghanistan in this regard. The ANSF personnel could get training and material support from Pakistan provided they establish good brotherly relationship, eschew blame game and carry out a strategic partnership. The main issue right now is the mistrust and suspicion between both states. Pakistan believes that Afghanistan is trying to destabilize Pakistan in collaboration with India, whereas Afghanistan believes that Pakistan supports the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network for greater political role in Afghanistan. Such mistrust and blame game is causing huge losses to both states. They need to work together and improve the capacity of local forces along with their regular army to overcome security challenges.

Conclusion

Afghanistan is facing numerous challenges and it requires holistic approach to stabilize this war ravaged country. The withdrawal of the US forces plunged this country into unending war against terrorism and extremism. The failure of the US led alliance proven to be disastrous for Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban along with other terrorist groups emerged as an undeniable force and now they control many parts of Afghanistan, established their training and recruiting centers. This is the reason that Afghan Taliban are carrying out terrorist activities against Afghan government, ANSFs and resolute mission forces with greater impunity and

ferociousness. It is beyond the capacity of ANSFs to defeat the Afghan Taliban and their affiliates.

The limitations in ANSFs related to men, material and morale are irrepressible. The only option left with Afghan government is to seek dialogue and reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban and other reconcilable groups. The dialogue process must be led by the Afghan government and supported by other regional and global actors. The reconciliation and dialogue process between Afghan government and Taliban must be universal and all ethnic groups/stake holders must be part of it. In addition, the peace process must be followed by massive socio-economic development and reconstruction programs.

Major Powers, including China, America, Russia, EU, Canada and Japan must whole-heartedly support economic revitalization of Afghanistan. The regional actors, including Pakistan, India and Iran must also stop their nefarious activities against each other because proxy wars will not help any party. Pakistan and Afghanistan cannot live without each other. Afghanistan needs Pakistan to connect its economy, people and goods through sea ports whereas Pakistan needs Afghanistan to connect itself with energy rich Central Asian States to overcome its energy woes. Without stability in Afghanistan it would be difficult for Pakistan to benefit from resource rich Central Asian states to improve its economy and overcome serious energy shortfall. Both states are necessity of each other, however it is advisable that both states must improve their bilateral ties and enhance their economic partnership for stable and prosperous future.

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NEW COLD WAR: REBUILDING PAKISTAN RUSSIA RELATIONS

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Abstract

This paper explores Pakistan and Russia building relations at the backdrop of New Cold War in the South Asia. It argues and justifies that competing and rival groups in the present international system are forcing states to build new alliances. Hence, Pakistan's new collaborative strategy of allying itself with Russia is due to several political and economic developments amongst its immediate neighbors in the region. While Russia, a former super power is trying to revive its role in the region is also looking for new partners with converging interests to deal with its security issues at home. Both states can benefit from the new partnership if they properly use their strength and capabilities in the region. The article also argues that how certain changes are forcing both Pakistan and Russia to revisit their foreign policies, thus indicating a beginning of the "New Cold War" in the South Asia.

Key Words: South Asia, New Alliances, Foreign Policies and New Cold War

Introduction

There are no eternal friends or foes in international relations. States interests' converge and diverge depending on the world order and the prevailing situation. Once upon a time, building better bilateral relations with Russia was a challenge for Pakistan, however today's global realities and compulsions have forced Russia to get closer to its old foe. In addition, certain political developments are indicating towards building a New Cold

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War in the world. The most important is the recent withdrawal of the United States' government from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty that resulted in tearing existing accords and has paved the way for launching a new nuclear arms race.[1] The Russo-Western tensions in Ukraine and Georgia translate into proxy wars, revisiting the Cold War rivalries of the 1970s and 1980s between the former Soviet Union and United States.[2] Both actors are waging war against each other through its proxies and are looking for allies in different regions of Asia. In South Asia, Pakistan used and abused in the War against Terror (WoT), is left in the lurch by the United States at the time of economic crises and is now looking for new friends. In this situation, Pakistan can prove itself an important ally if Russia wants to revive and assert its role in the region. In addition, it would be easier for Moscow to seek support from Islamabad as Pakistan is in the process of seeking new partners to taper off reliance on the West and the United States.

It is understandable that both Russia and Pakistan are weary of United States policies in the region. The United States' growing ties with India including all-inclusive economic relations and cooperation in the field of defense has exasperated Pakistan. Moreover, the United States has displayed an unpredictable demanding attitude towards Pakistan after years of cooperation on the WoT. Russia's situation is more critical with the United States, after losing several of its republics in Eastern Europe and Central Asia is now striving to depose the United States from its policing position in the region. In addition, Russia's old ally and friend India has started purchasing arms from the United States, thus replacing Russian arms and ammunition with American ones. This situation and change in loyalties has forced both Pakistan and Russia to get closer. Building Pak-Russia relations is a significant development in the region too. While the Indian economy and market is a major attraction for the world including Russia, Pakistan's growing relations with the former super power has greater prospects in realizing the security objectives of both states. It is pertinent to mention that security concerns of Russia and Pakistan are so huge that it has adversely affected their economies.

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[1] Daryl Kimball, "The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance | Arms Control Association," accessed November 6, 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty.

[2] Rupert Cornwell, "Proxy Wars and Provocations: Relations between Russia and the US Are Chilling" *The Independent*, accessed November 6, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/proxy-wars-and-provocations-relations-between-russia-and-the-us-are-chilling-a6997526.html.

Theoretical Paradigm

Pakistan and Russia's relations can be analyzed in the light of realist theory. Presently, both states have some serious security concerns and converging interests in the region. In the anarchic global politics, states' interests and policies fluctuate with such an amazing pace that sometimes it transforms strategic alliances into discord and in many instances unites traditional foes. As Henry John Temple Palmerstone remarked during the House of Commons session on March 1, 1848, "we have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and it is our duty to follow such interests". Therefore, to safeguard its state interests, Pakistan, while on the defensive, is discarding its traditional hostility towards Russia and has initiated its alliance-building efforts through different pacts and agreements.[3] In addition, Pakistan's hostile history with India and border cum militancy related issues with Afghanistan forced its policy makers to keep evolving its strategy in the region.

At the onset of the New Cold War, certain states are formulating their policies with calculated risks and threats emanating from their internal and external environments. Consequently, Pakistan is now seeking an alliance with Russia to ensure the defense of its state and control terrorism. In alliances, defense collaboration amongst the states is multifaceted phenomenon that comprises complex sets of outcomes and effects. In the case of Pakistan, the primary intention behind its defense collaboration with Russia is not only building favorable strategic conditions but also to uphold and reduce its obligations in dealing with the several international terrorist groups stationed in the region through collective efforts. Therefore, such joint efforts would include arms transfers, military exercises and other relevant programs. All such defense pacts would need to be favorable for both states that are dealing with terrorism regionally and internationally. Although there is an asymmetry in the power balance between Pakistan and Russia, the partnership will have its significance in both security and economic fields as long as there are no other strings attached to it.

[3] Naveed, Arooj, "Outlining Pakistan's Regional Challenges in The 21st Century," *South Asian Voices*, September 16, 2015, https://southasianvoices.org/outlining-pakistans-regional-challenges-in-the-21st-century/.

Old foes turning friends and strategic partners might be confusing to many if changes related to security, economics and politics in the region are not assessed. Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Pakistan, Mr. Alexey Y. Dedov, mentioned that in the given circumstances it is inevitable for both Pakistan and Russia to develop combined defense capabilities to fight terrorism in the region.[4] Therefore, several economic and defense pacts have been signed between the two countries to address their immediate needs and interests in the region. Moreover, the New Cold War in the making is more dangerous and un-predictable as it not only manifests as 'chill' (the armaments race) but also as outright 'hot wars' in different parts of Asia, such as the Syrian Civil War being more of proxy war between United States and Russia resulting in both powers supporting different militant groups in Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East. In addition, NATO's hostile policy towards Russia in the region is alarming too.[5] Pakistan, in such a situation of international anarchy is facing political, economic and security problems and trying to evolve strategies to deal with all the chaos happening around its backyard. Let us not ignore that several militant outfits from Central Asia and the Middle East are also interfering and supporting militant groups in Pakistan.

In international relations, it is essential for the survival of a state to have self-defense, economic security and wield power to control others' intrusions. In addition, due to the absence of an effective order or a body to regulate the behavior of other (aggressive) states, it is essential for a state to enhance its power and mechanisms of self-defense.[6] Thus, it is important for a state like Pakistan to have power in its international dealings. For many states, the only unfailing form of power is the military strength required for its self-preservation. Therefore, many states blaming the present international system try to seek power and protect themselves through military force and aggressive strategies. Hence, as realist theorists' arguments revolve around power and international anarchy, their focus of discussion is that international anarchy forces states to struggle for power and search for alliances with the kinds of converging interests as we see in the case of Pakistan and Russia.[7]

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[4] Mr. Alexey Y. Dedov, "Russian Position on Afghanistan and Syria" (May 12, 2016).

[5] Jeremy Shapiro and Miriam R. Estrin, "The Proxy War Problem in Syria," *Brookings* (blog), February 4, 2014, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-proxy-war-problem-in-syria/.

[6] Karpowicz-Korab, Julian, W., "Political Realism in International Relations," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Summer 2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/realism-intl-relations.

[7] Mearsheimer, John J., "Structural Realism," in *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

According to the popular realist's view, primary actors in international relations are states and their main goal is security and protection of their national interests; hence they struggle for power to preserve their national and international interests.[8] In an anarchic environment, the state pursues and defends such interests in its given capability and to its best-calculated judgment. Thus, due to the absence of a consistent and reliable reconciliation process amongst states, force is an available means of achieving its external ends that increase anarchy.[9] However the realists, while discussing anarchy and protecting states' interests, are divided on several issues. The main discourse is that why do some states (e.g., the United States and Russia) want power. The classical realist Hans Morgenthau argues in his work *Politics Among Nations* that "it is the nature of every human to exercise some amount of power and since great powers (states) are also governed by the humans, hence, they want their state to have dominating position in their interaction with other states."[10]

However, the structural realists' view varies from the classical realists', that they believe that human nature does not strive for power but in the anarchic system, it is essential for the state as an entity to acquire power for survival and protection of its varied interests. They argue that the drive behind the desire for acquiring power is the anarchic structure of the international system.[11] John Herz, a structural theorist, coined the concept of 'security dilemma' and explains, "it is the international anarchy that assures the centrality of the struggle for power even in the absence of aggressiveness or similar factors."[12] Thus, many argue that the states attaining power is directly proportional to the security problems. In the anarchic international system, powers of several states (e.g., the United States and Russia) are unchecked, hence creating an uncertain environment of insecurity for many

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[8] Karpowicz-Korab, Julian, W., "Political Realism in International Relations," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Summer 2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/realism-intl-relations.

[9] Keohane, Robert O., "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism & Beyond," in *Neorealism & Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

[10] Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics among Nations*, 1948.

[11] Mearsheimer, John J., "Structural Realism," in *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[12] Beer, Francis a. and Hariman, Robert, *Post -Realism The Rhetorical Turn In International Relations* (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1996).

other states such as Pakistan. Therefore, the decision of many states acquiring power is justified with the objective to defend itself against the powerful states' potential attack and aggressiveness.[13]

There are two different groups within structural realism too, defensive and offensive. The defensive realists see anarchy as the main reason behind states' behavior of engaging in self-help mechanisms of defense like Pakistan. Many states fearing the absence or reduction of security in the international system resort to taking steps by maximizing their security and power; therefore, in many instances they mitigate the policies of other states' security apparatuses. Given the security problems in the regional sub-system, structural modifiers refer to the relative distribution of capabilities that enable individual states to carry out particular diplomatic and military strategies.[14] According to Kenneth Waltz, many states in the international and regional sub-systems are struggling for maximization of their power. Hence, maximization of power is pertinent to the states' survival in the international order, which is devoid of a global leviathan to give them any protection.[15] He also argues that while every state is an autonomous, sovereign and equal political unit, however it must rely on its own resources to realize its political and security interests in such an anarchic environment.[16]

The majority of states, due to security concerns, are also forced to compete with each other for power in the international system and sometimes in the regional sub-arrangements too. These states define power with security, however beyond certain limits; they avoid achieving relative advantage over others, fearing that it will escalate competition for power amongst the states or motivate them to join in alliances against each other. Thus, the balance of power system in international politics is an inevitable consequence of the anarchical structure. Many form alliances with weaker states to neutralize the dominant powers and to balance power in the international system. In many instances, the primary concern of such states is not the maximization of power but maintaining a balancing position in the system.[17] Hence, interaction and alliances between international entities can

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[13] Mearsheimer, John J., "Structural Realism," 2013.

[14] Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., "Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," *International Security* 25, no. 03 (Winter -2001 2000).

[15] Pashakhanlou, Arash Heydarian, "Comparing and Contrasting Classical Realism and Neorealism," *E-International Relations Students*, July 23, 2009, http://www.e-ir.info/2009/07/23/comparing-and-contrasting-classical-realism-and-neo-realism/.

[16] Donnelly, Jack, *Realism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[17] Sutch, Peter and Elias, Juanita, *The Basic International Relations* (Routledge: Taylor & Francis Group, 2007).

be seen through the lens of power capacity of each state in international politics. Alliances are used both as a device of balancing power and enhancing security; presently, we can see that the United States is trying to balance its power in South Asia and warming towards India. At the same time, Russia is trying to enhance its security by establishing military relations with Pakistan. Waltz analyzed two features of alliances: state entering into alliance to balance against the other state's power and other enhancing its powers through military alliance.[18]

Unlike defensive realists, offensive are slightly radical in defining international anarchy. They believe that anarchy in the international system is Hobbesian and there is no restraining power over states. Some security exists but only either in the bipolar arrangements or in the form of nuclear deterrence. Thus, many states try to attain security by maximizing their relative advantage within given framework of the power relationship. Offensive realists observe that such behavior of the state is relative to its capabilities and its external environment. Moreover, all such factors are also translated quite smoothly into state's foreign policy and shaping its interests in different regions such as Pakistan.[19] To them war is inevitable and possibility in such anarchic situation where power shifts constantly and uncertainly. Therefore, it is essential for the states' survival to maximize their power in such situation, and must be on guard, pay attention to the shifting powers, interests in world order and must be ready to gain advantages. In such anarchic world, the hegemonic status of a state can guarantee survival.[20] Russia is in the process of balancing power with United States and its allies as well trying to enhance its power with military pacts, consequently changing its policies and relations in the region.

Russia Revisiting its Foreign Policy in the Region

During the Cold War, Russia maintained intimate relations with India, which affected its relations with Pakistan. However, the end of the Cold War

[18] Patricia, Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponent of Peace, Weapons of War* (California: Stanford University Press, 2004).

[19] Schweller, Randall L., "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Under Balancing," *International Security* 29, no. 02 (Fall 2004).

[20] Paul, T. V., Wirtz, James J., and Fortmann, Michel, *Balance of Power: Theory & Practice in the 21st Century* (California: Stanford University Press, 2004).

drastically changed the status of Russia and its political and economic influence in the world. The multi-polarity restructured the world politics and economics too, thus forcing Russia to devise a strategy to revive its old position. It is observed that the position of Russia was challenged in its former republics that led to confrontation with the West, somehow renewing (new) Cold War with different policy and alliances. The unfortunate crises of Ukraine and Crimean followed by the sanctions and skirmishes devastated its economy.[21] Apart from these developments, the Chechen rebels, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria challenged its security, therefore, Pakistan, a South Asia Gatekeeper and fighting a war against terror is considered as an important ally.

Russia is monitoring several changes in the region too. The entry of Pakistan in the nuclear club altered the geopolitics of South Asia. Russia observed the recent denouement of ideological Pakistan-United States traditional alliance and emerging United States-India partnership in the region. These new changes were expected with the end of Cold War and if we analyze these changes in the light of realists' theories, the states' changing policies are not tantamount to the expression of detachment from the traditional alliances; rather, it is an indication of evolving relations and unrelentingly promoting their national interests. India feels that alliance with Russian will no more serve its interest in the region, specifically in Afghanistan, hence it is moving out from the orbit of the East and getting closer to the West. For Russia, Pakistan is a 'South Asian Gatekeeper'; therefore, it is trying to devise its policies based on broad-spectrum ties with an important state that is linking the gigantic economies of Eurasia, Iran, South Asia and China for the revival of its economy, and also it will be an ideal partner in curbing terrorism.[22] Therefore, it is pertinent to discuss Russia's economic, political and security concerns that changed its foreign policy.

a. Economic Concerns of Russia

Russia after the end of the Cold War struggled with Glasnost and Perestroika reforms. It is now trying to recover its economy while sitting on the pile of arms and ammunition. However, the instability and shift of alliances in the region affected Russia's economic ambitions tied to its arms sale too. During the Cold War, the major importers of Russian arms and ammunition were India, Vietnam, China, Syria, Algeria, Iran, Myanmar and

[21] Korybko, Andrew, "Pakistan Is The 'Zipper' Of Pan-Eurasian Integration," *Russian Institute for Strategic Studies*, November 15, 2015, https://en.riss.ru/analysis/18882/.
[22] Korybko, Andrew, "Pakistan Is The 'Zipper' Of Pan-Eurasian Integration," *Russian Institute for Strategic Studies*, November 15, 2015, https://en.riss.ru/analysis/18882/.

Egypt.[23] Nevertheless, the end of Cold War and onset of New Cold War opened the markets for many of its old trading partners, thus adversely affecting the arms trade of Russia. The striking development was the lifting of US arm embargo from Vietnam that dramatically changed the US-Vietnam relations and it prompted Vietnam to purchase defense equipment from the new markets.[24] Similarly, Myanmar diversified its military relations with the Western states after US lifted sanctions against it, which is another serious setback to the Russia's arms sale.[25] Similarly, economic crisis in Venezuela also proved detrimental to Russian arms. The poor economic growth in Venezuela resulted in the food shortages and unemployment, thus making it impossible for it to continue its armament and purchase of military equipment from Russia.[26] In addition, Syria a long trusted Arab ally located at the confluence of Middle East and Europe, rife with deadly civil war, forced Russia to intervene. It provided its forces and military equipment to Syria to curb the insurgency that resulted in huge loss of arm sale as Syria is not in any position to pay for the Russian military equipment on large scale.[27] Egypt's Arab Spring proved devastating for the Russia economy too as it has to contest not only with the United States but also with the other European states. Iran, a state slapped with the sanctions and involved in the Middle East conflict is moving closer to China due to certain compulsions in the region, therefore Russia is trying to compete with Chinese enthusiasm too.[28]

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[23] Pulipaka, Sanjay, "Russia's New Approach to Pakistan: All About Arms Sales," *The Diplomat*, September 28, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/russias-new-approach-to-pakistan-all-about-arms-sales/.

[24] Prashanth Parameswara ,"US-Vietnam Defense Relations: Problems and Prospects," The Diplomat, accessed November 6, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/us-vietnam-defense-relations-problems-and-prospects/.

[25] Kurlantzick, "The United States Begins Lifting Sanctions on Myanmar," Council on Foreign Relations, accessed November 6, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/united-states-begins-lifting-sanctions-myanmar.

[26] "How Venezuela's Crisis Developed and Drove out Millions of People - BBC News," accessed November 6, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36319877.

[27] Pulipaka, Sanjay, "Russia's New Approach to Pakistan: All About Arms Sales," September 28, 2016.

[28] Paul Stronski Ng Nicole and Paul Stronski Ng Nicole, "Cooperation and Competition: Russia and China in Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and the Arctic," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed November 6, 2018,

With such developments, Russia is trying to secure back the old and new markets for its arms and ammunition. Pakistan surrounded by the hostile neighbors is the largest importer of American and Chinese defense equipment, however the recent turn of events in the region and shift of alliances forced the two states to collaborate. Hence, the interests of Russia and Pakistan converge on certain political issues in the region that brought them together on trade of arms too. Pakistan finds a new importer in the form of Russia, while Russia has a new market and an ally close to China in the form of Pakistan for its economic gains and political concerns.[29]

b. Political Concerns of Russia

After the disintegration of USSR, Russia is strategizing greater Eurasia; however, it will be possible only if East is strengthened and stabilized. Therefore, Russia is holding meetings with Pakistan, China and Iran for the stability and security of Afghanistan. Russia spearheading meetings linked to regional security in the South Asia reflects its increasing pivot towards South Asia and ready to replace United States.[30] However, for affective implementation of any policy, Russia realizes that it needs a support of China and Pakistan in the South Asia. The recent civil nuclear deal between the India and United States opened a new debate in the South Asia and many security analysts are linking it with the mounting New Cold War. In addition, India growing role in Afghanistan also made Russia uneasy.[31] Chinese position has grown stronger economically as well as strategically in the Asia while it also sees Russia as a potential partner against the United States' hegemony.[32] Hence, it can be assessed that the timing is appropriate to form a nexus of which Russia can be an integral part. The Russian economy may be weak but its political acumen can benefit China. In this process of connecting to China, Pakistan can play an important role in

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https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/28/cooperation-and-competition-russia-and-china-in-central-asia-russian-far-east-and-arctic-pub-75673.

[29] Pulipaka, Sanjay, "Russia's New Approach to Pakistan: All About Arms Sales," *The Diplomat*, September 28, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/russias-new-approach-to-pakistan-all-about-arms-sales/.

[30] Kamran Yousaf, "Pakistan, Russia and China Inch Closer to Formal Alliance | The Express Tribune," accessed November 6, 2018, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1372490/pakistan-russia-china-inch-closer-formal-alliance/.

[31] James Griffiths, "Who Are the Key Players in Afghanistan?," CNN, accessed November 6, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/26/asia/afghanistan-pakistan-india-china-russia-us/index.html.

[32] Khlebnikov, Alexey, "What Are the Major Security Threats for Russia in Eurasia?," *Russia Direct*, September 20, 2016, http://www.russia-direct.org/debates/what-are-major-security-threats-russia-eurasia.

bridging a gap between them. The New Cold War would be different from the old one, more deadly and competitive.

c. Security Concern of Russia

The evolving geopolitical realities have transformed the nature of threats faced by the Russia, emanating from Eurasia instead of the West. The fluctuating world order elevated the standings of China and Russia in regional settings. However, it is understandable that any attempt from either Russia or China to exploit these changes in the pursuit of their interests would be challenged by the West.[33] Consequently, Russia may face numerous threats and challenges to its security. Once a super power, the largest country of the region would be adversely affected by the uncalled changes happening around it. Therefore, policy planners in Russia, cognizant of such challenges and threats exhaling from changing world order are cautious and trying to find and adjust with new allies. Again United States and its Western allies would be the competitors in New Cold War, thus any face-off with them would lead to stern military and economic challenges. Therefore, it is trying to keep relations normal with the West to support its economy, its investment and have access to modern technology. However, Russia is facing a serious security threat from the Ukraine problem, which is based on Minsk Agreement.[34]

Similarly, Russian insecurity stems from the Syria-Iraq issues in the Middle East and its connectivity with the Central Asia rebel groups too. It has become a party to the Syrian conflict to secure its turf from the United States and trying to contain the spill over of the militants to its region. In its backyard, the old wounds of Afghanistan are still bleeding and further aggravated with the extended stay of United States forces in the region. It is also cautious of the presence of violent group of Islamic State of Iraq and

[33] Sergey Karaganov, "The New Cold War and the Emerging Greater Eurasia," *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 9, no. 2 (July 2008).

[34] "Dialogue, Political Will Critical to Solving Crisis in Ukraine, Chairperson of Intergovernmental Organization Tells Security Council | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases," accessed November 6, 2018, https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13241.doc.htm.

Syria in the Central Asia too.[35] This terrorist group is becoming dangerous and expanding; hence, Russians feel the need that it should be tackled on the priority bases. In addition to all such security risks, the instability in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan has given birth to the drug economy too, which is threatening the whole region including Russia.[36]

South Asia is a very complex region, comprising states having both internal and external conflicts, thus threatening the whole region and its surroundings. However, Russian strategists are observing it from different perspectives; they are monitoring China as emerging power in the region and watching that India is moving to the new North club. While Iran is trying to get acceptance with the West; however, it is also actively involved in the Middle East's conflict.[37] Consequently, Russia felt the need to form a regional mechanism and an ally that along with it manage the regional territorial conflicts. Russia has observed that China's ambitious project of "one belt one road", which passes through Central Asia, has irked India, West and the United States. It has been observed that several efforts to subvert the project have taken place as well. It is understandable that any act of destabilizing Central Asia would directly affect Russia too due to the connectivity and its shared history. Thus, the regional settings are folding and unfolding geopolitical realities and forcing Russia to revisit its foreign policy to tackle such security issues. In such circumstances, the ideal nexus would be with the Pakistan, which shared almost the similar security concerns in the region.[38]

Pakistan Shifting Alliances and Changing its Policy in the Region

During the Cold War, South Asian geopolitics witnessed cordial ties between India and Russia, creating rift between Pakistan and Russia. This closeness also forced Pakistan to facilitate the capitalist block in the eviction

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[35] Theodor Tudoroiu, "The Reciprocal Constitutive Features of a Middle Eastern Partnership: The Russian–Syrian Bilateral Relations" 6, no. 2 (July 2015).

[36] Anthony H. Cordesman, "Afghan Narcotics: 2000-2018: From Control and Elimination Efforts to a Drug Economy and Bombings Labs," accessed November 6, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/afghan-narcotics-2000-2018-control-and-elimination-efforts-drug-economy-and-bombings-labs.

[37] Khlebnikov, Alexey, "What Are the Major Security Threats for Russia in Eurasia?," September 20, 2016.

[38] Khlebnikov, Alexey, "What Are the Major Security Threats for Russia in Eurasia?," *Russia Direct*, September 20, 2016, http://www.russia-direct.org/debates/what-are-major-security-threats-russia-eurasia.

of former Soviet Union from its neighborhood in 1989.[39] However, the end of ideological wars between the two superpowers brought crucial changes in the old alliances and relationships. Moreover, the incident of 9/11 also transformed the international politics that further disturbed the ties of old trusted friends in the South Asia. Pakistan due to its geo-strategic position has to get on board with the United States in fighting War on Terror. However, Pak-US relations deteriorated due to growing distrust between them, which resulted in bitterness and accusations. Hence, it is observed that Pakistan's association with the capitalist block during the Cold War and post 9/11 has created several economic and security problems within the state.

United States encouragement with India in Afghanistan has annoyed both Russia and Pakistan. It is also a beginning of shifting interests and alliances in the region. The United States preference of India over Pakistan in Afghanistan has distanced the old allies of the Cold War and brought old foes together. Moreover, India signing different economic and military pact has disturbed its ties with Russia.[40] However, it is also observed that both China and Russia are not very happy with India's new evolving relations with the United States, which is threatening their economic and political interests. Pakistan's political and economic closeness with China is not an issue for Russians. Thus, in such scenario, Pakistan finds Russia a better partner to safeguard its economic, political and security concerns in the region and in the New Cold War.

a. Pakistan's Economic Concerns

A developing state like Pakistan is facing security problems coupled with serious issues such as population explosion, income inequality, environmental changes, and poorly managed resources. Similarly, in the realist world, there is strife among the powerful states for resources and market, hence the world is experiencing persistent power shift. Thus, today's

[39] Alan Taylor, "The Soviet War in Afghanistan, 1979 - 1989 - The Atlantic," accessed November 6, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2014/08/the-soviet-war-in-afghanistan-1979-1989/100786/.

[40] Dr Moonis Ahmer, "The Growing Schism in Pak-US Relations - Daily Times," September 21, 2018, https://dailytimes.com.pk/300822/the-growing-schism-in-pak-us-relations/.

world is all about politics and economic development.[41] It is also understandable that Pakistan is passing through an evolutionary phase and struggling with its economy due to several reasons. However, persistent security threat and political instability has adversely affected its economy and made the state dependent on the International Monetary Fund and other donor agencies. Unfortunately, since Pakistan's inception, governments are depending more on the foreign assistance (of one block) and are not paying attention to create conducive environment for the partnership investments to sustain its economy by utilization of available resources. Therefore, in such grim conditions, the only sustainable solution available is to revive our economy with the assistance of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and to start looking for more partners that can assist us.[42]

Pakistan with CPEC has strengthened its relationship with China and has extended the courtesy to Russia too. It is a well-known fact that Russia and China are strategic partners and are part of BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization.[43] Russia supported Pakistan's bid to become a part of Shanghai Cooperation as well. The notion of "Sino-Russian Belt and Union" with the Eurasian states (One Belt One Road and Eurasia) has floated amongst the regional powers and if materialized, it will change the power dynamics in the region and will benefit Pakistan. It is important to highlight that Russia is also interested in assisting Pakistan in exploring Thar Coal and is ready to invest 2 billion dollars for the construction of North South gas pipeline.[44] There are debates and diplomacy going on regarding Russia joining the economic alliance of China and Pakistan. It would be more productive for Pakistan if bilateral alliance (CPEC) is changed into multilateral, it will not only safeguard Pakistan's economic interests but will also address some of its security concerns too.[45] In addition, it is pertinent for Pakistan to counter economic alliances detrimental for its economic health in the region through partnerships and strong lobbying.

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[41] Bruce Vaughn et al., "Security and the Environment in Pakistan," August 3, 2010, 21.

[42] Masood, Talat, "Key Issues Facing Pakistan Today," *Express Tribune*, September 23, 2016.

[43] News Desk, "Russia's Joining of CEPEC to Enhance China, Russia and Pakistan Cooperation.," *Pakistan Today*, July 1, 2017, https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/01/07/russias-joining-of-cpec-to-enhance-china-russia- and- pakistan- cooperation/.

[44] Almas Haider Naqvi and Yasir Masood, "Rejuvenating Pakistan-Russia Relations: Discernable Trends and Future," *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad* 37, no. 4 (2017).

[45] News Desk, "Russia's Joining of CEPEC to Enhance China, Russia and Pakistan Cooperation.," *Pakistan Today*, July 1, 2017, https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/01/07/russias-joining-of-cpec-to-enhance-china-russia- and- pakistan- cooperation/.

b. Pakistan's Political Concerns and Threats of Isolation

Pakistan has several political concerns that have forced it to find new alliances in the region and specifically with Russia. The strategic alliance with United States and its War on Terror has adversely affected Pakistan's security, political stability and economic situation. Today, Pakistani state faced with numerous challenges is forced to look around for new alliances to deal with all the challenges in order to get out of the quagmire. After three decades of isolation from Russia, it has realized that the partnership with the United States has compromised its security, crippled its economic growth due to perpetual conflict that also affected its relationship with neighbors in the region.[46] In 2017, Pakistan affirmed through its spokespersons and foreign personals that it needs a 'paradigm shift' in its foreign policy to deal with the rising regional security and economic problems.[47] Therefore, we have observed that Pakistani diplomatic delegations visited China, Iran, Turkey and Russia to generate support for its stance and role in bringing peace to Afghanistan. In addition, Pakistan was successful in bringing on board Russia and China in BRICS summit and naming Pakistani militant groups as part of their "regional security concern".[48] Russia recognized Pakistan's efforts on counterterrorist activities, extended its unequivocal support to Pakistan on Afghanistan's problem, and declared it an important player and a stakeholder in regional peace.[49] Hence, it is very important for Pakistan to align itself to Russia and neutralize the influence of India and United States in the region.

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[46] APP, "Pakistan Wants Recognition of Its Legitimate Security Concern in Region: Asif," *The Nations*, July 10, 2017.

[47] Umair Jamal, The, "Is a Paradigm Shift in Pakistan's Regional Policy Possible?," The Diplomat, accessed November 6, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/is-a-paradigm-shift-in-pakistans-regional-policy-possible/.

[48] Jamal, Umair, "Is a Paradigm Shift in Pakistan's Regional Policy Possible?," *The Diplomat*, September 14, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/is-a-paradigm-shift-in-pakistans-regional-policy-possible/.

[49] News Desk, "Pakistan Warns Trump against Piling up Pressure on Pakistan," *The Express Tribune*, September 24, 2017.

c. Pakistan's Security Concerns

The new regional setting and looming New Cold War has created new challenges including traditional and non-traditional security threats for Pakistan. These problems challenged the preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states. In the absence of a proper mechanism to address these global issues, many problems have become internal matters of the state. In the past, state faced conventional military threats to their security but in contemporary world, apart from conventional threats, states have to contemplate transnational threats to its security too. Today such threats are internationally organized crimes, terrorism, arms escalation, rise of non-state actors used by states as proxies and at times international isolation at different world forums that can be threatening to one's economy and safety. In international relations, it is experiential hazards that determine the conventional security posture of a state, however, in case of Pakistan; geography determines its security posture. Hence, it is observed that geopolitical realities forced Pakistan to evolve policies and undertake actions to ensure its protection. The decisions such as joining hands with United States in Soviet-Afghan war and then War on Terror are reflection of state's geographical compulsion and its survival in the hostile region.[50]

Pakistan's western border is resonating with the fear of militants' trespassing and creating mayhem on both sides. Afghans the main protagonists in the tussle between capitalists and communists have forgotten the Indian standpoint on Soviet invasion and are at loggerhead with Pakistan at several international forums.[51] Apart from the threats emanating from its western border, the eastern border of Pakistan is also not secure. The hardliner and rightist government in India has taken an aggressive military stance and are waging both limited conventional war and isolating Pakistan. Moreover, the aggressive government in the United States started a strategic partnership with India on nuclear and missile technology, defense and trade.[52] Similarly, United States radical government expressed its displeasure over Pakistan's role in curbing terrorism in the region and threatening Pakistan with serious repercussions.[53] Thus, it is pertinent for Pakistan's security to form defense alliances with the former super power to

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[50] Naveed, Arooj, "Outlining Pakistan's Regional Challenges in The 21st Century," *South Asian Voices*, September 16, 2015, https://southasianvoices.org/outlining-pakistans-regional-challenges-in-the-21st-century/.

[51] Masood, Talat, "Key Issues Facing Pakistan Today."

[52] Naveed, Arooj, "Outlining Pakistan's Regional Challenges in The 21st Century," September 16, 2015.

[53] Masood, Talat, "Key Issues Facing Pakistan Today."

neutralize threats to its borders. Both the states realize the security threats and are already in the process of signing different defense pacts.

Pakistan - Russia and New Cold War

The incident of 9/11 and United States' policy of War on Terror was a harbinger of changing the strategic scenario of the region, thus forcing many countries to transform their foreign policies. The New Cold War is building; the old alliances are breaking down and new are in the formation process. In fact, the world is already divided into two blocks, however this time it is not an ideological war but based on the convergence of political and economic interests. Moreover, such interests and alliances would be also temporary and at times unpredictable too. Although, economically, Russia is obviously weaker than the West and United States, however its military capabilities, primarily nuclear, are comparable. Today the non-Western pole is not weaker geo-economically, but in some sense even stronger than the West if to regard it as consisting not only of Russia, but of all non-Western Eurasia – or at least those parts of it that gravitate around the growing entente between Russia and China.

The New Cold War is already underway in the form of United States adopting military doctrines giving green light to new ambitious nuclear rearmament programs, openly speaking about the need to contain Russia and China as strategic competitors. There have been also signs of a possible "missile crisis" in Europe. In the information space, the old West's hostility toward China and particularly Russia has reached the level that reminds one of the worst years of the previous Cold War. The campaign against Russia's alleged interference in the American election and the search for Russian "agents of influence" look very much like the McCarthy witch-hunt, an opinion shared even by many American observers. Moreover, the economic sphere, sanctions and countersanctions are becoming a norm. Most of the anti-Russian sanctions are formally linked to the Minsk process. In case of China, Trump administration has started a tariff war. Though the anti-Chinese economic measures have a different legal form (duties rather than

sanctions, although some sanctions are imposed, too). Pakistan and new Trump administration is at loggerhead on WoT.[54]

The precarious security situation and economic problems forced Pakistan to establish relations with Russia. In 2007, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov visited Pakistan and renewed bilateral relations. Likewise, army chiefs of both sides also paid visits to each other's countries. In 2011, several incidents in the region brought them together; the killings of two Pakistani by the intelligence agency personnel of United States and later Abbotabad's operation made Pakistan realize that it is a high time to get out of the asymmetrical alliance.[55] The happenings of 2011, forced Pakistani think tank to think about diversifying its foreign policy options by plummeting its dependence on the United States. In 2012, Pakistani Foreign Minister visited Russia to discuss different subjects of energy, trade and defense sales. The strategic dialogues between Pak-Russia in 2013 provided a major breakthrough for enhancing the bilateral ties. In 2014, through series of such political and economic developments, the bilateral ties shifted into a military cooperation too.[56] Most of the meetings between the two states emphasized on developing harmonized efforts to combat international terrorism and narco-traffic.

Russia also supported Pakistan's full membership in Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).[57] Russia's Rostec hi-tech corporation also waved off embargo on delivery of armament and military equipment to Pakistan, which was imposed during Cold War.[58] Many analysts regard Russian changing policy crucial for its security too. The Crimean issue also forced Russia to start changing its policy towards Pakistan.[59] In 2015, both the states signed a watershed agreement, the details of which were not shared by both sides. However, Russia starts providing sophisticated military

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[54] Rafiq, Arif., "Pakistan: Russia's New Best Friends?," *The National Interest*, September 27, 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/pakistan-russias-new-best-friend-13945?page=5.

[55] Declan Walsh, "A CIA Spy, a Hail of Bullets, Three Killed and a US-Pakistan Diplomatic Row," *The Guardian*, February 20, 2011, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/20/cia-agent-lahore-civilian-deaths.

[56] Roy, Rajorshi., "Russia's Military Cooperation Agreement with Pakistan: An Assessment," *Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses*, December 15, 2014, https://idsa.in/idsacomments/RussiasMilitaryCooperationAgreement_rroy_151212.

[57] Haider, Mateen, "Pakistan, Russia Sign Landmark Defence Deal," *Dawn*, September 20, 2015.

[58] Haider, Mateen.

[59] Khan, Ikram Ullah and Waqar, Ifrah, "Pakistan-Russia Relations in the New Age," May 6, 2014.

equipment that can be used for its security. Later in 2016, several military drills and exercises were carried out together on Pak-Afghan border too.[60]

Conclusion

The intricacy of international politics is witnessing the transformation of states' policies leading to the dilution of the old partnerships and building up of new alliances. World is witnessing New Cold War in which United States is losing its support on War on Terror doctrine while Russia is getting closer to the states in Eurasia and South Asia. It is also observed that the two adversaries of the Cold War are again at loggerhead with each other in South Asia, Middle East and Eurasia, however this time Russia is more cautious in evolving its policy. Similarly, the closeness between Russia and Pakistan is unfolding the dynamics of contemporary politics too. Russia understands the importance of geo-strategic position of Pakistan in the political schemes. Moreover, it has deep comprehension of the situation that United States left Pakistan in lurch post-Cold War to deal with the ramifications of Afghan war. In addition, even today Pakistan is fighting with the spin-off Afghan war and growing influence of India in Afghan settlement process and its economy in recession. The building of New Cold War has brought the old foes come closer and if Pakistan strategizes its position properly then it can benefit both politically and economically in the region from Russian partnership.

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[60] Haider, Mateen, "Pakistan, Russia Sign Landmark Defence Deal."

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THE SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES' INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN FOR WAZIRISTAN

Habib Ullah ✦ & Hanif Khalil Ψ

Abstract

The tragic event of 9/11 and the subsequent US-led NATO Forces attack on Afghanistan left tremendous impacts on the Pashtun community living across the Pak-Afghan border. Owing to its immediate proximity and porous border with Afghanistan the tribal areas of Pakistan in general, and Waziristan in particular became a sanctuary for Taliban. The ensuing war between the State and non-State actors has scores of impacts on the region such as economic, political and cultural. This paper, however, due to space limitations, only explores some of the major social institutions of Waziristan such as the tribal Maliks (influential tribal chiefs), Jirga system (council of tribal elders), Lashkar (volunteer tribal militia) and Hujra (male community centre) that have been seriously undermined after the US invasion of Afghanistan and its spill-over effects on the region. Unlike most of the contemporary studies, that attribute the current social disruption in Waziristan to the so-called Pashtun's cultural violence or their religiosity, this paper attempts to investigate the problem in quite a new perspective. It argues that the current disruption in the social institutions of Waziristan is due to the alignment between Washington and Islamabad and the pursuit of their respective geopolitical interests in this tribal periphery.

Key Words: US, Pakistan military, militants, *Pashtuns,* Waziristan, tribal social institutions.

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Introduction

Waziristan constitutes the southwestern tribal periphery of Pakistan with a total area of 11326 square kilometers. It comprises two tribal agencies i.e. North and South Waziristan with a total population of 1217319 persons.[1] The population is predominantly Muslim, with small pockets of Hindu and Sikhs, living in different parts of the region. It is bordered with the Zhob district of Baluchistan in the south and Kurram agency in the north. In the east, it is surrounded by Dera Ismail Khan, Laki Marwat and Bannu districts, while in the west it is bordered by the three provinces of Afghanistan i.e. Paktika, Paktia and khost. The major *Pashtun* tribes inhabiting the region are: Wazirs, Mehsuds, Daurs Bettani etc.[2]

The *Pashtun* tribes of this region had their own institutional mechanism such as the tribal chiefs, *jirga, lashkar* and *hujra* that evolved over the past several centuries. These institutions regulated the tribal society within the context of *Pakhtunwali* (a *Pashtun* code of life). The role and function of these indigenous institutions, however, gradually changed because of some internal and external factors particularly after the introduction of FCR (Frontier crimes Regulation) by the British in 1901. Under this regulation the tribal *maliks* were graded according to their power and influences and were paid regular allowances in return for their loyalties to the British government. The traditional *Jirga* was replaced by FCR *Jirga* and its new version was designed so to serve only the imperial interests of the British India.[3] The post-colonial Pakistani governments also kept the British policy intact and administered the region through the same archaic regulations.

The *Pashtuns* tribes, living across the Pak-Afghan border, have greater solidarity to each other due to their shared ethnic and cultural background. Any major incursion on the one side of the Durand Line[4] has had direct impacts on the other side. It became evident during the USSR invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, when millions of Afghan refugees migrated to the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. The seeds of current extremism and social disruption in Waziristan were actually sown during the Afghan war of 1980s, when Pakistani government with the help of Saudi Arab and United States not only established a series of *Madrassas* (religious seminaries) but

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[1] *Population Survey*, (2017). Retrieved April 25, 2017, from: http://www.pbscensus.gov.pk/sites/default/files/bwpsr/fata/North & South Waziristan Agencies Blockwis E. Pdf

[2] Laiq Shah Derpakhel, *Waziristan*, (Lahore: Al Matbat ul Arabia, 1993), 36

[3] Maira hayat, "Still taming the turbulent frontiers? The State in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan". *JASO, N.S.1* (2), (Winter 2009), 182

[4] It is poorly marked boundary line of 2252 kilometers between the British India (now Pakistan) and Afghanistan. It is named after Sir Mortimer Durand, the then foreign secretary of British India because he had drawn and signed the Durand Line Agreement with Amir of Afghanistan on the behalf of British India.

also provided the local tribesmen with sophisticated weapons like Kalashnikov for the purpose of fighting *Jehad* (holy war) against the Russians troops in Afghanistan.[5]

With the US invasion of Afghanistan thousands of militants including some high profile Al Qaeda leaders crossed the Pak-Afghan border and got shelter in Waziristan. Under the US pressure Pervez Musharraf–the then president of Pakistan– ordered for the deployment of military in Waziristan and the rest of tribal agencies. The tribal indigenous institutions such as *tribal maliks, jirga* and *lashkar* were not only sidelined but left on the mercy of the militants. The US induced Pakistan's military operations against the militants and the subsequent peace deals between the two further legitimized the role of non-state actors in Waziristan.[6] In their struggle for social control and legitimacy, the militants created widespread panic in the region through targeted killings and suicide attacks. They not only targeted the existing social institutions but also introduced a parallel social mechanism of their own. The ensuing war between the state and non- state actors led to a widespread destruction and displacement from the region, thereby undermining the existing social institutions in Waziristan. The paper in hand aims to investigate the ensuing changes in the social institutions of Waziristan and to make a casual relationship of these changes with the US invasion of Afghanistan and its spill-over effects on the region.

Theoretical Framework

Every theoretical framework is a model. If useful it helps explain some of the variance we observe, rarely all of it. In this regard an attempt is made to understand the current social change in Waziristan in the light of Johan Galtung's "Theory of Structural Imperialism". According to Galtung, there always exists a system of exploitation that simultaneously operates at two levels i.e. inter-states and intra-states. At the inter-states level the center states exploit the periphery states, while at the intra-states level both the center of the center and the center of periphery states exploit their respective peripheries.[7]

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[5] Fazlur Rahim Marwat, "The genesis of change and modernization in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan". *IPRI Journal, 7*(2), (2006), 77

[6] International Crisis Group. "Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants". *Asia Report 125* (December 2006) Retrieved March 24, 2017 from https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/pakistan-s-tribal-areas-appeasing-militants

[7] Johan Galtung, "A Structural theory of imperialism". *Journal of Peace Research, 8* (2), (1971), 84

Imperialism of this kind, according to Galtung, does not mean simply the subjugation of one nation by another; rather it is the establishment of special type of relationship between the center and periphery elites, which tie them together. The theory postulates that vertical interaction between the core and periphery center proves detrimental for the periphery of the periphery irrespective of the fact whether this relationship between the two centers is based on "harmony of interest" or "disharmony of interest".[8]

There have been different phases of interaction between Washington and Islamabad, however, the two important phases i.e. (1979-1990) and the post 9/11 phase, are more relevant to Galtung's theory of Structural Imperialism. During these two phases, the vertical interaction between the two centers left adverse impacts on the periphery of periphery (Waziristan). First, the tribal society was radicalized in the name of *Jihad* (holy war) and later on, the radicalized factions and their followers were declared as terrorists. The post 9/11 phase has proved to be more dangerous for Waziristan in term of social disruption because the already marginalized social institutions of the region almost reached on verge of collapse.

To know the post 9/11 social disruption in the region, different tools were used for data collection that include oral interviews; participant observation; and content analysis of the existing literature on the region in the form of government reports, official files, monograph, books and research articles etc. Using snowball technique, thirty face-to-face in-depth interviews were conducted with different stakeholders of the area such as the tribal *maliks*, political activists, FATA parliamentarians, journalists, educationists, religious scholars, and tribal youths. In addition, the tool of focus group discussion was also used. Four focus group discussions were held: two each in DI Khan and Bannu with the internally displaced tribal youth and *maliks* respectively. Access to the tribal women was almost impossible due to the rigidly prevailing *Purdah* (veiling) system; however, only two women above the age of 70 years were interviewed at district Karak who were living as IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons).

The paper in hand primarily focuses on the post 9/11 changes in the social institutions of Waziristan, however, a brief history of these institutions is provided so that the level of change becomes more conspicuous. The four major social institutions, central to the present analysis are as follows:

Tribal Maliks (influential Tribal chiefs)

Unlike the settled areas, tribal society had its own mechanism for social control and governance. Tribal *maliks* played significant role in the operation of that mechanism. The basic criterion for becoming a tribal *malik* was *Shamirtya* (manhood) which required a person to offer meal to the

[8] Ibid. p.97.

visitors and focus on the wellbeing of his tribe. Apart from these, such a person should also be shrewd, should be able to talk effectively in *Jirga* with arguments, and should abide by his commitments. On the demise of a *malik* if his progeny failed to meet standard qualities, some other person from another family of the same sub-tribe would become *malik.*[9]

The traditional way of enlisting the *maliks* underwent changes during the British consolidation of power in India. At the time of selection, the *malik*'s loyalty, his social standing, particularly his ability to get allegiance from the tribesmen was to be seriously taken into consideration.[10] Under the new criterion distinguishing attributes of courage, hospitality and shrewdness required for being *malik* simply vanished and the system of *malikism* locked in those families whose elders could exceed other in allegiance to the British government.[11] The British's allowances to the tribal *maliks* in return for controlling their tribes made them a part of the colonial administration instead of the colonized.[12]

In the post colonial period the status and role of tribal *maliks* almost remained the same. In his speech to the tribal *Jirga,* held at Peshawar on April 17, 1948, Jinnah--the then Governor General of Pakistan-- assured the tribal *mailks* that they would be paid regular allowances, as they were receiving in the past, in return for their allegiance to the Pakistani state.[13] The perks and privileges, they received from the Pakistani governments, further entrench their position in the tribal society. During the USSR invasion of Afghanistan, tribal *maliks* lost some of their powers and prestige to the *mullah* (religious cleric) as a result of the massive radicalization in the region. As observed by Ahmad, "the *mullahs* who once looked to the elders for support were now seen as the guardians of Islam and dominated the political agenda of the agency".[14] However, despite these odds the institution of tribal *maliks* managed to survive. Good or bad, it kept the tribal society intact.

After the US invasion of Afghanistan and the resultant flow of militants into Waziristan, tribal *maliks* emerged as one of the most affected segments of

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[9] Taj Muhammad, *The Pashtuns of Waziristan and the custom based Waziri Law from Shariah perspective.* (Islamabad: Mithaq Interprises, 2005), 359

[10] Ahmad Saleem, *Angrei Raj Aur Pakhtoon Siyasat (British rule and Pakhtun politics), 1915-1948* (Urdu) (Lahore: Takhleeqat Pakistan, 1997), 93

[11] Muhammad, op-cit,p.360.

[12] Hayat, op-cit, p.192.

[13] "*Jinnah's speech to the tribal elders"* (April 17, 1948). (*NDC file no. 18/CF/48:132).* (National Documentation Centre, Islamabad, Pakistan).

[14] A. S. Ahmad, *The Thistle and the Drone: How America's war on terror became a global war on tribal Islam.* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2013), 66

society in term of socio-political marginalization. A local correspondent told the author:

> When Taliban first arrived in Waziristan they showered money on the local tribesmen to win over their sympathies. Initially many influential people including some tribal *maliks* started struggle for accommodating foreign militants, particularly the Arabs who were more generous. But soon the militants became too strong to be controlled.[15]

Any local person or institution, representing potential threat to the militants, came on their hit list. In a focus group discussion with the tribal *maliks*, they shared that the process of target killing first started from South Waziristan after some of the tribal *maliks* proposed before the military authorities to raise *lashkar* against the militants. Subsequently, a similar practice also started in North Waziristan thereby engulfing the whole tribal regions.[16] The exact number of tribal *maliks*, killed in Waziristan after 9/11, is not known because there is no reliable source in the form of FIR (First investigation report) or any authentic survey conducted in this region. However, during my interviews and focused group discussions with the people of this region it was exposed that most of the influential tribal chiefs were either assassinated or forced to leave the area. Waziristan and Bajaur emerged as the most affected agencies in term of the target killing of the tribal elders.
Pakistan army under the US pressure launched several military operations in Waziristan, which caused widespread destruction and displacement from the region. The most effective way of dealing with the *Pashtuns* tribes was to work within the tribal framework. As noted by Olaf Caro, "If you want to get anything done in dealing with the tribes, work through the tribal organizations; let the tribal leaders produce the good in their own way,"[17] This method, however, was ignored by the Pakistan army stationed in Waziristan. The tribal *maliks* were side lined by the civil-cum military establishment of Pakistan on the occasions of military operations and the subsequent peace deals with the militants.[18] This not only undermined the role of tribal *maliks* but also provided social space and legitimacy to the militants. Rahimullah Yousufzai–a renowned *Pashtun* Journalist and authority on tribal and Afghan affairs–told the author:

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[15] Author's interview with Khalid Khan—an IDP from South Waziristan—Karak: April 23, 2017.
[16] Author's Focus Group Discussion with the tribal *mailks*, Dera Ismael Khan: July 15, 2017.
[17] Sir Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans*, (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 398
[18] Farhat Taj, *Taliban and anti – Taliban.* (Tyne UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), 88

> The peace deals between Pakistan army and the militants developed a psychological pressure on the local tribesmen as they saw that the all powerful Pakistan army surrendered before a few thousands militants. It broke the traditional power configuration in Waziristan and reshaped the tribal society around the non state actors.[19]

Disappointed by the ambiguous policy of Pakistan's army, stationed in Waziristan, most of the tribal *maliks* either left Waziristan for settled areas or went into complete hibernation. Fareedullah Wazir during an interview at Islamabad informed the author:

> There might have been some individual cases of opportunistic hibernation on the part of *maliks* in the past, however, such holistic serenity of the tribal *maliks* on any national issue in Waziristan was the first ever event of this kind observed only after 9/11. Assassination of the tribal elders, if any, in the past would happen in the last resort, the militants opted for the last option at the first step.[20]

With the changing circumstances, the political outlook of the tribal *maliks* also changed. Previously, *maliks* have been stern supporters of the status-quo by resisting any idea of politico-administrative reforms in the region. After losing their previous stakes, a significant part of the tribal *maliks* radically changed their stance, from previously opposing the political reforms to the one demanding provincial status and integration with the Pakistani state. [21]

The militants' onslaught on tribal *maliks* was the most important of all their strategic attacks, aimed to create a region more vulnerable to the militant influences. The new strategy had dual strategic advantages for the militants. Firstly, the assassination of tribal *maliks* created power vacuum in the region, which was soon filled by the militants. Pakistani government neither supported the *maliks* against the militants nor filled that vacuum by introducing modern state apparatus, thereby leaving the space opened for the militants. Secondly, the brutal killings of tribal *maliks* by militants developed psychological pressure on the tribal population. During a Focus

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[19] Author's interview with Rahimullah Yousafzai--a renowned *Pashtun* journalist and authority on FATA and Afghan affairs, Peshawar: January 9, 2017.

[20] Author's interview with Faridullah Wazir (producer radio Pakistan Miranshah) Islamabad: August 4, 2017.

[21] Sikandar Ahmad Shah, *International law and Drone strikes in Pakistan: The legal and socio- Political aspects*, (London: Rutledge, 2015), 206

Group Discussion one of my respondents told: "If tribal *maliks* could not withstand the militants how it could be expected of a lay man to do so".[22] Hence the tribal *maliks* were the integral part of the tribal society, therefore, the fall of this institution had direct impacts on the rest of tribal institutions.

Jirga (council of elders)

Jirga has served to be the most important dispute resolution mechanism in the *Pashtun* tribal society. It was a group of elders usually comprised of two or more persons depending upon the issue at hand, to discuss and decide an issue, which might range from a minor interpersonal issue to the bloody inter-tribal feuds[23]. The members of the *jirga* were required to have important characteristics such as social stature, proximity to the issue at hand and the confidence of the conflicting parties in them.[24] Disputes were mostly resolved according to the *Riwaj* (tribal customary law) but sometimes reference would also be made to the Islamic law depending upon the wishes of the conflicting parties. Except rare cases, the decisions of *jirga* were to be peacefully implemented. Its social legitimacy was so high, that people must abide by its rulings or risk expulsion from the community.[25]

Like the tribal *maliks*, the institution of *Jirga* also underwent structural changes during the British rule. An additional kind of *jirga* known as "FCR *jirga"* was introduced which was different from the traditional *jirga* in term of its composition and function.[26] Its members were to be selected by the political agent based on their loyalty and if the latter was not satisfied with their decision, he could order the case for further investigation or refer it to another *jirga*. Moreover, the decisions of FCR *jirga* were not binding; rather they had the status of recommendations and the actual power of conviction or acquittal still rested with the political agent.

The post-colonial Pakistani government also retained FCR *jirga* along with the traditional *jirga* whose functions were confined to the inter-personal issues or in some cases to the inter-tribal disputes. According to a local *malik*, the performance of traditional *jirga* also changed with the passage of time. The dispensation of justice became costly and sluggish. The members of *jirga* would demand feasts and pocket money from the disputing parties.[27]

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[22] Author's interview with Halil ur Rehman (Principal GHS Miranshah) Miranshah: October 6, 2017.

[23] Shah Sawar Khan Mama Khel Marwat, *Jirga* (Pashtu), (Laki Marwat: Danidh Kutabkhana, 2008), 34

[24] Dr. Sher Zuman Taizi, **"***Jirga System in Tribal Life*" (Peshawar: *Area Study Center University of Peshawar* 2007). Retrieved
April 13, 2017, From: http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-

[25] Ghulam Qadir Khan Daur, *Cheegha*: *The call from Waziristan the last outpost.* (Sweden: I-Aleph, 2014), 141

[26] James W.Spain, *The Pathan borderland*, (The Hague: Mouton, 1963), 145

[27] Author's interview with *Malik* Saadi Khan, Wana: April 13, 2017.

Good or bad, *Jirga* remained the only institution for dispute resolution in the tribal society.

The US invasion of Afghanistan and the resultant flow of militants into Waziristan have had direct impacts on the institution of *jirga. B*eing a potent institution, *jirga* was viewed by the militants as threat to their independent activities in the region. The activities of *jirga*'s members were strictly watched over by the militants. A local elder informed the author that in the beginning Taliban tried to discourage the *Jirga's* members through sending intimidation letters. When it did not work, they started suicide attacks on *jirga's* meetings, convened for the purpose of countering militancy.[28]

Attacks on *jirga's* members were not confined only to Waziristan; it engulfed the whole tribal region. At Darra Adam Khel *a jirga* meeting was attacked by a bomber, which claimed 40 lives, beside the other 50 that got serious injuries.[29] These attacks have long-term impacts on the institution of *jirga* in Waziristan. Firstly, it reduced the number of *jirga*'s meetings, particularly the large *jirga'*s meetings that usually dealt the inter-tribal issues. Mehboob Khan, a Baka Khel Wazir informed the author:

> Unlike the past, *jirga*'s meetings in the open areas are no more possible. Fearing the militants' attacks and the US drone strikes, these meetings, if any, are held in private without getting any publicity. The number of participants is much smaller as compared to the earlier practices.[30]

The small numbers of *jirgas* that seldom hold its meetings in Waziristan also dealt with only those issues having nothing to do with militancy. Owing to the rampant fear of militants' attacks, the issue of militancy has become exclusively out of the *jirga'*s jurisdiction. Leaving such important sphere like militancy to the Pakistan military is like the virtual collapse of the *jirga.*

Secondly, these attacks on *jirga* meetings have also changed the perceptions of local people regarding this institution. The ability of *jirga* to serve as an effective dispute resolution mechanism has been questioned by the local people. A graduate student from Miranshah told the author, "If it (*jirga*) cannot protect itself, how it would be able to protect us from the militants'

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[28] Author's interview with Moeet khan (a local elder) Mir Ali: May 5, 2017.

[29] Daud Khattak, "Suicide bomber attacks Darra elders, kills 40", *The Daily Times*, (March 3, 2008). Retrieved August 21, 2017, From: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C035C03%5Cstory-3-3-2008 – pg1-1.

[30] Author's interview with Mehboob Khan Wazir (Assistant professor Government Degree College Mamesh khel), Bannu: October 9, 2016.

assault or represent our interest in rightful manner".[31] Another correspondent complained that as far as American troops are there in Afghanistan, this region (Waziristan) and its people will be used for proxy wars by the Pakistani state centre. He further added that in such a state of proxy war the tribal people cannot expect *jirga* to deliver justice.[32]

The militants' policy of force and suppression did half of the work i.e. insulating the tribal people from the institution of *jirga*, and the rest of half was done by introducing their own mechanism of justice i.e. Taliban *Shura* (consultative council). The new mechanism was branded under the banner of "Islamic justice" and people were attracted and in some cases forced to seek justice out of it. The emergence of *Taliban' shura* proved a serious blow to the institution of *jirga*, which was already in the dilapidated position. *Shura* started function as a parallel institution providing justice to the people with its own mechanism. Saidullah Jan, a tribesman from South Waziristan said:

> At the start, Taliban raised the motto of Islamic justice. They would invite disputing parties to their office and decide disputes without demanding any feast or pocket money. But later on some of the local members of *shura* influenced its decisions in favor of their own kiths and kin.[33]

The members of Taliban *shura* were mostly young men having no classic experience of the *Pashtun* traditions. They did not care for local traditions and decided cases in their own manner with the label of Islamic justice. Moreover, they were neither the representatives of the tribal people by lineage nor by election. A tribal elder from South Waziristan told the author:

> The members of *Taliban's shura* were neither trained in Islamic *shariah* nor in *Pashtunwali*, a *Pashtun* code of life. They were mostly young men between the age of 20 to 30 with a poor reputation in the past. Their services were hired by the foreign militants and the latter had no concern with their previous record....How could one expect justice from a person who himself had been a professional thief and dacoit in the past.[34]

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[31] Author's interview with Baitullah Wazir (Graduate student Government degree college Miranshah), Miranshah: August 9, 2016.

[32] Author's interview with Nazir Gul Dawar– an IDP (Internally Displaced Person--from North Waziristan, Bannu: November 13, 2016.

[33] Author's interview with Saidullh Jan --an IDP (Internally Displaced Person--from South Waziristan, DI Khan: October 7, 2017.

[34] Author's interview with Safar, Gul Mehsud (Tribal elder from South Waziristan) Tank: August 21, 2017.

The aforementioned view clearly reflects that *Taliban*'s *shura* was not a representative body; its members were selected by the militants' commander with a clear aim to uphold the militant version of *Sharia* law. Moreover, the laws of *Sharia* invoked by the members of *shura* were incompatible with the basic components of *Pashtunwali* within which *jirga* operated.[35]

The role of *jirga* in Waziristan has also been undermined by the growing involvement of Pakistan army in the region. *Jirga* of any significant size cannot take place in Waziristan without at least the implicit approval of Pakistan army, and its ruling is implemented only if they correspond to the army doctrine.[36] In the given circumstances, the institution of *jirga* can no longer enjoy the power to execute its decisions through raising the traditional tribal *lashkar*.

Lashkar (volunteer militia)

The term *Lashkar* denotes troops.[37] Some western authors have referred to it as "raiding party*"* and "militia".[38] In tribal context *Lashkar* has been a group of armed tribesmen arranged on temporary basis usually for the implementation of a *jirga*'s decision. It can be raised against the individual or the tribe defying the *jirga'*s decision. But some time it is put up against another tribe or clan in case of dispute over land, mountains or water and is used as an instrument to take possession from another tribe.[39] Once *Lashkar* is formed, it usually remains operative for few hours or days but in extreme cases, it can be extended up to weeks or a month. Its members diffuse only on the call of *jirga* after the objectives have been successfully achieved or any patch up concluded between the tribes.

Apart from its traditional role, the institution of *lashkar* has been employed by the Pakistani state as a volunteer force during its wars against India. A great number of volunteer tribesmen from Waziristan were mobilized and made them fight along the regular Pakistani army against the Indian troops during the war of 1948 and 1965.[40] Similarly, during the ongoing war on

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[35] Farhat Taj (b), *"Compatibility: The Pakhtun culture, Talibanization and obscenity"*. Retrieved 14 May, 2016, from: http://www.pakhtunkhwapeaceforum.blogspot .com/pakhtun Culture-and-talibanization.html.

[36] Taj, (a), Op-cit, p.68.

[37] Rashid Waziri, "Tribal Belt or Blood Theater". *Journal of Regional Studies Center of Afghanistan.* No 12, (2009), 36

[38]C. Christine, Fair & Peter Chalk , *Fortifying Pakistan: the Role of US Internal Security Assistance*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 74

[39]Ali Gohar, *Who learns from whom? Pukhtun traditions in modern perspective*, (Peshawar: Abasin Printing Services, 2010), 70

[40] Darpakhel, Op-cit, p.356.Also see Daur, Op-cit, pp.29-33.

terror the institution of *lashkar* was again employed by the Pakistani state as a second line of defense against the militants.

The central government of Pakistan, particularly the provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa inspired the local authorities to form *lashkars* in different parts of the tribal areas. The organizers of *Aman Lashkars* known as "peace committees" were even issued appreciation letters by the government of *Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa*, commending their efforts for the maintenance of peace in the region.[41] The members of *lashkar* were promised, by the government authorities, to be provided with all sorts of material and monetary support against the militants. Accordingly, *Aman Lashkars* were formed in tribal agencies such as Khyber, Mohmand and Bajawar where people's involvement in the counter militancy campaign was fairly well. In North and South Waziristan no such step succeeded as there was strong presence of militants' network. In Khyber agency violent incidents took place between the members of *Aman Lashkar* and the militants, in which dozen of the local volunteers lost their lives. This was followed by similar incidents in Mohmand and Bajaur agencies where the members of peace committees were brutally killed by the militants. Akhunzada Chattan---a parliamentarian from Bajaur—told the author that the members of peace committees performed their duties with great enthusiasm but they were deserted by the governments which dampened their spirits[42].

This view is also supported by Farhat Taj who notes, "The lack of government support to the *lashkar*, and in some cases the former collusion with the militants has been a major source of people dissuasion from this institution".[43]

The militants' strategy of target killing has instilled a widespread terror in the mind of the common people who are now increasingly averse to the idea of joining the tribal *lashkars*. Except *Bajaur* agency where *lashkar* performance was fairly well, it has failed to perform the same in the rest of the agencies.[44] The case of Waziristan has been the worst among all the tribal agencies in this regard. Due to its vital geo-strategic location, militants have demonstrated "zero tolerance" to the formation of *lashkar* in Waziristan. Any person simply proposing the idea of *lashkar* formation against the militant would be their next target. An IDP from Mir Ali informed the author:

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[41] Taj (a), op-cit, p. 38.

[42] Author's interview with Akhunzada Chattan—a parliamentarian from Bajawar Agency—Peshawar: April 19, 2017.

[43] Ibid. p. 88.

[44] Abdul Shakoor, *Pakhtun and the war on terror: A cultural perspective* (Unpublished Ph D thesis) (Peshawar: Department of IR, University of Peshawar, 2012), 226

> We convened a tribal *jirga* in mid 2008 in order to form *Aman Lashkar* (peace committee) to bring peace in the region. The *jirga* comprised local tribesmen and *maliks*. The issue under consideration was to raise a tribal *lashkar* to counteract militancy. A suicide attack took place on *jirga* resulting into a number of causalities including an election candidate Itwar Ali. The *Aman Lshkar* survived only for fifteen days and was soon abolished thereafter.[45]

The idea of state sponsored *Aman Lashkar* that was tried by the Pakistan army in North Waziristan in 2008, also failed due to the prevailing uncertainty in the region. The previous treatment done to the members of peace committees in different tribal agencies have made the people of Waziristan highly suspicious of the Pakistan army role. Like the rest of social institutions the failure of *Lashkar* in Waziristan too was due to the competing interests between the US and Pakistan army in the region. The dual game played by some segments of Pakistan army in the region has made them reluctant to join the tribal *lashkar*.

The fall of the aforementioned three major institutions had direct impacts on *hujra*, which served as a pedestal for the organization and management of these institutions.

Hujra (Village Community Center)

Hujra is an Arabic word, which means room or cell.[46] In the tribal areas of Pakistan mostly inhabited by *Pashtuns* population, every *khel* had its own *hujra*– the *khel* community center– with a marked boundary but no wall around it, indicating the free access of every one to it.[47]

Hujra in tribal areas has been a yardstick through which the integrity and social standing of the families in *khel* (clan) could be measured. A well-stocked and well-maintained *hujra* has always been a sign of integrity among the families, indicating that the elders are in control of the community issues. An ill-maintained *hujra* would, conversely, show the elders' weak control over the families and the lack of commitment on the part of the family members to shoulder responsibilities or care for the family name.[48]

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[45]Author's interview with Karim Khan Daur (an IDP from Mir Ali), Karak: July 7, 2017.

[46] Mamoon Khan Khattak, et al, "Impact Analysis of Rural to Urban Migration on Hujra System of Pashtun Society", *The Dialogue* vol x No.1, 2015, p.81.

[47] M. Azam Baig, *Pakhtunkhwa Today*. (Peshawar: Dunya Pvt. Limited, 2009), 80

[48] Daur, op-cit,p.62.

Hujra has been an integral part of *Pashtun* culture where all kinds of social activities ranging from wedding ceremonies to the funeral process and condolence would take place. Beyond a forum of entertainment, *hujra* has been a place of character building. Being the first training school it served as a conduit to pass on the elderly traits of the forefathers into the tribal youths; wherein the latter would learn how to greet people, offer them hospitality, make them comfortable and to finally see them off. [49]

The institution of *hujra* has been central to the communal life of the tribal society. Being a symbol of unity, it successfully managed to fuse different families into *khels*, and *khels* into tribe. It provided social spaces where different issues concerning the communal life were brought on the table, discussed, debated and brainstormed. Above all, this institution served as a public forum for the organization of other institutions like *jirga*, *lashkar*, *cheegha* etc.[50]

Like the rest of social institutions, *hujra* has been through different historical stages. In the FCR (Frontier Crimes Regulation), it was devised that no *hujra* will be constructed without the prior permission of the political agent, a representative of the central government. Restriction on *hujra* can be best reflected from article 33 of the FCR (1901) which states:

> No building of the kind commonly known as "hujra" or "chauk" and no building intended to be used as a "hujra" or "chauk" shall be erected or built, and no existing building not now used as a "hujra" or "chauk", shall at any time be used as such, without the previous sanction in writing of the Deputy Commissioner. Whoever contravenes the provisions of Sub-section shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to six months or with fine, or with both.[51]

Despite these restrictions, the institution of *hujra* remained intact in traditional manner. During the 1960s and 1970s a significant number of youngsters from Waziristan migrated to Arab countries for overseas employments. Because of foreign remittances some well off families in Waziristan made separate arrangement of *hujra* for themselves in the form of *bettak/ Chowk* (local names used for *hujra*) attached to their houses.[52] The new trend of individual *bettaks*, though, was not a common phenomenon all over Waziristan; it had significant impacts on the community *hujra*. After the USSR invasion of Afghanistan the dynamics of *Pashtun* tribal society underwent changes. *Hujra* and the attached

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[49] Ibid. pp.62-63.

[50] Sultan i Rome, "*Pukhtu: The Pukhtun code of life*". Retrieved May 24, 2016. From: http://www.mitpressjournals.Org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2009.33.3.180

[51] For detail see article 33 of *The Frontier Crime Regulation* (FCR), 1901.

[52] Khattak, op-cit, p.80.

stakeholders i.e. tribal *maliks* were sidelined as they could no more serve the imperial designs of both Washington and Islamabad. A score of *Madrassas* (religious schools) and *Jumaat* (mosques) were constructed in the tribal areas with the help of Saudi and American aid, which became the centers of religious mobilization.

With the US invasion of Afghanistan situation in Waziristan became unmanageable and the institution of *hujra* underwent drastic changes with respect to its previous role in the tribal society. In a focus group discussion with the tribal students at Bannu one of my respondents told that any significant activity taking place in *hujra* is strictly watched over by the Pakistan army. He also shared that they cannot provide *Melmastya* (hospitality) to their guests according to the tribal traditions. He further complained that tribal people cannot offer *Panah* (asylum) to the wayfarers because of the omnipresent fear of militants and Pakistan army. They have no means to protect their guests as they are fully disarmed by the Pakistani government. Another respondent referred to the point that when two or more persons get together, they have to give the reason for their being together.[53] I also observed this change during my field work. For each night during my stay at Mir Ali (North Waziristan), I was told by my host (friend) to change the place.[54]

Being a public institution the institution of *hujra* was also affected by the vast scale displacements from Waziristan as a result of the Pakistan military operations. In South Waziristan displacement took place mostly in the areas inhabiting by Mehsud and Burqi tribes. Ahmadzai Wazirs, living in Wana and its suburbs were largely unmoved by the military operations. Similarly, in North Waziristan the areas inhabiting by Uthmanzai wazirs and Daur tribes were mostly evacuated as a result of operation Zarb-e-Azab, launched by the Pakistan's military in 2014. For the internally displaced persons there was no such arrangement of *hujras* in the IDPs camps and rural communities, they were living in. The detachment of IDPs from *hujra* for a period of more than a decade has changed their attitudes and perceptions regarding this institution and the attached cultural values. A Mehsud tribesman told the author:

> Being an immovable institution, *hujra* could not be carried with by the IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) to their host communities. Neither the IDPs camps nor the host communities (they are living in) have any provision of community center for

[53] Author Focus Group Discussion with the tribal students, Bannu: September 4, 2017.
[54] Author Field Note, August, 2017.

> the displaced persons. The new generation of IDPs is becoming totally stranger to the very concept of *hujra.*[55]

Although, physically *hujra* still exists in Waziristan, it has lost its previous role. The fearing environment is so pervasive that people prefer to stay inside their homes. Gathering of people in *hujra* and gossiping till late night are out dated traditions. It may risk their lives, either by the militant's attack or drone strike which is a common phenomenon in Waziristan. The previous role of *hujra* as a community center as well as a platform for the different socio-cultural activities to is no longer there.[56]

Conclusion

In view of the above findings it can be concluded that social institutions in Waziristan have been undermined in unprecedented manner during the ongoing war on terror in this region. The militant's policy of targeted killing in Waziristan not only led to the hibernation of the tribal maliks but it has also affected the performance of the rest of social institutions like *jirga, laskar and hujra*. The US induced Pakistan's military operations against the militants and the subsequent peace deals between the two further entrenched the role of non-state actors in the region, thereby undermining the local institutions. Ignoring the tribal dynamics of war, both Washington and Islamabad opted for the policy of force and suppression which led to unprecedented social disruption and chaos in the region. Despite the heavy presence of Pakistan army in Waziristan no safeguard was provided to these indigenous institutions and in most cases they were pitched against the militants.

In the above analysis it was found that the current disruption in the social institutions of Waziristan was mainly due to the Washington-Islamabad alignment in the post 9/11 era and the pursuit of their respective geopolitical interest in this region which later on came to surface in the form of good and bad Taliban.

The indigenous institutions and the attached cultural values that spoiled during the ongoing war in the region have very little prospects to be revived yet again. In the given circumstances, a more sustainable social change is required in the region. For this, Pakistani government should focus to understand the dynamics of social change and to make it more valuable for the people of this tribal periphery as suggested by Galtung.

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[55] Author's interview with Arbaz Khan Mehsud—Social activist from South Waziristan—D I Khan: September 7, 2017.

[56] Daur, Op-cit, p.256 .

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AREA STUDIES: NATURE AND SCOPE

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Abstract

The paper briefly describes the nature and scope of the Area Studies. It highlights the relationship between Area Studies and other traditional disciplines of social sciences, humanities and arts. The "multidisciplinary lens" is essential for Area Studies because no single academic discipline is capable of capturing and conveying a full understanding of another nation, or society or culture's Social Mechanisms. The Social Mechanisms comprising Structure and Super-structure can be political, legal, economic, educational, religious and anthropological etc., are study objects of various disciplines/sciences. These are interrelated systems and therefore are interdisciplinary. As these Social Mechanisms involve human beings/societies which in turn are objects of Area Studies and therefore Area Studies are multidisciplinary as well interdisciplinary. Various academic theories have been developed by human beings for the welfare of human beings. Area Studies own all academic theories because it provides the study object i.e. human beings/society, for the application of theories and therefore could not have its own specific theory or theories.

The paper also argues that the research approach and angle of study in Area Studies varies from country to country as per their national interests and bilateral relations. Area Studies need to build bridges between the disciplines of Area Studies and other departments or traditional disciplines in order to strengthen their disciplinary basis as well as interdependence. It is imperative because Area Studies are needed for disciplines as much as disciplines are needed for Area Studies.

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Key Words: Area Studies, Academic Disciplines, Multi-disciplines, Universities, Social Sciences, Interdisciplinary

Introduction

This particular paper briefly describes the nature, scope and extent of the discipline of Area Studies and its relationship with other academic disciplines. Area Studies refers to a methodical and scientific study of a nation or society of a defined or specific geographical space. Area Studies have been planned as a unit to meet requirements of understanding all aspects of life in a specific region/area.[1] The term can be generally applied to the comprehensive study of a single national territory/area or region such as Australian studies, American studies, Russian studies etc., while can also be applied to any study of a bi-national or multi-national region/area like Central Asian studies, South Asian studies, European studies etc. Area Studies has been defined as a scientific study of a particular region in order to understand as well as explain the region's place and role in international society and this can only be achieved by the methodical use of all branches of study that may provide valid explanations.[2] The descriptive and empirical contents of Area Study programmes vary widely and therefore programmes of Area Studies i.e. Scheme of Studies are in essence multidisciplinary – in more than two academic disciplines - as well as interdisciplinary because they combine or integrate two or more traditional academic disciplines at times. [3] According to Alan Tansman, Area Studies is a form of translation, analyses and interpretation of foreign cultures/societies through a multidisciplinary lens in order to know and understand them.[4] Area Studies in fact is an integrated, multidisciplinary coverage of an area while maintaining ground in a traditional discipline.[5] For instance at Area Study Centre for Russia, China and Central Asia, University of Peshawar, which runs MPhil and PhD programmes, a scholar having done Master in

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[1] John N. Hazard, "Law and Area Study Programs" , *International Social Science Bulletin*, IV(4), (1952). Retrieved from http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0005/000596/059694eo.pdf, accessed 17/9/2018

[2] Jean B. Duroselle, "Area Studies: Problem of Methods" *International Social Science Bulletin*, IV(4), (1952). Retrieved from http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0005/000596/059694eo.pdf, accessed 17/9/2018

3 As quoted by David L. Szanton, "The Origin, Nature, and Challenges of Area Studies in the United States", in David L. Szanton, ed., *The Politics of Knowledge: Area Studies and the Disciplines*, vol. 3, (University of California, Berkley, 2003)

4 David L. Szanton, op. cited.

5 David L. Szanton, "The Origin, Nature, and Challenges of Area Studies in the United States", in David L. Szanton, ed., *The Politics of Knowledge: Area Studies and the Disciplines*, vol. 3, (University of California, Berkley, 2003)

Economics has to conduct MPhil research in Economy or any aspect of the Economy of either Central Asian Republics or Russia or China after successfully completing the coursework. As the subject area is almost alien to the newly inducted MPhil and PhD scholars therefore the coursework at the Centre, comprising two semesters, is just like an introduction to the subject area through the lenses of multiple disciplines. The important factor which needs to be taken care of in Area Studies is that, for instance, a scholar having Master or equivalent degree in Law admitted to a Central Asian Study Centre for MPhil, must study courses on legal system and constitutional development in Central Asia along with other courses during the coursework. Same should be the regulation during coursework for scholars of other disciplines of social sciences acquiring higher education in Area Studies.

Area Studies is also said to be primarily an effort to make the meanings, assumptions, structure and socio-economic and political dynamics of another nation or society comprehensible to an outsider. However Area Studies at the same time provides opportunities to expand the outsider's knowledge and understanding of his/her own nation/society through analytical and comparative studies. For example a Central Asian studies scholar comparing Pakistan-Uzbekistan Cotton Sectors, he/she has to understand and know both Pakistan's as well as Uzbekistan's cotton sectors and then he/she will be able to compare/contrast both to find out fields of mutual interests and mutual cooperation regarding agriculture/cotton sectors. I stress here fields of mutual interests because we study Central Asia here in Pakistan from Pakistan's perspective.

Historical Background, Evolving Nature and Scope

Historically, Area Studies have their origin in the Eighteenth Century when the European powers started colonizing areas and started studying their languages, culture and social and political organisations.[6] This academic effort was mainly driven by commercial as well political interests of the European Powers. During the succeeding century i.e., Nineteenth Century, the European Universities witnessed the establishment of Area Studies as a colonial study.[7] However, the School of Slavonic Studies and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) were the first formal institutions established in London in 1915 and 1916 respectively as Area

[6] Bert Hoffmann and Andreas Mehler, "Area Studies", *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/topic/area-studies accessed 17/09/2018
[7] Ibid

Studies institutions.[8] Likewise Area Studies were established and developed in the first half of the Twentieth Century in the United States. Therefore, UK, USA and other European States have developed much strength in Area Studies and have tried well to understand rest of the World.[9]

Area Studies were established, organized and developed as mulitidisciplinary as well as interdisciplinary academic fields and therefore were placed on University Campuses to have close academic interaction between Area Studies and other traditional disciplines. An 'Area' cannot be studied, covered and understand fully through the prism and lenses of a single academic discipline. The traditional disciplines are nothing but they are different channels of knowledge. At an Area Study Centre, one has to study the subject Areas' historical background (History), economy (Economics), political system/s (Political Science), foreign policy/relations (International Relations), Geography, Sociology, Anthropology, conflicts and mechanisms of its resolution (Conflict Resolution), legal system/s (Law) language and literature in a particular language (English, Pashto, Russian, Chinese) etc. Area Studies, due to its multi-disciplinary nature, therefore, encompasses all academic disciplines particularly in social sciences, arts and humanities and organisation of Area Studies is required to be structured according to its nature. The courses of Area Studies are, therefore, designed on the basis of multiple disciplines. According to Lesley Pitman "there is almost no limit on the disciplines included in Area Studies apart from pure and applied sciences, and even they could be included in their historical and cultural aspects".[10]

Area Studies may help in upgrading and reconstructing an academic discipline by providing new material and new ideas to become an inclusive and more effective tool for socio-political, economic, ideological and cultural analysis and interpretations. Due to the diverse disciplinary bases and the determined evolution of the field, Area Studies scholars have been developing and legitimizing new understandings and forms of knowledge which academics in the social sciences and humanities are less likely to have imagined, and for understandable reasons. Historically, Area Studies have been producing new data, new ideas, new methods to key issues, and new units of enquiry, and have legitimized the intrinsic and analytic value of the perspectives of the "native" or the "other," and have been generating more

[8] Lesley Pitman, *Supporting Research in Area Studies: A Guide for Academic Libraries*, (Chandos Publishing: Oxford Press, 2015). Retrieved from http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1469352/2/area_studies_book_final_author%27s_text_UCL_template.pdf, accessed 17/9/2018
[9] Ibid
[10] Ibid

culturally rooted understandings and descriptions. By creating new types of multi-disciplinary academic units, Area Study Centre for Russia, China and Central Asia, University of Peshawar, for instance, has intellectually and academically transformed the University of Peshawar to a great extent in the realm of social Sciences, arts and humanities. Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar has produced 83 PhDs and 29 MPhil scholars since its establishment under the Parliament Act XLV in 1975. Initially the Centre was assigned the Area of Central Asia for research purposes, however the Government of Pakistan later on added Russia and China also to the Area of research. Other five Area Study Centres established under the parliament Act in Pakistan include: Area Study Centre for Americas, Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad, Area Study Centre for South Asia, University of Punjab, Lahore, Area Study Centre for Europe, University of Karachi, Area Study Centre for Far East and Southeast Asia, University of Sindh, Jamshoro and Area Study Centre for Middle East and Arab, University of Baluchistan, Quetta.

Generally it is said that Area Studies has no theories of its own. Let me explain that why Area Studies could not develop its own theories? Various academic theories have been developed by humans for the purpose of general welfare of human beings. This purpose will be achieved only through the application of these theories to the society/humans. Area Studies owns all academic theories because it provides the study object i.e. human beings/society, for the application of different and various academic theories and therefore could not have its own specific theory or theories. In other words Area Studies has as much theories as much disciplines are there in the realm of humanities, arts and social sciences. Area Studies give their practitioners better understanding of the phenomenon or theory they discuss through its application to a particular area/society.[11] The former Soviet Central Asia or former Soviet Union at large served as a laboratory to experiment different political, social and economic academic theories. It provides empirical study of communism as a political, social and economic system where different theories of social sciences were applied on the society. Area Studies verifies that there is always gape between theory and practice. When the theory of Karl Marx (Communism) was applied to the society in former Soviet space it could not produce a pure classless society (one of the main features of the theory) where the Chairmen of Collective Farms, Directors of State Farms and Governors of various regions enjoyed

[11] Kenneth J. Grieb, "Area Studies and the Traditional Disciplines" *The History Teacher*, 7(2) (Society for History Education, Feb., 1974), 228-238. Retrieved from http://home.sogang.ac.kr/sites/kylee/Courses/Lists/b6/Attachments/14/Area%20Studies%20and%20the%20Traditional%20Disciplines%20(1974).pdf, accessed 17/9/2018

better life than the workers. Similarly the theory of Adam Smith (Capitalism and Invisible Hand) i.e., no government intervention in economic affairs of state is unworkable in practice as proved by the Great Depression during the first half of the twentieth century, Asian financial crises of 1998 and global financial crises during 2008-09. The governments had to intervene to regulate their economies. In other words Area Studies provides opportunities to denote and address the deficiencies in theories through empirical research and application. It is also evident from China's modification of communism and socialism. China had started modifications in the theory of communism by as early as 1970 while former Soviet Union could not identify and address the deficiencies in the theory of communism.

The former Soviet States also provide the ideal laboratory for structured and focused analyses of their trajectories of post communist development. The proliferation of new topics has led to a much broader integration of post-Soviet study into the dominant theoretical concerns of the social science disciplines in the developed world. A significantly larger proportion of research articles in area as well as in disciplinary journals have been focusing and devoted to Area Studies of former Soviet states i.e. to analyse and conceptualize the transitional changes in the post-Communist era. Many published works during the 1990s focused on the ways these countries were dealing with the challenges of political transition i.e. democratizing their polities, economic transition from communism to capitalism i.e. marketizing their economies, and integrating into the international economic and political order. Significant research work has also been done and published on issues and matters related to state-building and nation-building, demilitarization, and transformation as well as diversification of foreign relations.[12] Besides historical, interpretive, descriptive, comparative, analytical and empirical research tools, tools of academic theory are essential part of training at Area Studies now. Area Studies scholars now conduct their research on the basis of theoretical frame work (theory) grounded in a traditional discipline.

Why or how Area Studies are interdisciplinary? The Social Mechanisms, i.e., Structure (base) and Super-structure, can be political, legal, economic, educational, religious, anthropological etc., are study objects of various disciplines/sciences and are interrelated systems, therefore interdisciplinary. As these Social Mechanisms involve human beings/societies which in turn

[12] Victoria E. Bonnell and George Breslauer, "Soviet and Post-Soviet Area Studies" in David L. Szanton, ed., *The Politics of Knowledge: Area Studies and the Disciplines*, Volume 3, (University of California, Berkley, 2003). Retrieved from http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context=uciaspubs/editedvolumes

are study objects of Area Studies and therefore multidisciplinary as well. Further Area Studies Programmes can be distinguished from traditional applied programmes of the types such as Political Science, or Economics because the primary objective of such programmes is typically to train students in the concepts and methods of a single discipline, while giving particular emphasis to the theories of that particular discipline. Importantly Area Studies as interdisciplinary research requires more a 'discipline' than a 'disciplinary' research.[13] For instance while studying economy of Central Asia, other auxiliary disciplines like geography, political science, law, anthropology etc., will help and cooperate but will subordinate their specific interests to the dominant discipline i.e. economics. Thus according to Hans J. Morgenthau it is the discipline of economics in this case which determines the common object of intellectual curiosity and call in other disciplines for assistance.[14] Integration requires a hierarchy of interests in which one interest has a function of integrating the others as mentioned above.

The principal objective of Area Studies Programmes on the other hand, is to study the area holistically, using whichever disciplinary or interdisciplinary approaches are most appropriate to understand the specific aspect of the area on which the scholars desire to concentrate. For example geopolitics of Central Asia refers to the analyses of geography, history, economics and other social sciences to understand the methods and tactics used by regional and extra regional states to formulate and apply their policies. It is also worth mentioning that there can be no institutional division between disciplines and area studies because disciplines are needed for area studies as much as area studies are needed for disciplines. It is obvious from the fact that, for instance, considerable work on the economies of China, Pakistan etc., have been embedded in the 'disciplinary economics department' of the University and similarly works on Constitutions of Russia, America etc., have been embedded in the discipline of Law. This is because of understanding the theories for their own sake as well as in the interest of comparative considerations[15].

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[13] Hans J. Morgenthau, "Area Studies and the Studies of International Relations" in *International Social Science Bulletin*, IV(4), (1952). Retrieved from http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0005/000596/059694eo.pdf, accessed 17/9/2018

[14] Ibid

[15] Professor Janet Hunter, as quoted by Roger Goodman and Amanda Berlan, "*The Future of Interdisciplinary Area Studies in the UK*", (Oxford University, 2005). Retrieved from. http://www.area-studies.ox.ac.uk/sites/sias/files/documents/The%20Future%20of%20Interdisciplinary%20Area%20Studies%20in%20the%20UK%20-%20Report%20of%20a%20Workshop%20-%20December%202005.pdf

Area Studies through interdependence and complementarity of different disciplines therefore comprehends all disciplines in social sciences, arts and humanities. These different academic disciplines are nothing but they are different channels of knowledge. Therefore any discipline of social sciences, arts and humanities, in principle, may be included as a major or minor channel of knowledge in the academic programmes at Area Studies. In practice, programmes tend to be organised either on the basis of various Social Sciences' disciplines or around a combination and formation of arts and humanities and social sciences such as politics, inter-national relations, and economics or politics and history. For example, the phenomena of geo-economics and geo-politics refers to or combine the study of geography, economics, politics, international relations and history. However, there is a wide diversity and the frontiers between these wide-ranging disciplines/branches are extremely permeable. Different spheres of Area Studies have evolved with different customs. Programmes at Area Study Centre (Russia, China and Central Asia) University of Peshawar enroll the students from all the disciplines in social sciences, arts and humanities i.e. literature, history, politics, Legal systems, Economies and International Relations of those societies with each other and with regional and extra regional states, as well as the transnational processes affecting those nations or societies. Programmes have also the peculiarity of giving importance to the study of institutions such as Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and other international organisations within the region in case of Central Asian Studies. Similarly comparative analysis or understanding can be implicitly or explicitly embedded in the syllabi. However as I mentioned earlier, the scholar at the Centre maintains his/her discipline of Master Level while conducts MPhil and PhD level research.

Professor Eric Herzber of Latin American Studies Program at Simon Fraser University (SFU), British Columbia in Canada said that "9/11 changed the security rational for supporting area studies and this impacts different area studies differently, but if one seeking support to train people to understand Central Asia, it is a significant shift".[16] It means research agendas have expanded further to include post-socialist political and economic transitions, civil society, ethnic resurgence, cultural and religious change, etc. It also reflects on the significance of contemporary Central Asian Republics (CARs), rather than on the history of Central Asia alone. The independent Central Asia or the contemporary Central Asia refers to the

[16] Eric Hershberg, in a Conference on "*Area Studies in the Future of Higher Education*" at Indiana University, Bloomington, February 26-28, 2009
http://www.indiana.edu/~reeiweb/2009asc/index.shtml

concept of studying an area that became independent after the collapse of former Soviet Union. Here history is relevant only to an extent that helps in understanding the emergence or making of Central Asia as a region, but the focus of study is the geo-strategic and geo-economic significance of the independent Central Asia. The interpretations and analysis of current political and economic transition in Central Asia and the International Relations of CARs with each other and with regional and extra regional states are important as they have implications on regional and global levels. Moreover, the study and analyses of the 'World Focus' on Central Asia and its impact on Pakistan and the policy options for Pakistan are important from Pakistan's perspective.

Area Studies addresses the basic need of contemporary researchers that is to develop intellectual and practical skills to apply to a given geographical area, to other areas and to comparative analysis in regional context as well as in the global context. The researchers also need to understand and interpret the world of the 'others' and to translate this otherness from various angles for the academic and end-users.[17] This approach, therefore, exceeds traditional disciplinary boundaries. Area Studies scholars, beside, undergoing training to learn and develop general research skills i.e. bibliographic and computing skills, teaching and presentation skills, communication and research design and management skills, they undergo additional training to learn and develop context specific research skills. This category includes learning about culture, political and economic organizations, history, geography and language of the area through direct and indirect exposure. The scholars evaluate, assess, analyse and interpret the data collected from different sources, primary or secondary, published or unpublished, interviews or documents, and theories both methodically and theoretically. It implies that demands in training at Area Studies are heavy, varying and challenging. Essentially the disciplines and methodology in Area Studies have evolved over a period of time through the history as earlier Area Studies were more general and rarely rooted in Social Sciences disciplines. For instance, Russian studies have been subject to changes, the theories and methods included in studying Post-Soviet Russia were inapplicable to the study of the Russia during Soviet era. In the fact the advantage of Area Studies lies in that beside a strong disciplinary basis it imparts understanding of other disciplines and strengthens the multi-disciplinary approach. At the same time it imparts research training to

[17] Roger Goodman. (ed.). "*The Future of Interdisciplinary Area Studies in the UK*", (Oxford University, 2005), retrieved from. http://www.area-studies.ox.ac.uk/sites/sias/files/documents/The%20Future%20of%20Interdisciplinary%20Area%20Studies%20in%20the%20UK%20-%20Report%20of%20a%20Workshop%20-%20December%202005.pdf

understand the application of different concepts, methods and theories developed in Western or Eastern context to other different cultural or political situations/contexts. For instance Communism/Socialism had a different meaning for Soviets and Chinese. Likewise 'Democracy' has a different meaning in Moscow and Washington.

Angle of Study

There are numerous Russian and Central Asian studies institutes around the globe. In all these centers or institutes the current developments in Russia and Central Asia are approached by the specific disciplinary perspective which may be history, political science, economics, sociology and international relations etc. The current world focus on Central Asia has further underlined the importance of research approach by different countries to analyze and understand Central Asia. However the research approach and angle of study varies from country to country as per their national interests and bilateral relations. For instance USA studies Central Asia form one angle while Russia studies it from the other. America concerns with constructing a marketized, liberal democracy that is integrated into global capitalism while Russia focuses on the continuation rather change. We here in Pakistan study Russia, China and Central Asia from Pakistan's perspective i.e. to search Pakistan's relations with the states of Area Concerned through historical perspectives as well as in contemporary era, to find out fields of mutual interests in every field of life, to find out Pakistan's place in markets of these states and to identify major irritants in Pakistan's relations with these states in regional and global context through descriptive, empirical, analytical methods as well as through comparative study by the faculty and through capable scholars offering them MPhil and PhD degrees as carrot. This way a stock of research community/area specialists is also produced for further reproduction

Recommendations

1. Universities need to build bridges between the disciplines of Area Studies and other departments or disciplines in order to show their interdependence. We have to forge pathways between disciplines to develop new theories. For example in UK and USA the focus is shifting from Post Doctoral and PhD research to Master level study in the disciplines of Area Studies. We here in the respective Universities can introduce or include minors and majors on Area Studies in different social science disciplines at Master level through exchange of faculty. Similarly the Area Study Centre University of Peshawar, and Area Study Centre for Africa and Americas,

University of Quad e Azam Islamabad can have a research project or program on American policy towards Central Asia.

2. Most of the Area Study Scholars in Russia, India and a number of countries are placed in the foreign affairs according to their specialty in area. To quote James F. Collins former American Ambassador to Russia, "As Ambassador to the Russian Federation, I found the only way to develop policy or structure my resources was in essence to rely on a series of area study seminars". I don't recommend to place area studies faculty as ambassadors but I would definitely recommend close coordination between Area Study Centers and relevant desks in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad; There should be annual or biannual meetings between the Area Study Centre and its relevant desk in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on regular basis to discuss the goals of study and set research agendas collectively.

3. Encouraging international seminars, conferences and exchange of scholars needed because these activities play vital role in furthering academic relations and developing mutual understanding and cooperation between the regional states.

4. The scholars at Area Studies need to accomplish their research work remaining specific to his/her discipline under the discipline and area relevant supervisor.

5. As the course work at Area Studies is combined for MPhil and PhD scholars belonging to various disciplines, the courses offered during a particular semester should be selected from a pool of approved courses at the Area Studies on the basis of scholars' disciplines in that particular semester.

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PAKISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SWAT: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF LITERATURE

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Abstract

Every conflict has its own peculiar and distinct characteristics that demands a defining response in the form of counterinsurgency. Before embarking on any such counterinsurgency campaign, it is of utmost significance to frame the parameters of the appropriate response. That arises the question as how much research has been carried out on the nature of insurgency and more importantly on the counterinsurgency. Such critical inquiries can lead the academicians and practitioners to explore as what was the pattern and nature of insurgency, i.e. secessionist, traditional or spiritual etc. More importantly, the relevant literature review must explain the contours of counterinsurgency operations. Besides, such research should bring forth the critical constraint and shortfalls of the counterinsurgency campaign vis-à-vis the civilian and military's approach of handling the insurgency. In Pakistan's Swat region, the insurgency posed an existential threat to the security of Pakistan. The post 9/11 era proliferated the wave of insurgencies in the region and Swat was not immune to the shock effects of the violent social change. Swat's insurgency got its momentum in 2006 and unleased a spate of terrorism and guerilla fighting that shook the entire country. In 2009, a grand scale counterinsurgency operation was launched incorporating all components of state. The softer prong of the operations is continuing till to date in the form of de-radicalization and counter extremism. In this article, I will endeavor to determine the research being

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carried out on the counterinsurgency in Swat and more importantly, the research gaps will be identified which needs to be filled by the future researchers and studies.

Introduction

The creation of *Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP) in December 2007 became the launching pad for organized phase of militancy, intertwining itself with the so called, global *Jihad.*[1] The insurgency in Swat widened to an extent that concerns were voiced internationally regarding safety of nuclear installations and writ of the government in areas close to Islamabad.

In the pre-9/11 period of Swat, *Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi* (TNSM)[2], a spiritual movement which initially began for the introduction of *Sharia* in Malakand Agency in the 1990s, emerged as reactionary movement because they sought to implement Islamic political and social arrangements in accordance with their own self-styled version. Usually, the reactionaries believe that they are the custodians of truth and are extremely intolerant toward those who don't share their views. The TTP led Taliban, on the other hand, have been termed as anarchistic in nature by Rasool Buksh Raees [3], because they aim at annihilating an established political system by terming it un-Islamic and replace it with an alternative Islamic political system based on *Sharia*, as interpreted by them. Historically, the post 9/11 insurgency in Swat is a result of centuries long religious historical, geo-political and social developments in the region. It was also an offshoot of attempts at *Shariatization*[4] of Malakand by the TNSM movement. Historically, the people of Swat have exhibited tendency of submission to the spiritual authorities whenever there was a threat of outside military intervention, as is evident from the episodes of the 19th Century, when they lent support to *Jihadist* movements. The people have further historically experienced the leadership part played by Mullahs in choosing kings of Swat in the beginning of the 20th Century.[5] Thus, when Sufi Mohammad launched his drive for *Sharia* in 1989 through TNSM, the people of Malakand region gave him complete support. Religiously motivated people also responded

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[1], Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan on the Brink: The future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West", (New York, Penguin Group, 2012),139-144.

[2]Movement for Enforcement of *Sharia* of Mohammad (PBUH).

[3] Rasul Bakhsh Rais, "11 Corps Symposium", off air recording", (Peshawar Inter Services Public Relations. 16 April, 2012) 00:25.

[4]The term was used by Usama Butt, 'Pakistan's Quagmire', Continuum International 2010, p.10: 'The short-lived *Nizam-e-Adl* Regulation, coupled with Taliban's 'capture' of cities 'very close to Islamabad' sent shock waves globally, with a media frenzy focusing on the possible "*Shariatization*" of Pakistan.'

[5] Khalid Aziz, "The Main Causes of Breakdown of Governance and Rise of Militancy", (Regional Institute of Policy Research and Training, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, (2009),36-37.

wholeheartedly, when Sufi sought to mobilize his people to fight a holy war against the NATO forces in Afghanistan in the wake of US attack in November 2001. In the next phase, Mullah Fazlullah launched his violent fanaticism in 2004, many people in Swat supported the trumpeters of *Jihad* in the hope that another epoch of religious movement has started. Until this point, Pakistan was severely affected by the wave of terrorism which was unleashed by the reactionary and anarchist forces. Sufi Mohammad's *Sharia* movement became the catalyst for the violent and terrorism of Fazlullah in the valley.

Since 2005/06, the rise of the insurgency and subsequent military operations and the huge displacement of people created a humanitarian catastrophe in Malakand and Swat.[6] The first military operation in Swat was preceded by political efforts at settling the conflict in the period between July to November 2007, but to no avail.[7] Consequently, 17 Division of Pakistan Army launched operation in November 2007, which continued till January 2008. Political efforts and peace deals were conducted from March 2008 till June 2008. After a brief stalemate in violence, militancy resurged in June 2008. Resultantly, selected military operations restarted from June 2008 till January 2009. Simultaneously, peace negotiations between ANP led government and the militants continued from January 2009 to April 2009, however, these failed to reach any positive outcome. Resultantly, a full blown and decisive military operation code-named *Rah-e-Rast* was launched by the 37 Division and 17 Division with the support of Special Services Group (SSG), from May to July 2009.[8] The large-scale military operation, Operation *Rah-e-Rast*,[9] was successful in flushing out the militants with a heavy cost.[10] Headquarter 1 Corps from Mangla was called and tasked to maintain, manage and accommodate around two million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Swat into camps as a result of the operation *Rah-e-Rast* in Swat and Malakand region. From February 2009 to

[6] Saira Bano Orakzai, "Conflict in the Swat Valley of Pakistan: Pakhtun Culture and Peace building Theory-Practice Application, Journal of Peace building & Development, 6(1), (2011).

[7] International Crises Group, "Pakistan: Countering Militancy in PATA", January, Brussels, (2013) retrieved from https://counterideology2.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/icg-pakistan-countering-militancy-in-pata.pdf accessed on 19 June 2017,

[8] The military operations were launched on three axes: first was Shangla – Khawaja Khela – Matta – Peochar; second axis was Malakand–Mingora–Kabbal; and third phase was Heli drop by SSG at Peochar and Auxiliary Effort in Dir & Bunir. There were 10 IDP camps established in 7 districts of KP, which accommodated around 2 million IDPs (Headquarter 11 Corps archives, May 2013).

[9] Meaning 'Righteous Path'- Military operation began in May 2009 for control of the Swat.

[10] Rasool Adnan, "How Bad Governance Led to Conflict: The Case of Swat", Pakistan Center for Public Policy and Governance, MPRA Paper 35357 (F), (2012).

September 2009, more than two and half million inhabitants of Swat had to leave their homes and became Temporary Displaced Peoples (TDPs) in Mardan, Peshawar, Charsadda, Swabi and Nowshera. It was one of the largest evacuation of people observed in humanitarian assistance work since the Second World War.[11]

The subject of insurgency and counterinsurgency (CI) in Pakistan has received scholarly attention from number of scholars, who have endeavored to theorize and comprehend Pakistan's CI paradigm. Numerous scholars have undertaken scholarly studies on the subject vis-à-vis the kinetic and non-kinetic operations. For the purpose of review, it is convenient to divide the scholars' writings on insurgency and CI into two broad groups: Those who explore the drivers of extremism and militancy as well as the underlying conditions of why people rallied behind the militants Noor, International Crisis Group, Khalid, Khalil, Rasool and Tabassum.[12] Those who studied the military operations as well as post conflict peace building initiatives in the wake of such insurgencies, David, Haider, Stephan, Nadeem, Rana & Sial, Chritiane & Seth, Sameer, Shujja, Joshua, Douglas et al, Tariq and Shahzad.[13] The above mentioned (both) classifications may be further divided into two or three variants.

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[11] Khalid Aziz, "The Main Causes of Breakdown of Governance and Rise of Militancy".

[12] Noor Elahi, "Militancy Conflicts and Displacement in Swat Valley of Pakistan: Analysis of Transformation of Social and Cultural Network", International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 5(3), (2015), 226-236; International Crises Group, "Pakistan: Countering Militancy in PATA", January, Brussels, (2013) retrieved from, https://counterideology2.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/icg-pakistan-countering-militancy-in-pata.pdf accessed on 19 June 2017; Khalid Aziz ; Khalil-ur-Rehman , Swat Valley: The Strategic Cap-Stone", Journal of Dialogue, VI(4) (2011)356-366; Rasool Adnan; Tabassum Majeed, "Insurgency in Swat: Conflict settlement and peace building 2001-2011, (Swat, Shoaib Sons publishers, ,2016).

[13]David Kilcullen, "The Accidental Guerilla", (London, C. Hurst & Co Publishers, 2009) ; Haider A H Mullick, "Helping Pakistan Defeat the Taliban: A Joint Action Agenda for USA and Pakistan", Institute for Social Policy and understanding, (2009), p.10, retrieved from, http://www.ispu.org/pdfs ISPUHelpingPakistan0 Report.pdf accessed on 12 February 2015; Stephan P Cohen, The FATA Challenge", Pakistan's Troubled Frontier: The Future of FATA and the NWFP, (Washington, D.C, Jamestown Foundation Conference, 2009); Nadeem Ahmed, COIN in Peace Building, PRISM Security Studies Journal, Sep, 2(4), (2011)4, 125-138; Christina Fair, & Seth Jones, Counterinsurgency in Pakistan", Rand, National Security Research Division, Pittsburgh, (2010) accessed 18 July 2016, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG982.pdf; Sameer Lalwani, "Pakistan's COIN Flip: The Recent History of Pakistani Military Counterinsurgency Operations in the NWFP and FATA", Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, New America Foundation, (2010), p.1; Shujja Nawaz, "Learning by Doing, The Pakistan Army's Experience with Counterinsurgency", February, South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council of the United States, (2011), accessed on 29 November 2016, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/126743/020111_ACUS_Nawaz_Pakistan

Literature Review

The first category scholars such as Khalil, Khalid, Rasool, Noor, International Crisis Group and Tabassum either blame the insurgency's rise on the state's inappropriate contextual response to address the grievances of the local people, or the political cadre for its policy of appeasement in the form of non-effective peace deals and negotiations.[14] The second category discussed in the above para can be grouped into three: Those who view Pakistan's CI campaign in Swat in the light of its focus on military approach of excessive use of power, such as David, Haider, Sameer, Stephan, Christine and Seth [15]; or scholars, such as Shujja , Nadeem and Joshua who argue that the military has learnt the mechanics of CI by the process of 'learning by doing'; and finally, scholars view radicalization of society vis-à-vis the violence and insurgency, Raheem , Douglas et al, Siddiqa, Christine, Kaja, Azam, Shahzad, Corinne & Rebecca , Amir, Safdar and Abdul Basit.[16] This literature review critically evaluates some of the arguments of these scholars.

Counterinsurgency.pdf; Joshua White n.d., "Applying Counterinsurgency Principles in Pakistan's Frontier", PhD , Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Research Fellow, Institute For Global Engagement, Brookings Counterinsurgency and Pakistan Paper Series, No.2, 2012, accessed 21 December 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ uploads/ 2016/06/0625_counterinsurgency_white.pdf; Douglas Johnston ,Andrew Mcdonnell, Henry Burbridge and James Patton, "Countering Violent Religious Extremism in Pakistan Strategies for Engaging Conservative Muslims", International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD), (2016); Tariq Rahman, "Madrassas: The Potential for Violence in Pakistan", October 2, Criterion Quarterly, Vol 2 No 2 (2013), retrieved from http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/madrassas-the-potential-for-violence-in-pakistan/ accessed on 21 May 2017; Shehzad H. Qazi , "A War Without Bombs: Civil Society Initiatives Against Radicalization in Pakistan," Policy Brief No. 60, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, February, (2013) retrieved from, www.ispu.org/pdfs/ISPU_Brief_Counter, accessed on 21 November 2017 Muhammad Amir Rana, Safdar Sial; Abdul Basit, "Dynamics of Taliban insurgency in FATA", Pakistan Institutes of Peace Studies, Islamabad, (2010).

[14] Khalil Ur Rehman, "Valley: The Strategic Cap-Stone"; Rasool Adnan, "How Bad Governance Led to Conflict: The Case of Swat".

[15] David Kilcullen, "The Accidental GuerillaKilcullen (2009); Haider A H Mullick, "Helping Pakistan Defeat the Taliban"; Stephan P Cohen, "The FATA Challenge; Fair & Jones (2010) and Sameer Lalwani, "Pakistan's COIN Flip: The Recent History of Pakistani Military Counterinsurgency Operations in the NWFP and FATA".

[16] Raheem ul Haque, Youth Radicalization in Pakistan, United States Institute of Peace, peace brief 169, February 26 Washington, D.C, (2014). Douglas Johnston et al, Countering Violent Religious Extremism in Pakistan Strategies for Engaging Conservative Muslims; Ayesha Siddiqa,"The Madressa Mix: Genesis and growth", Mar 03, Dawn News, (2015) retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/1166039 accessed on 10 Mar 2015; Christina Fair, 2008, "The Madrasas Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan", U.S. Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, pp 67-

Several scholars and think tanks such as Khalil, Noor, Khalid, Rasool, International Crisis Group and Tabassum claim that a frail and wrecked judicial system, pitiable governance and an institutional void created the space for insurgents to gain ground in Swat. Violent religious extremism and militancy are driven by a number of factors, including region's economic disruption, illiteracy and strict traditional customs. The problems of Swat and that of its inhabitants are one more expression of Pakistan's cognitive dissonance. The dilemma of the valley also has its origin in the socio-economic and political deprivation phenomenon. To Rehman, it is micro of Pakistan's macro reductionism. Elahi explores the continued economic and political dominancy of the landlords and disparities in terms of resources sharing among different groups as widening the gap between the rich and the poor in Swat's case. To him, most of those who fought the state, did so to rise from their positions of peripheries, thus the fighting was an effort by the marginalized groups to be at par with the elites of the community. It became apparent that weak governance structures provided the space for the disillusioned to hold their grounds. The rank and file of the insurgents who defied the government mostly included individuals from relegated groups.[17] In the nutshell, Swat faces difficult challenges where the efforts of the deprived people function within the complex dynamics of a historical mindset attached in a Jihadist outline that is pulled by the rhetoric of the war on extremism.

Carrying forward the debate and widening such assumptions, scholars such as Manzoor & Mosab, Naveed and Lubna , claim that support of the political parties, especially the one in power in KP province also promoted militancy in the Malakand division.[18] It has been observed that successive

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68, viewed 20 April 2016,https://bookstore.usip.org/books /BookDetail.aspx?productID=181109, pp 67- 68; Kaja Borchgrevink 2010, "Beyond Borders: Diversity and Transnational Links in Afghan Religious Education", PRIO Paper, PRIO Oslo. P.55, viewed 25 October 2016, https://www.prio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=7212., p.55; Azam Khan, "Not in the short term: Govt quietly dilutes its Counter-terrorism plan", The Express Tribune, March 8, (2015), retrieved from https://tribune.com.pk/story/849724/not-in-the-short-term-govt-quietly-dilutes-its-counter-terrorism-plan/ accessed on 9 march 2015; Corinne Graff and Rebecca Winthrop, "Beyond Madrasas: Assessing the Links between Education and Militancy in Pakistan", SSRN Electronic Journal · June (2010), p.41; viewed 20 November 2016, https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/228313373; Tariq, "Madrasas: The potential for violence in Pakistan", p.175; Shahzad Qazi; Muhammad Amir Rana, Safdar Sial,Abdul Basit, "Dynamics of Taliban insurgency in FATA" .

[17] Khalid Aziz, "The Main Causes of Breakdown of Governance and Rise of Militancy".

[18] Manzoor Khan Afridi, & Musab Yousufi, "Military Operation in Malakand Division Pakistan: Causes and Implications," Department of Politics and International Relations, Islamabad International Islamic University, Asian Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities, 3(3) (2014); Naveed Iqbal Khan and Lubna Abid Ali, "Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi in Malakand Division (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa): A Case Study of

provincial governments and bureaucracy functioning under them, supported the rise of insurgency. The militancy's rise in Swat was made possible by the MMA's provincial government's compassionate attitude towards the insurgents. Moreover, poor administration and lack of good governance weakened the writ of government and paved way for the emergence of TNSM and *Tehreek-e-Taliban Swat* (TTS) in Malakand division. There are other scholars including Tabassum and Sultan , who not only acknowledge the above findings but also predict that if the governance is not improved significantly, similar conflict will re-emerge in Swat.[19] They add that the peace developed in post-conflict Swat is a kind of cold peace, where tensions are still present beneath the layer of apparent peace. The government has to address the very basic cause of conflict, i.e. the feeble and outmoded judicial and legal system.

Some scholars, including Joshua and Sameer argue that the insurgency in FATA and PATA blended Pashtun nationalism with religious extremism as an exceptional religio-culture ideology.[20] This assertion can be challenged on the grounds that the nationalists' parties such as ANP didn't have any identification with the cause of insurgents and did not give any support to their ideological cause. Perhaps, ANP bore massive brunt for their antagonism of militancy and incurred the wrath of insurgents in the form of suicide bombings and assassination of the its leaders.

As far as the military component of CI is concerned, very few studies have comprehensively covered the kinetic aspect of CI in Swat. They include, Shujja, Manzoor & Musab, Khalil, David, Stephan, Christina & Seth, Joshua and Nadeem. Their research reveals divergent views. Some of them such as Nawaz argues that Pakistan Army has learned to counter the insurgency in the process of 'learning by doing'. General Nadeem articulates that the reasons for the success of the operation and response effort include, abundance of military assets, reformed training, articulate planning and organization, effective management of displaced people, public mobilization for local defense and good intelligence. Ahmed argues that the conflict in Swat was the first which the Pakistan Army had successfully undertaken a

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the Process of State Inversion", Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol. XX XI, No.1,(2010),131-158.

[19] Sultan-e-Rome, S 2011, "Crisis and Reconciliation in Swat", Journal of Pakistan studies, Vol. 3, no.1. viewed 16 March 2016, file:///C:/Users/Shahid/Downloads/101-107-1-PB.pdf; Tabassum Majeed, "Insurgency in Swat: Conflict settlement and peace building".

[20] Joshua T White, "Applying Counterinsurgency Principles in Pakistan's Frontier", 'Candidate,' Brookings CI and Pakistan Paper Series, No. 2, 25 June, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Research Fellow, Institute for Global Engagement (2009); Sameer Lalwani, "Pakistani Capabilities for a CI Campaign: A Net Assessment" New America Foundation, publication of the counterterrorism strategy initiative, (2009),16.

CI campaign. On the contrary, such claims have been contested by various scholars. Khalil, David, Stephan, Haider, Christine and Seth, Sameer and White claim in their research that the Pakistan military adopted a profoundly kinetic firepower-centered methodology to defeat the insurgency. In their opinion, Pakistan has failed to wage 'population-centric' CI in the PATA, FATA and KP and is instead using harsh conventional approaches that thwart long-term victory. They also point out that Pakistan's military had launched high intensity and heavy-firepower campaign that ended up with millions of IDPs and there was little modification in its CI approach over a period of time.[21] Some writers went harsher in criticism of Pakistan Policy such as Haider. To quote him, Pakistan Army operations have brutally suppressed full-blown insurgencies into ―dormant ones. Pakistan has primarily followed the ―coercion or 'out-terrorize the terrorist' school of thought.[22] It is also argued that Pakistan's efforts are hindered by the orthodox makeup of the Pakistani military, which yields a heavy-handed tactical approach. With regards to training of Pakistan Army, David acknowledges Pakistan Army's shortfall in weapons, equipment and inadequate training of paramilitary forces in CI operations, before 2009. He mentions that Pakistan's military improved its training and to some degree overcame the deficiency of such weapons and equipment in its CI operations in post 2009 period. Having debated the above arguments, Erika and Imtiaz acknowledge the limitation of research in this field and say that it holds true that no researcher has comprehensively evaluated the Pakistan CI's practices prescribed by existing population-centric CI literature.[23]

Some of the literature debates the Pakistan Army's CI campaigns in relation to the number of troops in proportion to the local population in insurgency stricken areas. About the nature of force deployment in CI operations, Sameer claims that between 370,000 and 430,000 more troops would be needed in FATA, PATA and KP for success in CI campaign. Iqbal

[21]Manzoor Afridi & Musab Yousafi, "Military Operation in Malakand Division Pakistan: Causes and Implications", Khalil Ur Rehman; David Kilcullen, "Accidental Guerilla",p.46; Joshua White, Christine Fair and Seth Jones; Nadeem Ahmed; Ahmed Rashid,, pp.139-144); Stephan P Cohen, and Shujja Nawaz, "Mastering Counterinsurgency: A Workshop Report", The Brookings Institution, 7 July, (2009), retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/0707_counterinsurgency_cohen.aspx, accessed on 3 July 2018; Christine and Jones; Sameer Lalwani.

[22] Haider, "Helping Pakistan Defeat the Taliban: A Joint Action Agenda for USA and Pakistan".

[23] Erika Renno, B.S., "Swatting at Flies: Pakistan's Use of Counterinsurgency", A thesis submitted to the Graduate School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University, Washington, DC April 16 (2010) retrieved from,https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553566/rennoErika.pdf? sequence=1 accessed on 17 December 2018; Imtiaz Gul, "The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan's lawless frontier", (India Penguin group, 2010).

provides a current estimate of around 170,000 troops deployed in FATA and KP. However, these figures seem far less than the desired number of troops in such areas. A similar reservation was brought up in a recent study by the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis which argues that KP and the FATA collectively report a population estimate of 26 million which, on a force to population ratio of 20:1000, requires a field force of approximately 5,20,000 troops. The above-mentioned researchers in these studies drew their analysis primarily in the light of the research carried out by James, where he emphasized the 20:1000 force into population ratio.[24]

Some studies analyze the structural orientation of the security institutions that are involved in the CI operations, such as the Frontier Corps (FC) and its ethnic positioning as a factor of influence in CI campaign of Pakistan. About FC, Mike and Tariq, in their research argue that ethnic Pashtuns from FC are led by Punjabi outsiders, with little identification in local culture. They also contend that FC men possess strong familial and societal ties to the population and militants, which results in low morale for fighting the militants.[25] However, FC units, despite being historically commanded by officers of various Ethnicities since British times, have nonetheless given a good account of themselves. Moreover, since the creation of Pakistan, many of the FC officers at junior and senior levels constitute Pashtuns themselves.[26]

Some scholars have deliberated upon the informational and psychological warfare methodology of both militants and the government such as Malik and Shams. The esoteric appeals to the common people transmitted through media especially the radio, created a competing constituency for the

[24] Sameer Lalwani ;Iqbal, A 2014, "Drone issue to be discussed during Army Chief's US visit", Dawn News, October 30, viewed 4 August 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1141259; Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, 2010, "Wither Pakistan: Growing instability and implications for India", New Delhi; James T. Quinlivan "Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations", Rand Review, summer, 27(2) (2003) pp. 28-29, retreived from, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/corporate_pubs/2007/rand_cp22-2003-08.pdf. accessed on 9 August 2017.

[25] Tariq Mahmud Ashraf, "Military Operations in FATA: Eliminating Terrorism or Preventing the Balkanization of Pakistan? 'Terrorism Monitor, 6(12) (2008) viewed 14 November 2014, https://jamestown.org/program/military-operations-in-fata-eliminating-terrorism-or-preventing-the-balkanization-of-pakistan/; Mike Koprowski , "Defeating the FATA insurgency", Yale Journal of International Affairs, (2009) retrieved from http://yalejournal.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/01/094206koprowski.pdf accessed on 23 June 2018.

[26] Majority of the Inspector Generals of Frontier Corps in the last decade were Pashtuns like, Maj Gen Fazal-e-Ghafoor, Maj Gen Taj-Ul-Haq, Maj Gen Tariq khan, Maj Gen Alam Khattak, Maj Gen Tayyab, Maj Gen Ghayur, Maj Gen Ubaid Khattak, Maj Gen Saddaqat Ali Khan.

Fazlullah's *Tehreek-e-Taliban Swat* (TTS).[27] Bakht quotes Fazlullah in an audio tape (TR001), saying, "Those who believes in Quran, they must know that Jihad is the command of ALLAH and shortest way to Jannah. …… therefore, there is need for training and fighting against the infidel democratic setup and to enforce the Sharia."[28] Therefore, the appeal to people's religious sentiments of Jihad was made to justify the violence against the state and its institutions. On the contrary, the anti-Taliban discourse in the pre and post operation *Rah-e-Rast*, as intended by the Pakistan military in its information campaign, was directed at denigrating the insurgents in order to build support for the kinetic operations. The militants were portrayed as evil, barbaric and vicious terrorists, who don t have any interest in Sharia imposition but instead aimed at spreading anarchy through terrorism.

Scholars, such as Erika , Christine and Seth have studied the conflict in Swat in the context of US and NATO's interests in Afghanistan.[29] US and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are have a serious interest in Pakistan's ability to efficiently wage CI, because NATO forces in Afghanistan are unable to check the infiltration of insurgents into Afghanistan due to NATO's limited manpower. History shows that the success of CI in Afghanistan is greatly dependent on building the cooperative security structures between Pakistan and Afghan/US forces. Therefore, Erika, Christine and Seth analyzed in 2010 that Pakistan's alliance is essential but success may ultimately depend on a strategic decision by Pakistan military to continue boosting its CI capability and converting its military into a hybrid power capable of proficiently engaging in CI warfare.

For scholars, such as Shujja and Shahzad the success of Pakistan's CI campaign rests on the ability of its civilian and military institutions to collaborate and strategize from a united platform. Unless the civilian and military approaches weave and turn into supportive and mutually helpful, the military will have to fight and re-fight its CI operations for years and years.[30]

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[27] Sajjad Malik, "Media and Militancy: Case Study use of FM Radio By Taliban In Swat", IPRI Journal XIII, no 1,(2013), 77-96, retrieved from http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/art5sajw13.pdf accessed 15 November 2017; Shamil Shams, "The Clash of Narratives Swat Military Operation against the Taliban", Working Paper, Series 120 October (2011), retrieved from http://www.a-id.org/pdf/the-clash-of-narratives-swat-military-operation-against-the-taliban.pdf accessed on 19 November 2017.

[28] Bakht Zaman, "Role of illegal FM radio stations in Pakistan, with special focus on the effects of Fazal Ullah Radio and its role in rising militancy in the Swat valley", (unpublished Phil Thesis, Department of Journalism and University of Peshawar, 2016).

[29] Erika Renno, B.S., "Swatting at Flies: Pakistan's Use of Counterinsurgency".

[30] Shujja Nawaz, "Mastering Counterinsurgency: A Workshop Report"; Shehzad H. Qazi, "A War Without Bombs: Civil Society Initiatives Against Radicalization in Pakistan".

In particular, the lack of an all-inclusive CI strategy comprising the civil administration, political leadership and the military has meant that whatsoever tactical successes they might have had, were largely ineffective in the long run. The transfer of authority to accountable and the concerned civilians' institutions would lead to better governance and public confidence. That implies wide-ranging restructuring to end PATA's constitutional and legal obscurities with granting the fundamental human rights to its people. There is equally a need for developing localized infrastructures for peace and development, including the transformation of the *Jirgas* from political/judicial forums to that of social interaction and reconciliation and implementing judicial reforms to respond to the people's demands for speedy justice.[31] Such processes should take place in tandem with rebuilding the economic infrastructure and taking a generational approach to peacebuilding.

De-radicalization as one of the most important component of Pakistan CI doctrine has been critically studied on by some scholars, including Zille-Huma & Ahmed, Rana and Sial, Abdul Basit, Qazi, Douglas Johnston ,Andrew Mcdonnell, Henry Burbridge and James Patton.[32] To Rana (2011), the inability to prosecute the militants due to lack of evidence or due to underage status of child militants led to the concept of de-radicalization and rehabilitation. The de-radicalization initiatives undertaken by Pakistan Army largely focused on drawing comparison with other models of de-radicalization in Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Morocco, Malaysia, Egypt and Indonesia. They emphasize that the rehabilitation and de-radicalization program aimed at deactivating terrorists' threats require a high level of expertise and experience.[33] Scholars such as Douglas, Andrew, Henry and James and Raheem argue about the religious basis and grounding of radicalization in Pakistan. However, others, including, Abdul Basit differ with the assumptions that youth radicalization in Pakistan emerges from

[31] Saira Bano Orakzai, "Conflict in the Swat Valley of Pakistan: Pakhtun Culture and Peace building Theory-Practice Application".

[32]Zil-e-Huma Rafique & Mughees Ahmed, "De-Radicalization and Rehabilitation Efforts: Analysis of Anti-Terrorism Activities in Pakistan", International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 2, Issues, February, 115-124, (2013), retrieved from https://www.counterextremism.org/download_file/48/134/270/3 accessed on 20 March 2017; Abdul Basit, "Countering Violent Extremism: Evaluating Pakistan's Counter-Radicalization and De-Radicalization Initiatives", IPRI Journal XV, no. 2 (Summer) (2015): pp.44-68, retrieved from , http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/3-art-s-15.pdf, accessed on 25 November 2018Douglas Johnston ,Andrew Mcdonnell, Henry Burbridge and James Patton, "Countering Violent Religious Extremism in Pakistan Strategies for Engaging Conservative Muslims".

[33] Muhammad Amir Rana, Safdar Sial, Abdul Basit, "Dynamics of Taliban insurgency in FATA", pp.138-148.

Islamic identity.[34] He argues that violent radicalism in Pakistan is certainly not limited to faith based militancy and terrorism only; it is prevalent widely at all levels of the society.

Madrassas are often labelled as incubators of vicious radicalism also characterized occasionally as ―weapons of mass instruction or ―factories for global Jihad.[35] However, a number of local and foreign scholars strongly reject the myth that militancy is being driven solely from the religious sources or Madrassas. Few of the militants were Madrassas' pupils and that recruitment by the militant groups materializes not just through Madrassas, but a number of other sources.[36] Similar views are further reinforced by the findings of scholar such as Tariq who claim in his research that Madrassas are not the only sources for radicalization in Pakistan; intolerant and extreme worldviews are also nurtured through the curriculum in the schools as well.[37] This situation was also confirmed by Rahim Ullah Yousafzai , as he argued that not only from Madrassa but people from all walks of life, young and old, joined the insurgents in Swat.[38] Some well-known militants, such as Muslim Khan and Sirajudin were not of Madrassa origin. This to some scholars is alarming. As Rana argues that the tendencies of non-violent extremism ultimately leading to violent radicalism amongst educated youth are great cause of concern as such qualified individuals inject new renewed wave of radicalization in the ideological folds of militancy.[39]

Scholars like Nadeem, Farzana Bari and Zaman, discuss the role of women in radicalization. Women have been actively supporting the insurgency and

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[34] Douglas Johnston, et al, "Countering Violent Religious Extremism in Pakistan Strategies for Engaging Conservative Muslims".

[35] The 9/11 Commission Report, "The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York, 2004) p. 367; Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture", Foreign Affairs,79(6) (2000), pp.115-126; Jamal Malik, "Introduction" in J. Malik (ed), Madrassas in South Asia. Teaching terror? (London and New York, Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series,2008); Ahmed Rashid, "Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia", (New Haven, Conn, Yale University Press, 2000).

[36] Asad Ullah Khan, "Radicalization: A Dilemma of Pakistan", Institute of Strategic Studies, Institute of Strategic studies (ISSI) August 19, Issue Brief, pp.3-4, retrieved from, http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Final-Issue-brief-dated-19-8-2015.pdf accessed on 23 August 2018; Ayesha Sadiqqa, Christine Fair (2008, p.67-68), Kaja (2010, p.55); Corinne Graff and Rebecca Winthrop, "Beyond Madrasas: Assessing the Links between Education and Militancy in Pakistan".

[37] Tariq Rahman, "Madrassas: The Potential for Violence in Pakistan", p.175).

[38] Rahim Ullah Yousafzai interviewed by author, Peshawar, KP, Pakistan, 23 October, 2016. He is a renowned journalist and the resident of daily journal, 'The News' Peshawar.

[39] Mohammd Amir Rana, "Extremist minds on campus" September 10, (2017), Dawn News, retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/1356677 accessed on 11 September 2017.

especially the TNSM and Fazlullah in Swat and it is naive to conceptualize women only as victims of terrorism. Additionally, the stereotype perception of women being the victims and oppressed, denies them the ability to play a role in peace-building and post-conflict development. With the launch of their latest offline magazine *Sunnat-e- Khaula* on August 1 2017, TTP endeavors to target urban Pakistani woman, inviting them to adopt the Jihadi way of life. The magazine urges women to learn to operate weapons and grenades and become lady Jihadists.[40]

Conclusion

To sum up, the available literature on insurgency and CI in Swat is of considerable value, however, there is a lack of an in-depth and integrated work based on empirical evidences. The orthodox academic research is restricted to an examination of Pakistan's traditional national security doctrine. Indeed, great deal of research has been carried out on the insurgency paradigm, focusing on the militants' ideology, recruitment, social expansion etc. However, CI's strategic and tactical operations have been given minimal attention due to various reasons such as limited access to the conflict zone, state's security control over the dissemination of data and information.

Pakistan Army evolved a new strategy of CI in Swat after earlier setbacks, which needs to be discussed on theoretical and practical perspectives. Another limitation of the existing literature on CI in KP and erstwhile FATA is that the contemporary nature of existing literature is descriptive and editorial rather than scholarly and analytical. While the various journal articles, monographs, treatises and public debates document the CI experiences, nonetheless, they do so in a piecemeal style. Since Pakistan is encircled by forces hostile to its existence and therefore, to certain extent, the organizational secrecy of Pakistan Army precludes sharing of its CI experience (both kinetic and non-kinetic operations). That is another reason that no holistic and comprehensive CI study has been carried out covering both kinetic and non-kinetic aspects of CI operations in Swat and Malakand region. Therefore, there is a need to do research incorporating all the logical lines of operations such as economic, political, social, informational and military. From Military perspective, there is a need of further deliberation on how different is the Swat military operations from the others in North and South Waziristan and Khyber agencies. From social and political angle, it is highly important to ascertain whether the grievances of Sufi Mohammad TNSM which was 'speedy justice' (later hijacked by Fazlulllah terrorists' approach) was appropriately addressed.

[40] Meera Nadeem, "Women in the TTP: recruiting across the gender divide", Opinion, (The Express Tribune, 10 August 2017), https://tribune.com.pk/story/1477711/women-ttp-recruiting-across-gender-divide/; Farzana Bari(n.d.); Zaman (2016).

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DEVELOPMENT OF LIBRARIES AND LIBRARY SCIENCE EDUCATION IN PESHAWAR-KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA, PAKISTAN: A HISTORICAL REVIEW

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Abstract

The history of Library and Information Science in Pakistan is traced back to the arrival of W. A. Broaden and Asa Don Dickinson to Sub-continent in 1911 and 1916 respectively. This piece of document tends to explore the history of library and library science education, library activities and role of professional associations in promotion of library culture in North-West part of Pakistan. This study is basically historical in nature. The paper is broadly divided into three parts that is library science education, library developments through ages and library associations and their role in the promotion of libraries in Khyber Pakhtunkhawa. Efforts were made to elaborate the growth of libraries in different eras over the passage of time. The role of Muslims and British in the promotion of library culture is also discussed. It is reflected that both nations have made no stone left un-turned for the establishment of libraries in this part of sub-continent. It is also evident from the pages of history that the introduction of Library and Information Science education was not that late here as compared to the rest of the world. University of Punjab is the third in the race of ranking after Germany and United States to offer this program. Various associations had also played their roles in this regard. They had worked hard for the promotion of library culture. The role of Pakistan Library Association (PLA) is observant and praise worthy in the said context. It is concluded that future of libraries and their education is bright in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as library schools, senior professionals and associations are playing their due role with zeal and favor.

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Keywords: Library activities- Pakistan, Library history- Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Library Activities-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Library Science education-KP, Library Associations-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Introduction

Library science education has its origin in early nineteenth century in Gotting Germany followed by United States of America (USA). University of Punjab stands at the third position in world ranking. Asa Don Dickinson and Lala Labu Ram played their active and prominent role to initiate LIS education in sub-continent. Dr.Abdul-Saboh Qasimi is the leading and founder personality worked for the initiation of LIS education in Khyber Pakhtunkhawa (the then N-W.F. P) of Pakistan[1].

From the pages of history, one can easily guess that Muslim rulers of the sub-continent had played a very active role in the establishment of educational institutions and libraries. Muhammad Bin Qasim laid down the foundation of "Maktab Madrasahs" in Sindh. In the same period, some schools and libraries had been reported to be there in Ooch, Multan and Thatta districts. In a second spell, another great Muslim leader Mahmud of Ghazni is seen who founded a number of schools and libraries at Lahore. Ghori, Tughluk, Lodhi and Mughals have left no stone unturned for the uplift in promoting of libraries. Mughals were real bibliophiles and fond of libraries. Each and every Mughal emperor had tried at their level best to lay down rich libraries. The libraries of Babar, Humayun, ShahJehan, Jehangir, Aurangzeb and Akbar were noteworthy. Mughal ministers and royal personalities had also established rich libraries like libraries of Darashikoh, Gul Badan (Zaib- un- Nisa), Abul fazal Faizi and AbduRahim Khan-e-Khanana. Apart from that, the libraries founded by Sultan Tipu and at Usmania University were also a part of our heritage.

After the British entry into the sub-continent, their so called isolation policy was badly failed, which led them to join hands with Indians for permanent and successful rule? For this purpose, they went to learn Urdu and Hindi and founded Asiatic Society in 1784 and Madras Literary Society in 1812 respectively.[2] These activities opened doors for the establishment of libraries in this part of the world. A library was established in Sukkah (Pakistan), known as Public Library Sukkah in 1830. This library is considered as the first library in the history of sub-continent. Later on, National Library India was established in 1836. Indeed, British Government did a lot for the promotion of education and libraries in the sub-continent but

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[1] Hamid Rahman, "*Library History of Pakistan: A Comparative Study of Pre and Post-Independence Period*. (Mahnama Kitab, 1985): 35-45

[2] Qarshi, Afzal Haq. "Editorial: Voyage through History." *Pakistan Journal of Library and Information Science* (7), (2006): 1-4.

the area which was later called Pakistan was unattractive for them except Lahore, where the situation was a bit satisfactory. Liana Hall Library Karachi (1851), Edward School Library Peshawar (1855), Khaliq Dina Hall Library Karachi (1856), Forman Christian University Library the then College (1866), Punjab Public library Lahore (1884), Divisional Public Library Khair Pur Sindh (1903), The Punjab University Lahore (1908), Islamia College Library Peshawar (1913), Dayal Singh Trust Library Lahore (1928), Civil Secretariat Library Karachi were the prominent libraries before the dawn of freedom in this territory. Similarly, prior to partition, Central Record Office (CRO) attached with Archives also served a type of depository library here in Peshawar. Important documents along with record related to this area had been shifted from Delhi and Mumbai to CRO Peshawar after independence.

Reportedly, Japan Library Association (JLA) is second to one of its kind in the history of Asia established in 1892 after American Library Association (1876) and Library Association U.K (1886). Pakistan Library Association was established in March, 1957[3]. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, PLA-KP chapter, Peshawar Universities Campus Librarians Association (PUCLA), Pakistan Librarians Welfare Organization (PLWO) and Pakistan Library Club (PLC) and University of Peshawar Library Science Alumni Association (UPLISAA) are playing their lively role to uplift of the LIS profession.

Objectives of the Study

The prime aim of this study is to examine the developments in library culture at large in Pakistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in particular. However, the specific objectives are:

1-To analyze the historical background of library science education in North West part of Pakistan.
2-To explore the library activities through ages at large.
3-To explain the role of professional education in the promotion of library culture in this part of Pakistan.

Justification of the Study

From the review of the relevant previous works, it was extracted that no such kind of work about specific geographic zone of Pakistan has been conducted so far. This study will be fruitful for the LIS professionals,

[3] Anees Khurshid, *8th Annual Conference of the Pakistan Library Association*, (Karachi: Pakistan Library Association, 1971).

academicians and researchers interested in the study of LIS in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa-Pakistan in specific and the whole country in general.

Material and Methods

Various print and electronic sources were consulted to access information related to the study in hand. Documents containing material related to Library and Information Science (LIS) education, establishment of libraries through ages and library associations were scrutinized. Various web sources were also retrieved from websites and data bases to supplement this piece of document with latest facts and figure. Senior Professors of Library and Information Science schools from University of Peshawar and Sarhad university of Science and Information Technology, Peshawar were also interviewed for the authentication and, verification of information. The information collected from different sources were filtered, edited, organized and documented.

Library Science Education in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

The administration and organization of a library is a skill which can be learnt through the education of library science. The idea of motivation and launching the library training and education in the subcontinent was engineered by the W.A Broaden, at Baroda state in 1911.This was basically an in-service training program for the library officials of Broada Public Library However, the first full-fledged course in library science was introduced and organized by Asa Don Dickinson at Punjab University Lahore in 1915. After the departure of Dickinson, Lala Labhu Ram supervised the system. The same continued off and on, till the year of bifurcation of Indo-Pak 1947.

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (the then North-West Frontier Province (N-W.F.P)),the library training program was uprooted with the introduction of "Inter Exchange Program"signed between the authorities of "A & M College" of Colorado USA and University of Peshawar. Under that program, Abdus Sabuh Qasimi went abroad to improve his qualification and got M.L.I.S degree from United States of America[4]. The visit of G.M. Coble was a part of this program. The visitor conducted a survey and brought forward the actual status of libraries in this part of the country. A two-month library science refresher course was designed in 1956. Mr. G.M.Coble and Abdus Sabuh Qasimi were the resource persons of this refresher course. Allocated seats for this program were twenty but only fourteen got admission but couldn't be materialized. Later on two more such packages to introduce diploma and refresher course in 1957 and 1959 respectively were

[4] AU Khan. "*A Brief Account of Libraries of the University of Peshawar*." University librarianship in Pakistan (1986): 81-106.

tried but lack of teaching faculty and resources the same met the past fate[5]. In 1962, a program of formal "Diploma Award" was chalked out in University of Peshawar. Twenty-three trainees were given the opportunity seeking diploma in Library Science. Mr. A.S.Qasimi, Mr. Qamar Mirza, Mr.Waheed Shah Bukhari were the master trainer/ resource persons of the training. The libraries of Islamia College and University of Peshawar were used laboratories for practical purposes of classification, cataloguing, cataloguing and indexing, bibliography and reference work, and library organization and administration were the course module of the said training. Mr. A.S.Qasimi left for Columbia University, New York City USA, in 1963. The position was filled in by Mr. A.U.Khan, who has the honor to be the first full-fledged Chairman and first Associate Professor in the field of Library and Information Science in KP[6]. The Department got its regular status in 1983, approximately after twenty years of its part time establishment. Mr. Mustamir Shah Khattak took over the charge of the Department in 1974, after the departure of Dr. A.S.Qasimi to Saudi Arabia and Mr.Qamar Mirza to Australia. The syllabus of Master of Library Science (M.L.S) also got approved having five subjects of 100 marks each which were implemented in 1983. The services of Mr. Abdul Hameed were hired in1977, but no longer than 1980.Mr. Fida Husain and Mr. Abdul Aziz Saleem joined the Department as visiting tutors in 1980.Mr. Hamid Rehman and Syed Liaqat Ali (the current chairman) were hired in 1984 and 1988 respectively. The Department of Library and Information Science has replaced the old system of BLIS and MLIS and initiated M.A Library and Information Science (Two years' composite program) in 2008-9. Approximately six thousand and five hundred students so far have been graduated from alma mater of University of Peshawar till 2017[7].

Sarhad University of Science and Information Technology (SUIT) have the honor to establish the second Department of Library and Information Science (LIS) in the history of KP. The idea was floated by Dr. Abdul Waheed Mughal, Dean Faculty of Social Science and Arts in 2012, although various other LIS programs were in operation in distance mode. Syed Arif

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[5] Khalid Mahmood, "A Comparison between Needed Competencies of Academic Librarians and LIS Curricula in Pakistan." *The electronic library*, 21(2), (2003): 99-109.

[6] Ameen, Kanwal. "Challenges of Preparing LIS Professionals for Leadership Roles in Pakistan." *Journal of education for library and information science* (2006): 200-17.

[7] Hamid Rahman, (Assistant Professor, University of Peshawar), interviewed by Saeed Ullah Jan, Peshawar, July 2017.

Ali Shah, the chief librarian of the University was given the office of first coordinator of library science education program. The author has the distinction as pioneer Head of Department of this second School of LIS in the province. Prof. Hamid Rahman and Prof. Syed Liaqat Ali (as visiting faculty) have been engaged since the establishment of the Department till date. Mr. Muhammad Ibrahim and Mr. Abid Hussain are also working as part-time lecturers in the Department for the last two years. The Department has the distinction to launch MS-LIS program in the history of KP. Allah Almighty has bestowed this honor and opportunity to the author to initiate this program in 2013. Until now, more than seventy MS-students are enrolled in this program. Currently, the DLIS SUIT offers three different programs namely BA-LIS, MLIS and MS-LIS. The BA-LIS program currently replaced with Associate Degree in Library and Information Science (AD-LIS) with the introduction of BS-LIS program as per HEC guide lines. Dr. Muhammad Ashfaque Ahmad has joined Khushal Khan Khattak University Karak as chairman LIS. The major program (MS-LIS) of this Department is twofold; firstly, students have to pass three courses of nine credit hours in their last semester (course work) instead of research work of six credit hours (research work). The MS-scholars (with research) have to complete thirty credit hours whereas MS-scholars (with course work) have to study thirty-three credit hours for the award of MS-degree.

The third school of Library and Information Science (LIS) opened at Khushal Khan Khattak University Karak, KP. Mr. Rahim Jan, Assistant Professor of the department initiated the idea and was materialized the by Dr. Muhammad Ibrahim Khttak, the then Vice-Chancellor of the University in 2014, but the classes started in 2015. The first MLIS batch consisted of sixteen students. The author was on the roll of the University as visiting faculty till regular appointment in December 03, 2015. At the same time, Dr. Ghalib Khan, Muhammad Hussain, Izhar Muhammad and Muhammad Shahab Khattak joined the Department on regular basis. The Department presently offering three programs:

1-BS-LIS four -year program; introduced for the first time in the history of KP.
2-MLIS two-year program
3-MPhil-LIS two -year program

MPhil-LIS was launched in October2017 and seven students enrolled in its first batch. The Department has the intention to start PhD program in LIS after the fulfillment of HEC criteria. There are more than one hundred and twenty students on the strength of this Department at present.

The course of Library Science as an optional subject at intermediate level was introduced in 1994. A good number of Higher Secondary Schools and

Colleges in Khyber Pakhyunkhwa are offering Library Science at intermediate level but unfortunately, it does not exist at degree level in KP.

Library activities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

After the war of independence in 1857, Muslims of the sub-continent realize the importance of modern education and libraries. It is reported that the first attempt in KP was made by the British Government when they attempted to establish the first ever school, the Edward High School in Peshawar in 1855[8]. Reportedly, a library was also established in that school. Later on, this school was upgraded to college named as Edward College Peshawar in 1900 (Edward College Prospectus, 2014). Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qayum Khan: an influential Pashtuns Chief realized that only modern education and better relation with book could give his nation freedom from ignorance and foreign dominations. Sir George Roose Keppel and Sir Sahibzada selected the present site of the college and its library. The history of Islamia College Library is as old as the history of college and was established in 1913. Abdul Raheem, Kulachvi, an Arabic and Pashto teacher was given the charge of the library and considered as the first librarian of the institution. The library is one of the oldest libraries in Pakistan in general and KP in particular. Before the establishment of University of Peshawar, this library had rich collection sufficient to satisfy the information needs of the readers. Later, its collection was transferred to the Central Library University of Peshawar in 1951. Currently, the library has a collection of more than 92,000 printed volumes whereas the total number of manuscripts in the library is 1259[9] (Zeeshan, 2017). A famous catalogue, named Daratul Maariful Islamia (a list of manuscripts) was also compiled by Adul Raheem Kulachvi.

The central library, University of Peshawar was established in February 1951. It was housed in a small room in the old central building. The Project Director of newly established University of Peshawar transferred the services of Abdu Sabuh Qasimi from University of Punjab to University of Peshawar. Abdus Suboh Qasmi was an employee of Central Library University of Punjab. He was first librarian of University of Peshawar Library. The library was transferred to the existing three storied building in 1957. It has a total area of 10,000 sq. Feet with a capacity of about seventy-

[8] Pervaiz Ahmad, "Library Organizations in the Punjab Province of Pakistan: An Appraisal." *Malaysian Journal of Library & Information Science* ,12(2) (2017): 77-88.

[9] Zeshan Ullah (Assistant Librarian, Islamia College University Peshawar), interviewed by Saeed Ullah Jan. December, 2017.

five thousand volumes (Khan, 1986). United States Information Services and American Friends of the Middle East are the two most important contributors for this library.

Library Associations in KP

The history of library associations dates back to the development of American Library Association (ALA) in 1876 and Library Association (LA) U.K in 1886. The first library association in Asia was Japan Library Association (JLA) established in 1892. In sub-continent the first effort was made in 1916 with the name of Punjab Library Association. Apart from that Pakistan Library Association (PLA),Pakistan Bibliographical Working Group (PBWG), Society for the Promotion and Improvement of Libraries (SPIL),Pakistan Library Automation Group (PAKLAG),Pakistan Library Cooperation Group (LIBCOOP), LIS Solution Pakistan, National Book Foundation (NBF), Pakistan Scientific and Technological Information Centre (PASTIC), Federal Library Association (FLA), West Pakistan Library Association (WPLA), Lyallpur Library Association (LLA), Punjab College Library Association (PCLA),Punjab Library Foundation (PLF), Punjab University Library & Information Science Alumni Association (PULISAA) University of Peshawar Library & Information Alumni association (UPLISAA), Punjab University Library Organization (PULO),Punjab Medical Library Association (PMLA),Punjab School Library Association (PSLA),Karachi University Library Science Alumni Association (KULSAA), Sindh Council of School & College Librarian, Library Promotion Bureau, Karachi (LPB), Sindh Library Association (SLA),Karachi University Professional Librarian's Association (KUPLA), and Peshawar University Campus Librarian Association (PUCLA) are the most prominent library association in the country. There are several other associations in Pakistan about which detail information are not available. These include: Karachi Library Association (KLA) 1949, Library Association of Pakistan (1956), Librarians Forum, Karachi (1971), Pakistan Organization of Young Librarians and Information Scientists Karachi 1976, Pakistan Medical Library Association 1986,Association of Pakistan Library Schools (1987,Pakistan Association of Special Libraries and Information Centre (revived in 1988), Idara-e-Kitabiyat-i-Pakistan, Karachi (1992), ALL Pakistan Public Library Association (APPLA) (revived in 1992) previously known as Public Library Association, Library and Information Advisory Council, Karachi (1996), Sindh College Library Association, Hyderabad, Sindh 1996,Sindh Council of College Librarians 1996,Pakistan Bibliographical Society, Karachi, Pakistan Library Forum, Lahore and Library Writers Bureau, Peshawar(LWB 1988).

Pakistan Library Association (PLA) is the representative class of library professionals in the country. This Association was established in Pakistan under the Societies Registration Act XXI of 1860 vide Joint Stock

Companies Registration No. KAR No. 3143. It concerns all types of libraries: State, National, Public, School, College, University and special library serving persons in Govt. Commerce and Industry, the Arts, the Armed Services, Hospitals and other institutions. The Associations is the chief spokesman for the people of Pakistan in their search for highest quality of library and information services and librarianship. The constitution of PLA stated that librarians of all facets holding degree in Library and Information Science can become the member of the association. The members of the association can be categorized into three groups: Students, regular members and life members. The students have no right to hold any office or to cast vote. The regular members are registered for a period of one year. They have to renew their membership every year. Life member are the permanent members till death. Both regular and life members can cast vote and can act as office bearer. PLA has an executive body at national level called PLA head quarter with local units at every province as PLA provincial chapters.

Pakistan Library Association was the episode-2 of Punjab Library Association. Actually, Punjab Library Association was founded in 1916. After partition, this association could not survive due to shifting of some important office bearers to India. This association was re-constituted in June 06, 1948 at Islamia College Lahore. Later on, this association was merged with Pakistan Library Association in March, 1957 after the merger of Punjab in one Unit. The first ever conference of PLA was inaugurated by Maj: General Sikandar Mirza, the then President of Pakistan at Karachi. The head quarter of the association keep changing, and rotates among the four provinces and capital as per constitution of PLA. The last conference was held in Islamabad in 2016 under the umbrella of PLA Head Quarter (federal branch). The last general PLA election was held in July-August 2017. As per constitution, the PLA head quarter has now shifted to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. PLA started a quarterly journal in 1960 which was ceased in 1969. Recently, two issues: 2013 and 2014 have been published on annual basis by PLA.

Peshawar Universities Campus Librarians Association (PUCLA) is a local representative forum of the librarian's community of grand campus of University of Peshawar. The first meeting of the association was held in the library, National Centre of Excellence in Geology, University of Peshawar on April 21, 2009[10]. The main theme of this association was to provide a legal base to safe guard the rights of the librarians of university of Peshawar.

[10] PUCLA. "Peshawar Universities Campus Librarians Association." Last modified Accessed July 18, 2017. https://www.sites.google.com/site/puclaorg/.

It has played a very pivotal role in the promotion of library culture on the campus. Various conferences and workshops have been organized for the capacity building and uplift of the profession. Reportedly, total strength in terms of membership is about fifty-five.

Pakistan Librarian Welfare Organization (PLWO) was established in 2006 in Lahore by library professionals. It is a non-profit organization working for the uplift of the LIS profession. PLWO is dedicated to transform professionals from librarian to "teacher of teachers". It has hundreds of members all over the country, but the membership rate is low in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. There are about 15-20 PLWO members in KP. Khalid Usman and Niamat Ullah of Bannu and Muhammad Hussain of Khushal Khan Khattak University Karak are the active members of this association in KP. The role of this organization is very positive and there is a great chance of increase in membership in this part of the country. PLWO has started the third research journal in Pakistan in the field of Library & Information Science (LIS) named "International Journal of Information Management Sciences". Chief Minister Directive issued on May 08, 2012 for the announcement of vacant posts of Librarians at College and School level in Punjab Province over the special efforts of PLWO. Pakistan Library Club (PLC) is a nationwide representative forum of working librarians. The basic theme behind the establishment of PLC is to inculcate potential leadership qualities among LIS professionals in Pakistan. This Association is constantly engaged in various activities like seminars, workshops and conferences for the uplift of the profession[11].

Conclusion

Libraries are considered as a sign of prosperity of a region. It is the source which changes the destiny of nations by generating the sense of tolerance, patriotism and devotion among the masses. The history of libraries in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a north-west part of Pakistan is not too old. The Library of Edward High School (1855) (now College) had a library followed by Islamia College Peshawar (1913). The introduction of Library Science education had also a rich history. Department of Library and Information Science, University of Peshawar is the oldest school in the territory imparting LIS education to the community. More than six thousand students had been graduated from this school. Pakistan Library Association and Peshawar Campus Librarian Association are the two more dominant forums of LIS professionals in KP. These associations have arranged dozens of workshops, in-service trainings, seminars, conventions and conferences for the uplift of the LIS profession. The associations and LIS schools are trying their level best to create awareness among the people about book,

[11] PLC. "Pakistan Library Club" Last modified Accessed July 05, 2018.

library and its importance. The library culture in KP has taken momentum in right direction with focus on research in library and Information Science.

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